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ABSTRACT

The unique maritime geography of the Southeast Asian region presents
distinct maritime security threats. Southeast Asia has a vast maritime area and the
ocean plays an important role in the economy of all Southeast Asian countries. The
flow of trade in this region is highly dependent on maritime trade and constitutes one
of the main sources of national income.
Analyses of the prevailing international and regional legal frameworks
governing maritime security threats in Southeast Asia are elaborated in this thesis.
Moreover, the thesis confines the scope of its inquiry specifically to five issues:
piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing, and marine pollution
caused by offshore oil and gas activities. Furthermore, the thesis examines these
maritime security challenges, both from an international and a regional perspective.
This thesis analyses the components of the international and regional legal
frameworks which govern issues of maritime security in Southeast Asia and identify
their weaknesses. It also identifies and addresses the problems which stem from the
inherent gaps and weaknesses in legal instruments at the international and regional
levels, as well as the measures that are required to remedy these gaps and
weaknesses. Furthermore, in circumstances where no binding legal framework is in
place to regulate certain maritime security challenges, the thesis examines existing
non-binding legal and policy frameworks which address the maritime security
challenges.
The thesis concludes that the current international and regional legal
frameworks are inadequate to address the issues of piracy, maritime terrorism, people
smuggling, IUU fishing and marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas
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activities in Southeast Asia. In order to address these maritime security threats in a
comprehensive manner, there is a need for States in the region to cooperate with one
another to formulate (and sometimes reformulate) existing legal frameworks.
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CHAPTER I
1 Introduction

1.1

Introduction
The sea has made a large contribution to the world economy – one which it

continues to make today. In 2014, seaborne trade contributed approximately 9.84
billion tonnes of goods to the global economy, with approximately 38 per cent (3.82
billion tonnes) coming from Asia.1 The sea has played a pivotal role in Southeast
Asia’s economic and political development.2 However, seaborne trade also faces
several challenges and threats. These series of challenges and threats vary according
to time and place and constitute what has been often characterised as maritime
security threats.
The definition of maritime security, as well as what constitute threats to
maritime security has been subject to much academic debate.3 However, despite the
lack of a universally accepted definition of maritime security, governments,
organisations, institutions and scholars have attempted to define maritime security
and its elements. A law of the sea expert from Indonesia, Hasjim Djalal stated that
maritime security includes issues such as: (i) national unity; (ii) piracy and maritime
terrorism; (iii) territorial claims; (iv) major power interests; and (v) foreign
intelligence gathering activities in the exclusive economic zone.4 The International
Maritime Organization (IMO) has drawn a distinction between maritime safety and

1

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport
2015 (United Nations, 2015) 8.
2
J Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’ (2005)
58(3) Naval War College Review 63, 63-64.
3
United Nations General Assembly, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General
(United Nations, 2008) 15-32.
4
H Djalal, Regional Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia (2012).

1

maritime security. IMO stated that ‘maritime safety refers to preventing or
minimizing the occurrence of accidents at sea that may be caused by substandard
ships, unqualified crew or operator error,’ whereas maritime security ‘is related to
protection against unlawful, and deliberate, acts’5. As for maritime threats, it is
commonly identified as activities conducted in maritime spheres including ‘terrorist
attacks; the movement of terrorists, as well as raising of finances for terrorist
activities through shipping activities; the shipping of WMD and related components;
shipping of conventional weapons; drug trafficking; people smuggling; piracy and
armed robbery at sea’6.
In contrast, and owing to its broad nature, the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea7 (LOSC) does not contain any provisions which
provides for a specific definition of maritime security. The LOSC merely identified
some illegal activities which possess elements of maritime security, such as piracy
and illegal fishing. However, there are other types of illegal activities which occur in
maritime areas that are not covered in the LOSC. These illegal activities, such as
armed robbery, usually take place in areas which are rich in natural resources or on
routes which are commonly used for international navigation.
This thesis will examine the challenges/threats facing Southeast Asian States
in relation to maritime security, both from an international and a regional
perspective. The research focuses on the main elements of maritime security in
Southeast Asia. These include piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, illegal,
5

Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford, 2011), 9.
Ibid,10. For other views on the idea of maritime security see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for
the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 3rd ed 2013) chap 12; and Chris Rahman, Concepts of Maritime
Security: A Strategic Perspective on Alternative Visions for Good Order and Security at Sea, with
Policy Implications for New Zealand (Victoria University of Wellington, 2009) 29-46.
7
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC.
6

2

unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and marine pollution caused by offshore
oil and gas activities. These main threats to maritime security have been selected
with deliberation based on the perception of States in the region which would be
discussed later in this chapter.
This thesis also highlights the legal framework - at both the international and
regional levels - that seeks to address the five threats mentioned above. Furthermore,
the possibility of improving the current legal framework and enhancing cooperation
in the region in relation to maritime security will also be discussed.

1.2
1.2.1

Southeast Asia Region
Geographical Description and Profile

Based on geographical criteria, for the purposes of this thesis Southeast Asia consists
of eleven States, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Timor Leste. Except for
Timor Leste, all of these States are members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).8

8

Association of Southeast Asia Nations, see http://www.asean.org/ at 10 October 2015.
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Figure 1: Map of Southeast Asia and Major Seaborne Trade Routes9

The land area of Southeast Asia is approximately the same as South Asia,
about half the combined size of China and the US, and about 58 per cent of the size
of Australia.10 The north-south reach of Southeast Asia covers some 39˚ of latitude,
extending from Myanmar (roughly 28˚N) to Rote Island (about 11˚S), while the
west-east extent of the region covers a distance of some 49˚, spreading from Arakan
(Myanmar) to the easternmost part of Papua (Indonesia). 11 Much of Southeast Asia
is made up of semi enclosed seas (such as South China Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, the
Gulf of Tonkin, the Andaman Sea, and the numerous seas of the Indonesian and
Philippine archipelagos).

9

Map of Southeast Asia, see http://www.cgsgs.com/article/201401044101, at 20 November 2016.
R Hill, Southeast Asia: people, land and economy (Allen & Unwin Australia, 2002),, 2.
11
Ibid, 2.
10
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Country

Area (KM2)

Proportion of region’s total (%)

Brunei

5765

0.13

Cambodia

181035

4.03

Indonesia

1904443

42.37

Laos

236800

5.27

Malaysia

329758

7.34

Myanmar

676552

15.06

Philippines

300000

6.68

Singapore

648

0.01

Thailand

513115

11.43

Vietnam

331114

7.37

Timor Leste

15410

0.35

Total

4494640

100.00

Table 1: Land Area of Southeast Asian States12

Various terms have been used to refer to Southeast Asia. The region has been
known as the ‘Asia of Monsoons’, as the monsoon weather is vital for agriculture in
all States in the region.13 The term ‘further India’ has also been used to refer to some
parts of Southeast Asia. This is because several States in the region lie beyond the
Bay of Bengal, such as Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. The term Southeast Asia
itself gained popularity during the Second World War, and was often used in a
military context to differentiate the region from India, China and the Pacific. In the

12
13

Europa World Year Book (1997).
M Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (Allen & Unwin, 11th ed, 2013) 3.
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past, there have been debates as to which States should be included in Southeast
Asia. For example, before the 1960s, it was questioned whether the Philippines
should be considered to be part of Southeast Asia14. The most recent State which has
sought to join the region (through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
regime) is Timor Leste.
The Second World War represented a watershed in the history of Southeast
Asia. Many scholars, historians, anthropologists and political scientists have focused
their research on this part of the world in relation to the war. It was believed that
Southeast Asia was neither little India nor little China, although it has been
recognised that China and India did influence some Southeast Asian States in the
arts, religion and political theory. However, States like Myanmar, Cambodia, and
Indonesia did use values which could be traced from China and India in these areas
tailored for their own benefit and in accordance with the needs of their countries.
Accordingly, some scholars have proposed that the contribution of China and India
in the cultural, economic and political development of the region has been over
emphasised.15
Several historians, such as Chandler and Steinberg, have argued that the
boundaries of Southeast Asia have been located at different places in the past, which
do not correspond to where those boundaries lie at present.16 Politically, Southeast
Asia has clear land boundaries which stretch from Myanmar to Vietnam,
encompassing the ‘Indian Archipelago’ (now popularly recognised as Indonesia),

14

Ibid, 3.
Ibid, 3-5.
16
Hill above n 10, 1.
15

6

which spreads from the westernmost island, Sumatera, to the easternmost island,
Papua.17
The clarity of the land boundaries between States in Southeast Asia exists due
to uti possidetis juris, a principle of customary international law wherein successor
States (or a newly formed State) should possess the same land territory that their
former colonies possessed before their independence. Therefore, it is clear that States
in Southeast Asia are assured of the ownership of their land territory. However, there
have been disputes over islands such as Sipadan and Ligitan between Indonesia and
Malaysia, but these disputes were settled in 2003.18 The clarity of land boundaries
supports the notion that good fences (i.e. defined boundaries) make good neighbours.
Today, most Southeast Asian nations enjoy robust and largely positive diplomatic
and economic relations with one another. Indeed, the stability of undisputed
territorial boundaries principally account for this.

17

Ibid, 1.
Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipidan, Indonesia v. Malaysia,
Judgment, 17 December 2002, Reports 2002, 625.
18
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No

Year

Parties

Area

Type of
Delimitation/
Provisional
Arrangement

Signed/ Entered
Into Force

1.

1969

Indonesia
Malaysia

Continental Shelf

Straits of Malacca
West South China
Sea East South
China Sea

27 Oct 1969
7 Nov 1969

2.

1970

Indonesia
Malaysia

Territorial Sea

Straits of Malacca

17 March 1970
8 Oct 1971

3.

1971

Indonesia
Australia
(PNG)

Continental Shelf

New
Guinea
Arafura
Sea

18 May 1971
8 Nov 1973

4.

1971

Indonesia
Thailand

Continental Shelf

Strait of
Malacca
Andaman Sea

17 Dec 1971
16 July 1973

5.

1971

Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand

Continental Shelf

Northern Part of the Strait
of Malacca

21 Dec 1971
16 July 1973

6.

1972

Indonesia
Australia

Continental Shelf

Timor
Sea
Arafura
Sea

9 Oct 1972
8 Nov 1973

7.

1973

Indonesia
Australia
(PNG)

Single MultiPurpose Territorial
Sea, Continental
Shelf Fishery
Boundary

South of New Guinea in
the Arafura Sea

12 Feb 1973
26 Nov 1974

8.

1973

Indonesia
Singapore

Territorial Sea

Straits of Malacca

25 May 1973
29 Aug 1974

9.

1974

Indonesia
India

Continental Shelf

Andaman Sea dividing the 8 Aug 1974
shelf between Nicobar Islands 17 Dec 1974
and Sumatra of Indonesia

8

1975

Indonesia
Thailand

Continental Shelf

Andaman Sea

11 Dec 1975
18 Feb 1978

1977

Indonesia
India

Continental Shelf

Andaman Sea

14 Jan 1977
15 Aug 1977

1978

India
Thailand

Continental Shelf

Andaman Sea

22 June 1978
15 Dec 1978

1978

Australia
Papua New
Guinea

Torres Strait

Unknown

1978

Indonesia
India
Thailand
Malaysia
Thailand

Continental Shelf

Andaman Sea

22 June 1978
2 March 1979

Territorial Sea

24 Oct 1979
15 July 1982

1979

Malaysia
Thailand

Continental Shelf

Straits of
Malacca Gulf
of Thailand
Gulf of Thailand

1980

Myanmar
Thailand

Andaman Sea

25 July 1980
12 April 1982

1980

Indonesia
Papua New
Guinea

Pacific Ocean

13 Dec 1980
10 July 1982

1981

Indonesia
Australia

Provisional
Fishery Line

Timor Sea

29 Oct 1981
1 Feb 1982

20.

1986

Myanmar
India

Single MultiPurpose Territorial
Sea, Continental
Shelf Fishery
Boundary

Andaman
Sea Coco
Channel
Bay
of
Bengal

23 Dec 1986
14 Sept 1987

21.

1993

India
Thailand

Continental Shelf

Andaman Sea

27 Oct 1993

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

1979

Multiple
Boundaries
Continental Shelf
Fisheries

Single MultiPurpose Territorial
Sea, Continental
Shelf Fishery
Boundary
Single MultiPurpose
Continental Shelf
EEZ

9

24 Oct 1979
15 Oct 1982

22.

1993

India
Myanmar
Thailand
Malaysia
(Johor)
Singapore

Continental Shelf

Andaman Sea

27 Oct 1993
24 May 1995

23.

1995

Territorial Waters

Johor Straits

07 Aug 1995
07 Aug 1995

24.

1997

Australia
Indonesia

Multiple
Boundaries
Continental Shelf
EEZ

Timor Sea

14 Mar 1997
Not yet in force

25.

1997

Thailand
Vietnam

Single MultiPurpose
Continental Shelf
EEZ

Gulf of Thailand

9 Aug 1997
27 Dec 1997

26.

2000

China
Vietnam

Single MultiPurpose Territorial
Sea Continental
Shelf EEZ

Gulf of Tonkin

25 Dec 2000
30 June 2004

27.

2003

Indonesia
Vietnam

Continental Shelf

South China Sea

26 June 2003
29 May 2007

28.

2009

Indonesia
Singapore

Territorial Sea

Singapore Strait
(Western)

Unknown

29.

2009

Brunei
Malaysia

Single MultiPurpose Territorial
Sea Continental
Shelf EEZ

Off Borneo

Unknown

30

2014

Philippines

EEZ

Mindanao Sea and
Celebes Sea

Unlknown

Indonesia

Table 2: Maritime Boundaries Arrangement in Southeast Asia
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Southeast Asia is significant because of its geography as well as the size of its
population. Geographically, it plays an important role in the geopolitical and geostrategic context of the world. There are several important straits in the region which

19

Tara Davenport, AsianSIL Working Paper 2012/ 7, Southeast Asian Approaches To Maritime
Delimitation, Paper presented at the 3rd NUS-AsianSIL Young Scholars Workshop, NUS Law School
23 February- 24 February 2012.
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are used for the international navigation of goods and energy resources. These
important straits include the Malacca, Singapore, Lombok, Sunda Straits.

Figure 2: Straits of Malacca and Singapore20

In terms of population, Southeast Asia accounts for eight per cent of the
world’s total population.21 Indonesia alone has approximately 250 million people,
making it the fourth most populous nation in the world (after China, India and United
States).22 About 91 million people live in Vietnam, which is twice the population of
Spain and almost three times the population of Canada.

20

Strait of Malacca and Singapore, see http://www.safety4sea.com/malaysia-ensures-smoothshipping-traffic-in-malacca-straits-15423.
21
Osborne, above n 13, 1.
22
World Population, see http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/.
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State

Population
2015
428,539

World Rank

Brunei

Population
2014
423,205

Cambodia

15,408,270

15,677,059

69

Indonesia

252,812,245

255,708,785

4

Laos

6,894,098

7,019,652

106

Malaysia

30,187,896

30,651,176

43

Myanmar

53,718,958

54,164,262

24

Philippines

100,096,496

101,802,706

12

Singapore

5,517,102

5,618,866

114

Thailand

67,222,972

67,400,746

20

Vietnam

92,547,959

93,386,630

14

Timor Leste

1,152,439

1,172,668

157

175

Table 3: Population of Southeast Asian States23

Southeast Asia is considered an economic powerhouse and an attractive area
for investors around the world. The growth of several cities in Southeast Asia,
especially after the Second World War, illustrates the significant developments that
have taken place in the region. A good example is the case of Bangkok, the capital of
Thailand. Over a century ago, Thailand’s total population was approximately six
million. However, in 2010, the population of Bangkok alone was 14 million. This

23

List of Asian Countries by Population 2015, http://statisticstimes.com/population/asian-countriesby-population.php at 19 August 2016
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trend can also be seen in other major cities in the region, such as Jakarta, Phnom
Penh and Ho Chi Minh City.24

1.2.2

Limitation of the Region

Southeast Asia is described as “a subregion of Asia geographically situated east of
the Indian subcontinent, south of China and north of Australia, between the Indian
Ocean (in west) and the Pacific Ocean (in east)”25. The scope of this research is
limited to 11 (eleven) States in Southeast Asia,

namely, Brunei Darussalam,

Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam and Timor Leste. Ten out of eleven States in Southeast Asia are members of
ASEAN.

1.2.3

Complexity of the Region
Southeast Asia is predominantly maritime in character. Every country in the

region, with the exception of Laos, has direct contact with the sea. The region has
two of the world’s largest and most important archipelagic States, Indonesia and
Philippines. The region is highly dependent on maritime trade which constitutes a
primary source of national income across all States. The transport of goods,
including raw materials and finished goods, as well energy resources such as oil, are
transported by ships. Southeast Asian waters are major arteries of world trade, 26 with
about one-third of world trade passing through these waters. The Malacca and
Singapore straits are two critical sealanes in the global oil trade. Therefore, any kind
24

Osborne, above n 13, 1.
About the Southeast Asia Region,
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map_of_southeast_asia.htm at 19 August 2016
26
S Huang, ‘Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?’ (2008) 61
Naval War College Review 87, 87.
25
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of disruption to the flow of trade at sea, such as illegal activities involving ports, the
hijacking of ships, as well as armed robberies, piracy and kidnappings, would have a
dramatic impact on the Southeast Asian economy. Moreover, there are several
important straits in the region that could be vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as well as
the trafficking of drugs, weapons and people.27 This scenario illustrates the
importance of safety at sea for States in Southeast Asia. The increase in legislative
and enforcement coastal State jurisdiction, provided by LOSC, makes this issue
particularly relevant. Therefore, the concept of managing maritime security threats is
significant in the region in order to maintain State sovereignty and sovereign rights.
Due to their importance, Southeast Asian waterways are not only a concern
for States in the region, but also for other States that have an interest in them.
Therefore, it is common for non-Southeast Asian States to offer schemes of
cooperation with Southeast Asian States and regional organisations. However, such
action is not always perceived positively by States in the region, and as a result many
of the initiatives are not legally binding or have been rejected to some extent. It is
important to note that the principle of non-intervention (as mandated by the ASEAN
Charter, not as a state policy) among the Southeast Asian nations could often pose
serious impediments to regional cooperation. This is particularly the case when
States are dealing with sensitive issues such as maritime security, which has the
potential to erode State sovereignty. The principle of non-intervention has been
firmly in place since the inception of the ASEAN regime in 1967,28 and was
favoured by all member States. The fact that all member States (with the exception of

27

Catherine Raymond, ‘The Malacca Straits and the Threat of Maritime Terrorism’ (2005) Power
and Interest Report http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Terrorism-Asia/Raymond-CatherineZara/The-Malacca-Straits-and-the-Threat-of-Maritime-Terrorism .
28
The Founding of ASEAN, see http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/history.
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Thailand) were once under colonial rule means that it is incredibly difficult for such
States to be involved in sensitive agreements with other States, especially where
there is a risk their State sovereignty will be compromised. As a result, some
Southeast Asian States are reluctant or hesitate to cooperate with the outside world.
This hesitancy is an effort to avoid other forms of colonialism.
A good illustration of this problem is the initiative proposed by the United
States (US) - the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)29. This proposal was
not warmly received by States in the region on suspicions that it would allow the US
to conduct anti-terror patrols in the Malacca Strait. Another initiative that did not
receive support was the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI), which suffered from
a lack of trust by Southeast Asian States.30 Interestingly, there are other States
outside the region which do not agree with foreign involvement in Southeast Asia.
China, for instance, rejected the proposal of the Japanese Prime Minister in 1999 to
create a regional coast guard to combat piracy.31
The unwillingness of some Southeast Asian States to cooperate with extraregional powers is unfortunate, as it means regional States are prevented from
gaining information through information sharing, as well as the benefits of
responsive multinational decision-making related to maritime issues. However,
cooperation with regard to maritime security in Southeast Asia can be efficiently
practised with the presence of a neutral, multinational framework.
It is important to note that States in Southeast Asia tend to cooperate among
themselves. This cooperation is articulated in the form of different arrangements and

29

Bradford, above n 2. 75.
David Rosenberg, ‘Dire straits: Competing security priorities in the South China Sea’ (2005) 13
Japan Focus 1, 1-4.
31
Huang, above n 26, 88.
30
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agreements. Indeed, stringent action has been taken by Southeast Asian States to
control their rights over the sea. Such action includes ratifying and implementing
relevant international conventions, improving national legislation and law
enforcement, complying with UN Security Council resolutions and improving
maritime domain awareness, as well as strengthening enforcement capabilities and
encouraging bilateral and multilateral cooperation. However, when viewed in terms
of their effectiveness, such actions have not proved adequate. Despite these
measures, many criminal acts are still occurring in Southeast Asian waters. For
example, in 2003, a sea robbery was committed on a carrier called Alberto, anchored
in Panjang, Indonesia. Robbers attempted to steal the ship’s stores and the crew’s
valuable belongings.32 In the same year, a cargo ship, Trimaggada, was forcibly
stopped by pirates while passing through the Strait of Malacca. The pirates
kidnapped the master, chief officer and chief engineer of the ship. Incidents
involving Sunrise 689 and Srikandi 515 in 2014 are examples of sea-based crimes
perpetrated in the region.33 Further statistic regarding the acts of piracy and armed
robbery against ships which were reported to have been allegedly committed and attempted
in Southeast Asia period 2010-2014 are set out in Table 4.

32

Dana R Dillon, ‘Maritime piracy: Defining the problem’ (2005) 25(1) SAIS Review 155, 159.
ReCAAP, ‘Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships In Asia: Annual Report’ (ReCAAP
Information Sharing Centre, 1st January - 31st December 2014 )62, 32-33.
33
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Locations
Indonesia
Malacca Straits
Malaysia
Myanmar (Burma)
Philippines
Singapore Straits
Thailand
Vietnam

2010
40
2
18
0
5
3
2
12

2011
46
1
16
1
5
11
0
8

2012
81
2
12
0
3
6
0
4

2013
106
1
9
0
3
9
0
9

2014
100
1
21
0
6
8
2
7

Table 4: Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which were reported to have
been Allegedly Committed and Attempted in Southeast Asia34

Despite measures undertaken by States with respect to maritime security, the
nature of these arrangements has been quite general and limited in its scope and
goals. Therefore, in the absence of legally binding tools to address maritime security
issues, incidents such as those described above will continue to take place. Indeed,
more persuasive talks among the States in the region are urgently needed, especially
within the auspices of ASEAN.

1.2.4

Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia
The 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea

noted that the definition of maritime security is yet to be agreed. However, the report
adopted a broad perspective when dealing with maritime security threats.
Furthermore, the UN Secretary General elaborated that “maritime security involves
protection from direct threats to the territorial integrity of a State, such as an armed
attack from a military vessel”.

35

The Report identified seven specific threats to

maritime security: piracy and armed robbery against ships,36 terrorists acts involving

34

ICC-IMB, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual report’ (International Maritime
Bureau, 1 January - 31 December 2014) 7.
35
Assembly, above n 3, para 39.
36
Ibid, para 54.
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shipping, offshore installations, and other maritime interests,37 illicit trafficking in
arms and weapons of mass destruction,38 illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances,39 smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea,40 illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing,41 and finally, intentional and unlawful damage to
the marine environment.42 This report encompassed the apprehension of many
related parties such as governments, the shipping industry, operators, military,
researchers and analysts as the list covers a large scope of maritime problems.
The Southeast Asian States which participated in the Maritime Security
Desktop Exercise (MSDE) 2, 3 and 4 held in 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively,
revealed that piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling and IUU fishing were
deemed to be the primary maritime security threats in Southeast Asia.
The MSDE aims to strengthen cooperation and coordination among the
participating countries in combating crimes at sea and dealing with other maritme
challenges in the region. The exercise is organized by the Badan Koordinasi
Keamanan Laut (Bakamla) Indonesia in cooperation with Australian Border Force.
States outside the Southeast Asian region such as Australia, Sri Lanka, China, Japan,
Maldives, Pakistan, also participate in the exercise.
As illustrated in Table 5, almost all the States in the region had a similar
threat perception within the three year period (2011-2013).

43

Marine pollution

caused by offshore oil and gas activity also forms a significant challenge to maritime
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Ibid, para 63.
Ibid, para 72.
39
Ibid, para 82
40
Ibid, para 89.
41
Ibid, para 98.
42
Ibid, para 107.
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The researcher attended the 3rd and 4th Maritime Security Desktop Exercise which was held in
Jakarta (2012) and Bali (2013).
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security in the region, as raised by Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore and
Thailand in MSDE 2013. Although marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas
activity may not be a primary maritime security threat, the growing significance of
oil and gas in Southeast Asia to the world economy means that it ranks as one of the
recognised potential maritime problems in the region.

Piracy

Maritime

IUU Fishing

People

Terrorism

Oil and Gas

Smuggling

Years

2011

2012

2013

2011

2012

2013

2011

2012

2013

2011

Brunei

-

ü

X

-

ü

ü

-

X

ü

-

Cambodia

-

X

X

-

ü

X

-

ü

X

Indonesia

ü

X

ü

ü

X

X

ü

ü

Laos

-

X

X

-

X

X

-

Malaysia

ü

ü

X

X

X

X

Myanmar

-

X

-

-

ü

Philippines

ü

ü

ü

ü

Singapore

-

ü

ü

Thailand

X

ü

Vietnam

ü

Timor Leste

ü

2012

2013

2011

2012

2013

ü

ü

-

X

ü

-

ü

X

-

X

X

ü

ü

ü

ü

X

X

ü

X

X

-

X

X

-

X

X

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

X

X

X

-

-

X

-

-

X

-

-

X

-

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

X

X

X

X

-

ü

X

-

X

X

-

ü

X

-

X

ü

X

X

ü

ü

X

ü

X

ü

ü

ü

X

X

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

X

ü

ü

X

ü

ü

ü

X

X

X

X

-

ü

X

-

ü

ü

-

ü

ü

-

X

X

-

Darussalam

Legend: X = Not mentioned, ü = Mentioned, and - = did not attend the MSDE.

Table 5: Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia 2011-201344
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Maritime Security Desktop Exercise (2011-2013) based on Country Presentations.
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1.3

Purpose, Scope and Limitation

This thesis provides analyses of the prevailing legal framework at both international
and regional levels governing maritime security threats in Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, non-binding frameworks (at regional level) are also analysed in the
absence of legally binding frameworks for some of the maritime security threats.
Whilst the thesis recognises that there are different types of maritime security threats
in Southeast Asia, this thesis confines the scope of its inquiry specifically to five
issues: piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing, and marine
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities.
In order to achieve the purpose, this thesis will address the following: firstly,
it will discuss different approaches to maritime security and provide an overview of
the maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia. Secondly, the international and
regional frameworks governing maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia will
be canvassed. To this end, the thesis identifies and discusses those rules which exist
at both the international and regional level to regulate the five central threats to
maritime security in the region. Furthermore, these legal frameworks are analysed to
ascertain their weaknesses. Finally, the possibility of improving the current legal
framework and enhancing cooperation in the Southeast Asia region in relation to
maritime security will also be discussed.
The scope of ‘maritime security’ adopted by this thesis reflects the approach
taken by the 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea
noted above. Like the UN Secretary General’s Report, which elaborated numerous
maritime security threats, this thesis adopts an approach to maritime security based
on regional States’ maritime security threat priorities. As mentioned earlier, the
20

MSDE meetings established the maritime security threat perceptions of every
participating State. Those list of threats are taken into account in this thesis and
analysed separately in different chapters.

1.4

Statement of the Problem

As discussed earlier, Southeast Asia covers a huge maritime area. There are two
archipelagic States in the region (Indonesia and Philippines) and several straits used
for international navigation (Malacca and Singapore Straits). In the past decade, there
have been a number of maritime security incidents in the region such as sea piracy
against Trimaggada and incidents involving Sunrise 689. Therefore, understanding
the different kinds of threats to maritime security in Southeast Asia and taking
appropriate measures to combat these threats are important issues to consider.
There are three main arguments that this research seeks to highlight:
1. The Southeast Asia region is prone to maritime security challenges
because of its complex maritime nature. Thus the question to be
addressed is: in what way are maritime security challenges more
difficult to address in Southeast Asia?
2. Addressing the maritime security challenges require regional
cooperation. Thus, what specific types of cooperation would be more
appropriate, orhave better chances of success for Southeast Asia?
3. The current legal framework is inadequate to address the maritime
security challenges in Southeast Asia.

21

This thesis analyses the components of the international and regional legal
frameworks which govern issues of maritime security in Southeast Asia and identify
their weaknesses. This thesis will identify and address the problems which stem from
the inherent gaps and weaknesses in legal instruments at the international and
regional level, as well as the measures that are required to remedy these gaps and
weaknesses. Furthermore, in circumstances where no binding legal framework is in
place to regulate certain maritime security challenges, the thesis examines existing
non-binding legal and policy frameworks which address the maritime security
challenge.

1.5

Thesis Statement

The current international and regional legal frameworks are not adequate to address
the issues of piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing and marine
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities in Southeast Asia. In order to
address these maritime security threats in a comprehensive manner, there is a need
for States in the region to cooperate with one another to formulate (and sometimes
reformulate) existing legal frameworks.

1.6

Methodology

In analysing the international and regional legal frameworks governing maritime
security threats in Southeast Asia, the researcher used the inductive strategy of
writing - that is, explaining the problem from a broader or general perspective, then
narrowing down to the main idea that the researcher would like to point out.

22

In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the problem, the
researcher also visited several relevant institutions in Southeast Asia. The relevant
institutions include universities, government institutions, and non-governmental
organisations. Furthermore, the researcher also participated in seminars, dialogues,
exhibitions and consultations that proved useful in gaining additional information for
the thesis.
This thesis also follows a particular framework to comprehensively address
five maritime security threats in Southeast Asia which are elaborated in Chapter 3 to
7. First it starts with the explanation of the concept of the threat, and then it
elaborates the nature of the problem in Southeast Asia. Next, the chapter discusses
the overview of the international legal frameworks regulating the threat. The chapter
then narrows down its discussion to examine the regional legal frameworks
governing the threat in the region. Furthermore, if the international and regional legal
frameworks are lacking or absent, the chapter also discusses other non-legally
binding measures which addresses the problem. Before concluding the discussion,
the chapter highlights and analysis the gaps in the international and regional
frameworks and provides possible ways these frameworks could be improved.

1.7

Significance of the Research

This research fills a gap in the academic literature on the issue of maritime security
in Southeast Asia. There is a clear dearth of academic studies which analyse, from a
comprehensive and interrelated perspective, the five maritime security threats
(piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing and marine pollution
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caused by offshore oil and gas activities) in Southeast Asia from international and
regional legal perspectives.
In addition, this thesis also discusses the possibility of improving the current
legal framework and enhancing cooperation in the Southeast Asia region. Regional
cooperation will be vital in implementing measures to combat maritime security
threats.

1.8

Thesis Structure
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter one, the Introduction, discusses

the geographical area of Southeast Asia, the complexity of the region and the
primary maritime security threats facing Southeast Asia. The chapter outlines the
purpose, scope, limitations and the central problem that the thesis seeks to
investigate. It also provides the statement of thesis, explains the methodology and
significance of the research, and the structure of the thesis.
Chapter Two, Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, discusses the concept of
security and the different approaches towards maritime security, with the main aim
of highlighting different views on the concept of maritime security. This chapter
discusses the regional architecture and maritime complexity in Southeast Asia. It also
provides an overview of maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia.
Chapter Three, Maritime Piracy on Southeast Asian Waters, discusses the
concept of piracy and its legal history, the nature of piracy in the Southeast Asian
region and the possible measures that could be adopted to combat piracy. The debate
over which acts constitute piracy as opposed to armed robbery will also be discussed.
Furthermore, this chapter highlights international as well as regional legal
24

frameworks that are designed to address this issue, as well as possible ways these
frameworks could be improved.
Chapter Four, Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia, discusses maritime
terrorism as a maritime security threat. This chapter analyses the nature of maritime
terrorism in Southeast Asia, and examines the relevant international and regional
legal frameworks, as well as non-binding regional efforts to combat maritime
terrorism in Southeast Asia. In addition, this chapter identifies and analyses the gaps
in the international and regional frameworks and provides recommendations how
these frameworks could be improved.
Chapter Five, People Smuggling in Southeast Asia, describes the status and
causes of people smuggling in Southeast Asia. This chapter highlights the concept
and regional context of people smuggling in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the
chapter analyses both the binding international legal frameworks and non-binding
regional framework designed to combat people smuggling in Southeast Asia along
with suggestions to improve the current framework.
Chapter Six, Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing in Southeast Asia,
discusses concept and challenges in combating IUU fishing in Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, this chapter discusses the nature of IUU fishing in the region. This
chapter examines the legal framework at both the international and regional levels
that address the problem of IUU fishing in the region as well as ways to further
strengthen and improve the regime in the future.
Chapter Seven, Marine Pollution caused by Offshore Oil and Gas Activities
in Southeast Asia, discusses marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas
activities as a maritime security threat as well as the nature of the problem in
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Southeast Asia region. This chapter analyses the international legal framework
regulating marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. Furthermore,
regional non-binding framework addressing the issue in region is also analysed. This
chapter also highlights several measures that could be taken to improve the current
framework.
Chapter Eight, Prospects for Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: A Proposal
for Change, summarises the five maritime security threats in Southeast Asia
discussed in Chapters three to seven. This chapter highlights maritime security
partnerships as a proposed solution to address maritime security threats.
Furthermore, this chapter discusses ways in which States in the region could
cooperate to solve maritime security issues. Finally, the chapter discusses the
possibility of improving the prevailing framework and suggests that regional
cooperation is the preferred solution to combat maritime security threats in Southeast
Asian region.
.
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CHAPTER II
2 Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

2.1

Introduction

There is no universally accepted definition of maritime security. The variance in
definitions, approaches and perceptions of maritime security are often accounted for
by differences in interests, political or ideological perspectives.1

Geoffrey Till

argues that there are different definitions of maritime security due to the vast scope
of the term.2
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)3 which was
adopted and signed in 1982 and came into force in 1994 gave hope to the world that
it could be used as a tool in resolving maritime-related problems. However, the
LOSC has not given a clear definition of the term ‘maritime security’. It merely
provided a broad understanding of security in general. There are several articles in
LOSC that explain and regulate security. These provisions address wide-ranging
issues such as threats caused by military activities (weapon exercises, use of force,
military aircraft activities, etc.) and environmental issues and illegal fishing.4
However, these provisions do not define maritime security nor does the Convention
classify them strictly as maritime security threats.

1

Chris Rahman, Concepts of Maritime Security: A Strategic Perspective on Alternative Visions for
Good Order and Security at Sea, with Policy Implications for New Zealand (Victoria University of
Wellington, 2009) 29.
2
Geoffrey Till, ‘Developments in Maritime Security’ in Peter Cozens (ed), New Zealand’s Maritime
Environment and Security, (Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Victoria University of
Wellington, 1996), 5.
3
United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS
3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC.
4
Article 19, LOSC.
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There are different approaches to maritime security. The following
approaches will be discussed in this chapter: a. defence perspective on maritime
security; b. maritime security threats; c. maritime safety and maritime security; d.
non-traditional approach; and e. geographical and national interest approach. There
are numerous scholarly research and academic publications which expound the
varieties of approaches towards maritime security. This chapter will highlight the
views of some of these scholars, including Natalie Klein, Chris Rahman, Geoffrey
Till and Sam Bateman.
This chapter will discuss several regional organisations which play a
significant role in addressing regional issues including maritime security. The
chapter identifies critical factors unique to the region which illustrate the maritime
complexity of Southeast Asia. Lastly, the chapter provides an overview of maritime
security challenges in Southeast Asia that would be discussed in detail in the
succeeding chapters.

2.2

Concept of Security

Maritime is derived from the Latin word “Mare” which means sea, the term is used
in connection to activity connected with the sea, especially in relation to seafaring
commercial or military activity. The concept of maritime security can be understood
through its intricate association with general concepts of security, such as collective
security.
The concept of collective security rejects traditional balance of power
considerations and alliances aimed against identifiable threats; whilst acknowledging
the role of force in world affairs. Collective security supports the existence of a
28

global body such as the UN in order to resist any aggression against the political
status quo.5 This concept underpins the US Navy’s global maritime partnership
initiative,6 the US national strategy for maritime security7 and also its 2007 maritime
strategy.8 However, in reality, collective security is not truthfully implemented but
rather utilised more as technical jargon and as a mere slogan. In line with this view,
Gwyn Prins believes that the presence of an ‘ocean guard’ and a UN standing naval
force would be measures to implement the real concept of collective security at sea.9
The ocean guard would operate under the control of an international recognised
agency and attempts to resolve maritime issues related to its task.10
While there are different security concepts, the unique nature of maritime
security implies that not every security concept will be suitable or could be easily
implemented alongside maritime security. Another security concept that is applied in
the maritime realm is comprehensive security. The concept of comprehensive
security is premised on inclusivity and not the application of security in strict sense.
Whilst one might think that this concept might work in Southeast Asia because of the
enclosed and semi-enclosed nature of the seas in the region; however, the imaginary
lines that separate a nation’s jurisdiction render it difficult for States to surrender
their maritime jurisdiction. Nor is it possible to ask fish and other marine resources to

5

Inis L Claude, Swords into plowshares: the problems and progress of international organization
(University of London Press, 1965), 234-238.
6
Admiral Mike Mullen, USN, remarks delivered to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Pearl
Harbor, HI, 31 October 2006, 3.
7
White House, ‘The national strategy for maritime security’, September 2005. 2.
8
US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard, ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower’ (2007) 3 Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 5. Also read the latest version in
US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard, ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower’ (2015).
9
Gwyn Prins, ‘Maritime Security and Common Security’ in Andrew Mack (ed), A Peaceful Ocean?
Maritime Security in the Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era (Allen & Unwin, 1993), 38-39.
10
Rahman, above n 1, 42.
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remain within a particular territory or to limit terrorist and other criminal actors to
conduct their actions in one particular place.11
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (CSCAP)12
Memorandum (Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation)13 clearly states that in
the Asia Pacific region, the concept of comprehensive security is adopted. It covers
the ‘maritime confidence and security building and preventive diplomacy measures
identified by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and reflect the strong support in the
region for UNCLOS’14. Also, ‘the Guidelines are consistent with UNCLOS and have
been influenced by State practice with regard to developments in oceans
management and international law since UNCLOS was opened for signature’15. The
series of maritime issues including ocean management are interrelated, and therefore
should be considered as one package. In order to have a comprehensive outcome,
there should be a multidisciplinary approach which would involve the cooperation
and coordination of every related body involving measures such as “accession to and
cooperation under LOSC, conflict prevention at sea, protection and maintenance of
sea lines of communication (SLOC), the sharing of maritime surveillance
information, naval cooperation, search and rescue, maritime safety, management of
natural marine disasters (including humanitarian assistance), law and order at sea,
protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine resources, marine

11

Martin Murphy, ‘Piracy and UNCLOS: Does international law help regional states combat piracy?’
in Peter Lehr (ed), Violence at sea (2007), 155-182; and Martin N Murphy, ‘The blue, green, and
brown: Insurgency and counter-insurgency on the water’ (2007) 28(1) Contemporary Security Policy,
73-74.
12
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, see http://www.cscap.org/.
CSCAP is a forum for dialogue on security matters in the Asia Pacific. It is a second track or nongovernmental process that discusses issues related to political and security challenges in the region.
13
CSCAP, Memorandum 4, Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation, December 1997.
14
Ibid
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scientific research, technical cooperation and capacity building and training
education.”16
There are different opinions on the feasibility of the CSCAP Memorandum as
it is very broad in nature and assumed to include all interested bodies in activities.
Jim Rolfe raised a critique that the Memorandum is not quite convincing when it
comes to the argument of linking all the above factors.17 It is true that the seas are
connected to one another and transnational in nature, but, it is somehow impossible
to link all aspects of maritime security to different regions, for example treatment in
Bay of Bengal would be different to that of West Java.
If it is not possible to apply at a regional level, is it possible for the concept to
be implemented at national the level? The answer to this question is different
depending on the unique maritime security concerns of every State. In the case of
Australia, which adopted a comprehensive Oceans Policy which also addresses
maritime security issues, because the lead agency was the Department of
Environment, most of its contents were environmental in nature and merely cursorily
addressing maritime security 18. The case of New Zealand exhibits the same concern.
New Zealand has an oceans governance approach, but similar to Australia, placing
an enormous emphasis on marine environmental management and not on security
issues. Moreover, a report produced by a ministerial group composed of six ad hoc
members did not represent the whole nation’s efforts in improving maritime
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security.19 ‘New Zealanders recognize the sea as a global entity, and want their
Oceans Policy to lead the world’.20 Furthermore they demanded ‘better integration of
the range of activities and processes currently associated with managing their
involvement with the marine environment’21. Thus compliance and enforcement are
regarded as important issues that need to be realised.
The other security approach towards maritime security is cooperative
maritime security, which proposes to replace existing regional security structures
with new multilateral ones. This approach requires like-minded states to converge on
collective need to assure access to the maritime commons and adopts a collaborative
approach to preserve safety and security.
This raises a question of the imperative for inclusive cooperation that
involves many States in addressing the issue of maritime security. In ASEAN, for
instance, where non-intervention is a cornerstone principle and sensitivity on issues
concerning sovereignty are still held sacrosanct, countries like Indonesia and
Malaysia tend to avoid multilateral arrangements and are still more comfortable
addressing the issue domestically.22 Southeast Asia, a region with large maritime
areas, is one of those regions that does not prefer to have multilateral arrangements to
address law of the sea issues.23 The case of the Strait of Malacca illustrates this view,
where Indonesia and Malaysia show more inclination to solve their own problems
and avoid foreign involvement in the region. Thus, given the prevailing cultural

19

Ministerial Advisory Committee on Ocean Policy, ‘Healthy Sea: Healthy Society. Towards an
Ocean Policy for New Zealand’ (30 September 2001).
20
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mind-set of the States comprising Southeast Asia, the chance of inclusive
cooperation between States in this area is relatively small.
In contrast, in the South Pacific there are better prospects for cooperative
maritime security. The enforcement of the Niue Treaty24 has become the basis of
maritime security cooperation. Australian-donated Pacific patrol boats can also lead
cooperation amongst Southwest Pacific countries which is also in line with Gwyn
Prins’ proposal on ocean guards.25 However, in the Asia-Pacific region, cooperative
maritime security would be harder to see realised as States have different maritime
interests which would deter this idea.
The United States has tried to apply this approach by pursuing a maritime
strategy called A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in which one of its
main goals was to improve maritime security cooperation.26 However, this effort is
principally to safeguard their position economically and maritime superiority
globally rather than their intention to apply the concept of cooperative maritime
security itself 27.
The ASEAN-United States relationship has expanded dramatically since
formal relations began in 1977. The United States acceded to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2009. There are numerous commonalities of
interest. Both are combating terrorism and have taken initiatives to strengthen
cooperative anti-terrorism measures, including intelligence sharing, joint surveillance
and police training. The ASEAN-U.S. strategic partnership plays a vital role in
24

Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in South Pacific
Region, opened for signature 9 July 1992, (entered into force 20 May 1993). Hereinafter referred to as
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tackling transnational challenges. ASEAN and the United States work together to
address challenging global issues with maritime elements, such as terrorism and
violent extremism, trafficking in persons, and IUU fishing.28

2.3
2.3.1

Approaches towards Maritime Security
Defining the Term

The first approach is adopted by US Naval Operation Concept which looks at
maritime security from a defence perspective, which guarantees navigational
freedom and stability in the flow of commerce, in addition to the protection of ocean
resources.29

Furthermore, the concept also covers issues such as securing “the

maritime domain from nation-state threats, terrorism, drugs trafficking and other
forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction and illegal seaborne
immigration”. 30
In the US, the term maritime security operation is popular in describing
maritime enforcement operations particularly in connection with their efforts in
combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.31 In line
with this notion and the focus on counter-terrorism recognized in the US National
Strategy for Maritime Security, US maritime strategy recognises the importance of
maritime security:
The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating
threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug
trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these irregular and
1 28 Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/11/21/joint-statement-asean-us-strategic-partnership, at 20 November 2016.
29
Chief of Naval Operation-Commandant of the Marine Corps, ‘Naval Operations Concept 2006’
<http//www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/docs/Naval_Operations_Concept_2006.pdf>.
30
Ibid.
31
US Navy and US Marine Corps, ‘Naval Operations Concept 2006’ (2006) , 14; and The U.S. Coast
Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, 19 January 2007, 11-12.
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transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and
secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.32
Maritime security is also defined by the Royal Navy as ‘actions performed by
military units in partnership with other government departments, agencies and
international partners in the maritime environment to counter illegal activity and
support freedom of the seas, in order to protect national and international interests’. 33
The private sector such as operators in the shipping industry also tried to
define maritime security as issues related to the marine transport system which
includes the assurance that shipping of cargo is free from criminal activity.
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Likewise, shipping industries do not differentiate the kinds of criminal activities such
as piracy, armed robbery and terrorism but regards that maritime security includes
the avoidance of maritime violence in general.35 In line with this approach, Hawkes
explained that maritime security aims to protect against seizure, sabotage, piracy,
pilferage, annoyance or surprise. Owners, operators and administrators of vessels,
port facilities, offshore installations, and other marine organisations take steps in
order to assure themselves that they are safe from these problems.36
2.3.2

Threats of Maritime Security

This approach focuses on the discussion of the different threats to maritime security
and avoids defining the term as well as discussing the concept of maritime security.
This approach posits that by exposing what constitutes maritime security threats is
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the best way of understanding maritime security. According to Sadurska, a threat is
“an act that is designed to create a psychological condition in the target of
apprehension, anxiety and eventually fear, which will erode the target’s resistance to
change or will pressure it towards preserving the status quo.” 37
The 2008 Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea by the UN Secretary
General recognises terrorist movement, terrorist attacks using ships as well as piracy,
arms robbery, trafficking narcotics and drugs, illegal fishing and environmental
issues as threats to maritime security. As noted in Chapter 1, the UN Secretary
General in the Report acknowledged that there is no agreed definition explaining
maritime security that can be accepted universally. Furthermore, the report also
elaborated different threats to maritime security. All of these threats affect States
directly or indirectly. Some threats also affect private victims, including commercial
entities. This Report reflected the apprehension of many related parties such as
government, shipping industry, operators, military, researchers and analysts as it
covers a large scope of maritime problems.

In line with this approach, Klein

suggested that understanding the ‘commonly perceived’ threats of maritime security,
in addition to knowing the measures that have been or should be done to address
these threats is the ideal way to recognise maritime security. With this regard, Klein
defined maritime security as “the protection of a state’s land and maritime territory,
infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful acts
occurring at sea.” 38 Harmful acts here refer to the specific threat to maritime security
mentioned in the UNGA Report 2008. Similar to this definition, a Dalhousie

37
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University study defined maritime security as a process of maintaining stability in
the international system on, over, under and from the sea.39
2.3.3

Maritime Safety and Maritime Security

There are also other organisations that do not follow the two abovementioned
approaches. For instance, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)40 since
1980, understands maritime security from the perspective of its Maritime Safety
Committee which explains and elaborates the concept.41 The Committee
differentiates between maritime safety and maritime security. Maritime safety refers
to the act of preventing accidents which normally occur due to substandard ships,
unqualified crew or operator errors.42 In contrast, maritime security is an action of
protection against unlawful acts. 43 Despite differentiating the two terms, the IMO
only has differentiated expressions for ‘security’ and ‘safety’ in other international
languages such as French (proteccion maritime) and Spanish (surete maritime) since
the amendment of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS
Convention)44 Chapter XI.45
2.3.4

Non-traditional Approach

There are alternative approaches in looking at the issue of maritime security from a
non-traditional perspective. The traditional approach to maritime security is statist in
orientation and as such mainly involves States as the main actors and units of
analysis. On the other hand, the non-traditional approach views maritime security in
39
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a non-strategic way, which is arbitrary and non-exclusive.46 The explanations are
sometimes interrelated, overlap and at certain times explains the same problem but
exploring it from a different viewpoint. Those alternative perspectives which were
highlighted by Rahman are: security of the sea itself, ocean governance, maritime
order protection, military activities at sea, and security regulation of the maritime
transportation system 47.
The first approach, that is the security of the sea itself, believes that the
objective of maritime politics should be the ‘ocean’, which needs to be secured not
because it impacts on human existence or development or security, but for its own
sake.48 The main idea of this approach is to protect marine resources (living and nonliving) and also the marine environment. The centre of attention here is the ocean
itself and not the implication of marine environmental security towards people and
their political relationships.
Another alternative approach to maritime security is the ocean governance
approach which posits that the international political and legal framework play a big
role in managing the ocean.49 Furthermore, LOSC becomes the core idea in this
approach which should be upheld and implemented in order to form a stable
maritime regime.50 This approach also stresses that governments should create the
rules and regulations to govern the ocean and also implement them. The rules and
regulations would act as the solution to conflicts and problems occurring at sea and
46
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thus become a tool to govern the ocean. As there is no government which can lead
the whole world, it is upon the States to decide and negotiate on the set of rules that
can enhance trust and stability in a particular area, in this case, the ocean. However,
although the LOSC acts as the central solution in this approach it does not mean that
it will be applicable at all times.
The regulations in the LOSC which carried a huge impact on coastal State
jurisdiction may affect their relationship with other States in maritime areas rich in
natural resources in the exclusive economic zone, deep sea bed and also the high
seas. Furthermore, the growing trend of illegal activities that occur in several regions
of the world such as the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, the Caribbean, Indian
Ocean and Southeast Asia might draw the attention and consideration of States in
those regions. Therefore, there is a need for tighter regulations both in addressing this
issue at the national and international levels.
The third alternative approach is maritime border protection. This approach
argues that in order to have effective ocean governance, efforts taken should not be
limited to multilateral frameworks (regional and international levels) but should also
include the role of coastal States in maintaining their maritime jurisdiction.51 As the
LOSC has thickened the jurisdiction of coastal States, especially those related to the
exploration and exploitation of the EEZ, coastal States have to be aware of their
sovereignty and their sovereign rights at sea.

Furthermore, the concept of

archipelagic States, which is relevant to countries such as Indonesia and the
Philippines, will also have impact on their security as they need to exercise control
over ships passing through their archipelagic waters. This approach is simple and
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uncontroversial as it includes the measures of States in upholding their sovereignty,
assurance of their sovereign rights at sea, as well as implementation of their interests
in their maritime zones. However, solving a maritime problem is not an easy task for
a State to resolve. Cooperation with other countries through bilateral, regional and
multilateral negotiations is still needed in order to effectively protect their
sovereignty and application of sovereign rights at sea.
The next alternative approach explained by Rahman is military activities at
sea. This approach explains maritime security in relation to common security which
highlights the concept of arms control. Up until now discussions regarding the
limitation of arms are still taking place, and yet there is not an agreed policy on
restriction of arms of a State. The Independent World Commission on the Ocean
tried to promote reduction of arms, demilitarisation, and elimination of sea-based
nuclear weapons;52 however, this effort is not in line with several navies which still
do not have restrictions to arms, particularly the leading naval powers.
Due to the difficulties associated with structural arms control, there has been
a change in focus. Naval/maritime confidence building measures CBMs) instead
became the solution, which focus on three categories: declaratory (statement of intent
or

general

principles),

observation/inspection

transparency

measures)

and

(communication,
constraint

(risk

notification

and

reduction

and

exclusive/separation measures, and constraints on personal, equipment and
activities). 53
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The last non-traditional approach towards maritime security is the security
regulation of the maritime transportation system. 9/11 changed the approach towards
maritime security. The international maritime system before 9/11 hardly attracted
serious security concerns with only a few regulations produced prior to 9/11, which
included the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA Convention)54 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf.55 The
IMO, which plays a big role in maintaining and governing shipping and maritime
safety of the member States surprisingly, had no particular desk to deal with security
issues. In fact, the Maritime Safety Committee within IMO plays an important role in
dealing with navigational safety and also in the making of numerous regulations for
safety at sea.56 One of its products was the SOLAS Convention of 1974.
9/11 marked a global turning point in perception towards security. There was
widespread concern that all forms of transportation could be targeted or utilised to
launch a terrorist attack. This scenario was most worrisome in the maritime
transportation context which did not have any comprehensive regulation.57 The
United States, which was the main victim of 9/11, tried to bring the issue of terrorism
to the attention of the IMO in order to initiate a binding regulation that could prevent
terrorist attacks at sea. Since then, the IMO has produced several regulations as
measures to combat maritime terrorism and other maritime crimes. Those regulations
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include the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)58 which
came into force in 2004, provision for satellite-based Long Range Identification and
Tracking (LRIT) of SOLAS-regulated ships and the establishment of new protocols
to the SUA Convention.
Because of its nature, the IMO would continue to be the hub that could
connect many nations in order to deal and tackle with maritime security issues. The
IMO is seen as an organisation whose regulations will be accepted by major
countries and has a bigger bargaining power especially for those nations who are not
allies of the United States. Furthermore, the IMO is the largest regulatory body that
is in charge of governing regulations over maritime issues. However, the IMO as an
organisation has limited authority, States still need to take the lead in resolving their
own issues including issues in respect of the maritime transportation system. With
regard to this approach, 9/11 has played a vital role in changing the world
perspective towards security regulations, especially for shipping, ports, offshore
installations and also the existing international system for seaborne trade and
somehow altered the new security regime.59
2.3.5

Geographical and National Interest Approach

The national interests and geography of States may also impact the definition of
maritime security. It is not easy to get an acceptable definition of maritime security
in a particular region as States often do not share a common view of what constitutes
maritime security. Some States considers traditional threats to maritime security in
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the definition while others would prefer not to classify them as such.60
Environmental issues and illegal fishing are non-traditional threats to maritime
security; whereas military threats, protection of national interests and sovereignty at
sea constitute traditional threats. Traditional threats are classified exclusively as
national matters.61
Another illustration of this approach is looking at the reaction and framework
of States with large maritime areas. Indonesia and the Philippines for instance, as
archipelagic States that have large jurisdiction over maritime areas would likely
support the broader definition of maritime security. These States would consider the
inclusion of issues such as environmental protection and illegal fishing. A country
like China might also support this approach as it is in line with their maritime
concept of a ‘harmonious ocean’.62 This concept boosts their maritime security in
terms of naval strength and security responses that include non-traditional threats
such as environmental protection and disaster relief.63 In contrast, States that do not
have control over vast maritime areas and have limited access to the sea would
possibly agree with the notion of exclusion of non-traditional threats in the definition
of maritime security.64 , Small countries such as Singapore, which exercises
jurisdiction over a very limited maritime area, would most likely share the same
position. The inclusion of non-traditional threats in the definition would compel them
to enact additional maritime security regulations, which might not be in their national
interest priorities.
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However, there is a common concern among the States in the region that
maritime security includes issues of security and safety of shipping and seaborne
trade. In addition, countering piracy and maritime terrorism, search and rescue
(SAR) as well as other marine safety services are also common issues of concern
across States. Despite these commonality of concerns, there is still much hesitation
among regional States to include security concerns in regional agreements, for
example in the Cooperative Mechanism for Safety and Environmental Protection in
the Malacca and Singapore Straits.65 The hesitation in this case was due to the
sovereignty concerns of Indonesia and Malaysia.

For the purpose of this thesis, maritime security is defined as the combination
of preventive and responsive measures to protect the maritime domain against threats
and intentional unlawful acts.
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, this thesis adopts the approach of
maritime security based on the perception of threats of the Southeast Asian States
towards maritime security. The list of threats set out by the Southeast Asian States in
the MSDE becomes the main discussion of the substantive Chapters of the thesis.
The list of international and regional frameworks, both binding and non-binding,
which are used to prevent or resolve the prevailing threats are analysed.
In addressing the identified maritime security threats, governments make
decisions and policies, and participate in legal mechanisms, and collaborate with
other States in the region. This thesis sets out frameworks at both international and
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regional level as a form of commitment of the States to resolve the problem. The
thesis also offers an alternative way of collaboration in situations where international
and regional frameworks are absent or in circumstances where frameworks are
poorly endorsed.
There are different forms of maritime cooperation that are to be found among
States in Southeast Asia:
a. Cooperative Anti-piracy and Maritime Border Patrols
Several cooperative maritime border patrols are tasked with combating
piracy/sea robbery and other unlawful activities at sea66. A good example for
this cooperation is the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols (ISCP),
which was formed in July 1992 aimed to combat sea robberies in the
Singapore Straits, expanded into the MALSINDO Malacca Straits Patrols in
2004..
b. Maritime Information Exchange
Regional cooperation is enhanced by the creation of maritime information
databases and data exchange mechanisms. Examples of information that can
be made available in a database include piracy and other illegal activities at
sea that may pose threats to commercial traffic, information on ports,
shipping, and oceanographic data67. Prominent examples of maritime
information sharing in the region include the the international Piracy
Reporting Centre of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and and ReCAAP.
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c. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other Track I Meetings.
The ARF provides a platform for the exchange of views and ideas among
maritime-related agencies, including navies68. Other forums that deal with
maritime security issues include the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meetings
(ADMM) and ADMM-Plus, APEC, The ASEAN Maritime Forum and
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, and the East Asia Summit.

2.4

Regional Architecture

There are no shortage of regional multilateral organisations in Southeast Asia. The
most prominent and most recognised one is ASEAN. However, there are other
institutions such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)69 forum and
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which have Southeast Asian States as core
members.
Since its inception, ASEAN has become a platform where its members could
communicate and discuss issues that are of common concern. In order to make it a
rule-based organisation, ASEAN adopted a constitution called the ASEAN Charter.
The legal platform was designed to facilitate a more efficient process in settling
disputes among the member States and acts as a foundation to create a more
integrated ASEAN.70
In 2015, the ASEAN Community consists of three main pillars, Economic,
Socio-Cultural and Security Communities, was formed. The third pillar is of
particular importance to the security development of the region and creates hope in
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addressing the maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN
Political-Security Community ‘subscribes to a comprehensive approach to security,
which acknowledges the interwoven relationships of political, economic, socialcultural and environmental dimensions of development’71. Furthermore, ‘it promotes
renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force or other actions in any
manner inconsistent with international law and reliance of peaceful settlements of
dispute’72. It also supports relevant ASEAN instruments that play an important role
in confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. Those instruments
include the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia (TAC) and the Treaty on the
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).
To date, ASEAN is considered an important organisation in terms of setting
up dialogues on numerous maritime issues; however, a legally binding framework
necessary to eradicate the problems is yet to be adopted.73
ASEAN also plays a role in the regional security architecture especially in
Asia. ASEAN created a forum called the ASEAN Regional Forum which consists of
ASEAN States as well as neighbouring States such as India and Pakistan and also
extra regional powers such as the US and Russia. This Forum aims to enhance
security dialogues among the member States and promote cooperation. The ARF has
focused on issues such as non-proliferation, terrorism and maritime security.
Furthermore, ASEAN countries also play pivotal role in the East Asia Summit,
which involves States from Northeast Asia, Australasia, ASEAN and South Asia.
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This forum also discusses issues related to security.74 Another forum which was
created by ASEAN was the ASEAN Maritime Forum. In this forum, member states
discuss numerous maritime security and safety issues including freedom and safety
of navigation, marine environment protection and piracy.75
APEC is a regional forum for economic cooperation which consists mainly of
states from the Asia-Pacific region. This regional institution established in 1989 was
formed in order to enhance sustainable economic growth among its members. APEC
countries account for around 50 per cent of international trade and 60 per cent of
global gross domestic product (GDP). Its rapid development plays a big role in
regional confidence building measure processes as well as institutional capacity
building.76
However, the involvement of a large number of States in a regional institution
creates a host of challenges. The inherent diversity of member States in terms of
population, economy, political systems and income level, poses a challenge in
creating a mutually acceptable agreement to all members. Therefore, APEC needs to
be flexible in nature and resilient to accommodate diversities and divergences in
interests to ensure common economic and trade goals are achieved by the member
States.77
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2.5

Maritime Complexity in Southeast Asia
The maritime complexity of Southeast Asia could be attributed to several

factors unique to the region. The region is home to several international shipping
lanes that straddle the territorial waters of numerous States. The Strait of Malacca,
for example, passes through the territorial seas of Malaysia and Indonesia. There are
several maritime areas shared by more than two States. The tri-border area between
Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia, for instance, affects the tightening of each of
the respective national security measures for all three countries.78
The unavailability of a common, unified regional language is another reason
which makes this region complex. States in the region have their own recognised
national language and therefore communication between States are conducted in a
second language such as English. Nonetheless, there are States which have
similarities in language such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.
There are numerous political structures in the region. Some countries are
democratic but Thailand still adopts the monarchy system where the king still has a
role in deciding the State’s priorities. Furthermore, there are two communist States in
Southeast Asia, namely Vietnam and Laos. The differences in political structures
also potentially pose challenges which affect the bilateral and multilateral relations
amongst States
Another complexity of the region is the presence of disputed, contested and
un-delimited territorial and maritime boundaries which are often the source of
intermittent friction and occasional armed violence between claimant States. The
absence of well-defined boundaries and the close proximity of States to one another,
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which means there are no high seas present in the water areas of the Southeast Asian
States, render the situation volatile at times. The South China Sea, for instance, is
particularly contentious being subject to competing claims between several Southeast
Asian states and China. Furthermore, other than the South China Sea issue, there are
still other un-delimited maritime boundaries between neighbouring States. Of course,
many States in the region have made some progress in delimiting overlapping
maritime zones over the years.
There are several important SLOCs in Southeast Asia. The Straits of Malacca
and Singapore connect the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, and the Indian Ocean with
the South China Sea. Around one-third of global trade is carried through this strait.
Annually, approximately 50,000 vessels pass through the Strait of Malacca. Other
transit lanes which are also important are the Lombok, Sunda, Makassar and
Mindoro Straits. For those heavy tanks which are not able to pass through the
draught-limited Malacca Strait, it is necessary to transit other deeper straits such as
the Lombok or Sunda Strait.79 These straits are important to world trade. Around
85% of Chinese oil imports and approximately 80% of the total import of Japanese
petroleum are carried through the Malacca Strait.80 Other States such as Taiwan and
Korea are also dependant to the sealanes in Southeast Asia for raw materials carried
from Africa and Australia through the Southeast Asian waterways to the industries
present in East Asia. Furthermore, the straits in Southeast Asia are considered
economic chokepoints to the world economy. It would create a global problem if the
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straits are closed for some reason and vessels are not allowed to pass through them.
Therefore the straits have strategic importance worldwide.81
Southeast Asia is also significant because of its ports. Several ports located in
this region are considered among the busiest in the world. A prime example is
Singapore, where many vessels passing through the region visit and conduct
activities such as refuelling and offloading.82 Heavy traffic in the area is also due to
the presence of hub ports around the region in places such as Japan, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and South Korea. Southeast Asia’s maritime complexity thus can be thought
to be not only ‘internally generated’ but also ‘externally generated’.83
Finally, another significant factor that could be pointed out in the region is
the presence of numerous offshore installations that extract oil, gas and other mineral
resources. Several of these platforms, however, are located in underdeveloped areas.
Therefore security arrangements are important in order to maximise the utilisation of
these platforms.84

2.6

Overview of Maritime Security Challenges in Southeast Asia

As mentioned earlier in the Chapter 1, there are five maritime security challenges in
Southeast Asia which will be discussed in this thesis. Those are: piracy, maritime
terrorism, people smuggling, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and marine
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. These challenges will be
elaborated briefly in this section.
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Piracy and armed robbery at seaare leading maritime security threats present
in Southeast Asia. Indeed, in the past few years, this threat has gained the attention of
both the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB) – with both organisations highlighting piracy in Southeast Asia in
their published reports. Indeed, the ReCAAP organization was established to
improve cooperation to deal with the threat.Issues regarding piracy in Southeast Asia
will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
Another threat to maritime security in Southeast Asia is maritime terrorism.
In order to fulfil their political ambitions, offenders conduct criminal activities in
groups which are affiliated with a particular terrorist organisation.85 Terrorist
activities intentionally intimidate civilians to create fear and sometimes conduct
violence. Terrorists also seek to create enduring damage through their actions. This
damage can be psychological, by cultivating an atmosphere of fear and panic, or it
may take the form of physical acts causing damage or destruction, the intention being
that the relevant authorities may concede (or partially concede) to the terrorists’
demands.86 Furthermore, terrorists aim to achieve maximum publicity in their
attacks, because the more people that recognise their attacks, the more political
pressure they can create. In order to combat maritime terrorism, States have taken
measures both at the international and regional levels. Issues regarding maritime
terrorism in Southeast Asia will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
People smuggling constitutes another threat to maritime security in Southeast
Asia. Indeed, this issue has become one of the main concerns of the international
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community, as people smuggling not only affects countries of origin and destination,
but also transit States.87 There are several causes of people smuggling, although
poverty is a main reason people decide to ‘migrate’ to another country. Their
intention is to make a better life for themselves by seeking employment opportunities
in their destination country.88 Another factor that causes many people to migrate is
discrimination..89 Humanitarian crises in places such as the Middle East, Afghanistan
and Sri Lanka have also played a significant role in the rise of people smuggling.
Further discussions on people smuggling in Southeast Asia will be elaborated in
Chapter 5.
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU fishing) is one of the major
maritime concerns in the world today. IUU fishing commonly occurs in the EEZ,
with irresponsible or criminal fishermen harvesting protected fish species or large
quantities of fish which are subsequently not reported. Fish is a primary food source
of protein for many developing States, and therefore its continued availability is
critical. Despite this fact, larger and larger quantities of fish are captured every day in
order to meet an ever-growing demand. Moreover, the advent of modern technology
has made the process of harvesting fish even easier. The US Commission on Ocean
Policy has estimated that only three out of every ten fish stocks around the world are
being fished at a sustainable level, and hence it is not surprising to see States rally
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together in opposing illegal fishing practices.90 Issues regarding IUU fishing in
Southeast Asia will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
The last issue that will be discussed is Marine Pollution Caused by Offshore
Oil and Gas Activities. An increase in demand for energy has caused greater pressure
to explore and exploit offshore oil and natural gas resources, particularly in Asia. It is
anticipated that the economies of China and India will grow by more than five per
cent per annum until 2035.91 Indeed, these countries, and other non-OECD countries
in the Asia Pacific region (excluding Japan and Republic of Korea) are predicted to
consume more natural gas in the future. In 2008, their world natural gas consumption
was ten per cent, and is expected to reach 19 per cent by 2035.92 The number of
projects currently operating in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and
Australia is quite significant in comparison to other parts of the world. Combined,
these regions have 441 projected shallow (less than 300 metres) and deep water
(greater than 300 metres) offshore oil and gas fields.93 This industry, however, poses
considerable environmental risks to the marine environment. Further discussions on
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities in Southeast Asia will be
elaborated in Chapter 7.
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2.7

Conclusion

In conclusion, maritime security can be understood by examining the concept from
different approaches, as the discussion above illustrated. The differences in people’s
backgrounds, interests and concerns ultimately influence how maritime security is
perceived and addressed. Defence officials, operators, shipping industries,
researchers or analysts, policy makers, other members of the private sector and
government officials would understand the issue differently based on their interests
and fields. Klein explained that maritime security is often described in a contextspecific meaning and infrequently in a categorical way.94 Thus, there are no universal
agreed elements that constitute maritime security.
It is clear that there are numerous regional organisations which are
particularly concerned about maritime security issues prevailing in the region.
However, the complexities of the region as well as the inadequacy of these regional
organisations to address the problem are the reasons why several maritime threats
persist. This chapter thus highlighted five maritime security threats in Southeast Asia
which are the focus of discussion in the succeeding chapters.
.
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CHAPTER III
3 Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters

3.1

Introduction

One of the main threats to maritime security in Southeast Asia is piracy. In the past
few years, this threat has gained the attention of both the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) – with both
organisations referring to piracy in Southeast Asia in their published reports.
Furthermore, reports on piracy are also produced by the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP). These reports show that there is a significant number of piratical
incidents taking place in the maritime area of Southeast Asia.1
The term piracy originates from the Greek word ‘peirates’, and was used to
refer to people who attacked ships.2 According to Vagg, an English criminologist,
acts of piracy are similar to acts of banditry,3 the only difference being that piracy
occurs on water. Piracy is an unlawful act at sea which may involve violence and
robbery.4 Other scholars have proposed that piracy more closely resembles armed
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robbery - with both offences involving violence or criminal acts which occur in areas
lacking in government control.5
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the international and regional legal
frameworks governing piracy. The chapter also examines the concept of piracy from
different perspectives. Furthermore, it analyses the prevailing gaps at both
international and regional levels.
In order to get a comprehensive picture of the problem, this chapter will discuss
several issues related to piracy such as the concept of piracy and its legal history, the
nature of piracy in Southeast Asia, and the international and regional legal
frameworks for combating piracy The chapter concludes that the existing legal
frameworks both at the international and regional levels are inadequate to address the
problem. Piracy is transnational in nature and thus multinational cooperation is
needed to overcome the problem.6 Furthermore, cooperation at the regional level is
required in order to eliminate maritime piracy in Southeast Asia.
3.2

Concept of Piracy and its Legal History

This section will analyse the concept of piracy by discussing the different definitions
of piracy, elaborate the hostis humani generis (the enemies of all mankind) nature of
piracy, and provide a brief historical overview of the initial development of the legal
framework in addressing piracy.
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3.2.1

Defining Piracy

In the past, the main goal of piracy was to steal riches, booty and slaves. However,
with developments in the political, economic and military affairs of States, these
types of raids decreased in frequency. The current aim of piracy is varied in nature,
but extends to receiving ransom from governments and ship companies.
The IMO and IMB are the two main organisations which are concerned with
the issue of piracy globally. Both organisations have defined piracy in different
ways. The IMO, as a body under the United Nations (UN), adopts the definition of
piracy from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).7 The
definition itself is quite narrow and defines some illegal activities at sea to be piracy.
Compared to the IMO, the IMB’s definition is broader and covers almost all attacks
against ships in all maritime jurisdictions of a State.
The offence of piracy, as defined in Article 101 of the LOSC, consists of five
elements.8 In order for an act to be categorised as piracy, it must satisfy the following
conditions: Firstly, there must be violence, detention or depredation.9 Secondly, such
action must be conducted on the high seas.10 Thirdly, there must be two ships
involved in the action.11 Therefore, the pirates must use another ship in order to
attack the targeted ship. Illegal acts such as mutiny and privateering are not
categorised as piracy. Fourthly, the spoils of piracy must be enjoyed for private (as
opposed to political) ends.12 Finally, the vessels used to carry out the piratical attack
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must be private vessels.13 Hence, attacks by government owned ships, such as naval
vessels, are not considered acts of piracy subject to several exceptions as stipulated
in LOSC.14
In light of the above requirements, many illegal acts committed at sea fall
outside the definition of piracy. Criminal acts conducted in territorial seas where
States enjoy both sovereignty and jurisdiction are not categorised as piracy. Indeed,
such acts are considered by IMO to be armed robbery at sea. However, this
distinction between ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery’ has led to other complications. As
not every State has domestic legislation dealing with armed robbery, it is often
difficult for governments to prosecute offenders who have engaged in such activities.
Only those acts which are committed on the high seas (including the EEZ) where
States enjoy freedom of navigation or ‘mare liberum’ are considered piracy. The
IMO defines armed robbery in resolution A.1025 (26) Code of Practice for the
Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships as:
(i) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof,
other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters,
archipelagic waters and territorial sea; and (ii) any act of inciting or of intentionally
facilitating an act described above.15

On the other hand, the IMB definition of piracy is different than that of the
LOSC. The IMB definition consists of three different elements. Firstly, the crew or
passengers of the ship must board or attempt to board another ship. Secondly, the
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motive of this act must be to commit theft or another crime. Finally, there must be
“an attempt or capability to use force in furtherance of that act.”16
It is clear that the IMB definition of piracy is broader than that of existing
international law. The LOSC requirement that the act must be committed on the high
seas in order to be categorised as piracy has not been adopted by the IMB.
Furthermore, the LOSC requirement that two ships must be involved in the attack
also has not been adopted by the IMB, thus allowing an attack from a raft or quay to
be considered piracy. In addition, there is no limitation that the act be committed for
private ends. Hence, if the motive of the criminal act is regarded as political or
environmental, the act may nonetheless be categorised as piracy according to the
IMB.17 Therefore, the attack against the Achille Lauro falls within the IMB definition
of piracy.18 Interestingly, acts committed by naval ships, which are generally under
the control of the State, can also be categorised as piracy under the IMB definition,
provided it can be shown the naval ship committed a criminal act.
From the above discussions, the LOSC definition of piracy is different to the
IMB. The latter, however has no legal standing. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis,
the definition of piracy which is adopted is the one defined by the LOSC. The
definition is widely accepted as it is a part of LOSC which has been ratified by most
States in the world. The existence of several definitions of piracy created confusion
for some States; for those States which are affected by a high number of armed
robberies at sea conducted in territorial waters would not want these offences also
categorised as piracy.
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3.2.2

Pirates as hostis humani generis

The act of piracy is a violation of international law and considered as a sui generis
universal crime.19 The universal crime nature of piracy gives the right to every State
to seize the pirate ship, arrest the pirates,20 and punish the perpetrators. An act is
categorised as piracy if it is committed on the high seas, an area where all States
enjoy several rights, including the freedom of navigation. Indeed, it would be almost
impossible to eradicate piracy and apprehend its perpetrators if the act was restricted
to a narrow jurisdiction. For this reason, every State is allowed to seize pirate ships21.
Likewise, in Europe, the act of piracy is considered hostis humani generis or
‘enemy of all mankind.’22 Indeed, piracy has historically been regarded as a threat to
many people around the world, especially those from a western culture. In 1820, the
US Supreme Court accepted the concept of hostis humani generis, thereby granting
any State the right to prosecute piratical acts.23 As a result, pirates are subject to
universal jurisdiction, which means that every State has the right to take appropriate
action,24 even though the act may not have been committed within the state’s
jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction is a unique concept of international law, allowing
States to exercise jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of where the offence
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took place.25 In most cases, international law only allows States to enforce their
jurisdiction over crimes that take place in their territory, or over accused citizens who
are their nationals. Furthermore, the right of a State to assume jurisdiction over
another State’s territory is strictly limited. Interestingly, this provision of
international law does not apply to piracy. In contrast, States are allowed to exercise
their jurisdiction on the high seas and over any national, as piracy is considered
hostis humani generis.26 Hence, it is legitimate under international law for States to
implement measures to prosecute perpetrators of piracy. Flag state jurisdiction on the
other hand gives the right to a state to prosecute a crime (exercising enforcement
jurisdiction) if it has recognised grounds to claim jurisdiction over the event in
international law, and its domestic law expressly asserts that jurisdiction.
3.2.3

Privateering versus Piracy

Historically, privateering was considered a legal act, as the attack was committed
with the authority of the government. Privateering was practiced by private
companies during times of war, with privateers being asked to attack and capture
enemy ships with the consent of the ruling party. Such action was considered
legitimate, as the government provided letters of marque to authorise the seizure.27
During those times, privateers were not considered pirates and therefore privateering
was legal, whereas piracy remained illegal. However, with the issuance of the Paris
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law in 1856, privateering was abolished. The
reason behind the abolition was the inappropriate use of government authorisations
25
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by the privateers. The privateers were known to be motivated by their own selfinterest, using their powers for personal enrichment.
3.2.4

Harvard Draft

The legal formulation of ‘piracy’ started in the 1930s, with the Harvard Research
Group attempting to define the term.28 An important aspect of the group’s work was
to create a ‘special jurisdiction’ which could be used to prosecute acts of piracy. This
group was led by American scholar Professor Joseph Bingham from Stanford
University.29 Their work resulted in a 1932 paper which was known as the ‘Harvard
Draft’. This draft contained nineteen articles and associated commentary on piracy.
The group’s definition of piracy, which formed a vital part of the draft, was the initial
source for today’s modern definition of piracy.30 There are two significant aspects of
the Harvard Draft. Firstly, the Draft had undergone an extensive consultation
process, with the Harvard Research Group canvassing the views of several national
courts and competent jurists.31 Secondly, the Harvard Draft formed the foundation of
the modern concept of piracy, as found in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
as well as LOSC.32
3.2.5

High Seas Convention

A further development in piracy law took place when the General Assembly of the
United Nations requested the International Law Commission to review and draft
conventions relating to the law of the sea, based on the prevailing rules of
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international customary law.33 This process was held in 1950 – a time when the
International Law Commission was heavily influenced by the Harvard Draft,
especially in relation to drafting laws related to piracy. As a result, the commission
was able to prepare four draft conventions on the law of the sea. The definition of
piracy was also included in these conventions and was embedded in the 1958
Convention on High Seas.
LOSC restates verbatim the definition of piracy drafted by the International
Law Commission in articles 14-20 of the High Seas Convention. As most UN
member States are either a party to LOSC or the High Seas Convention, the legal
definition of piracy is today uniform across most States.34
3.3

Nature of Piracy in Southeast Asia

Many researchers categorise maritime piracy as a non-traditional threat which means
that the perpetrators are non-State actors. Meanwhile, non-traditional security theory
treats it as ‘human security.’35 Especially in the post-cold war era, piracy has been
regarded as one of the non-traditional treats which “arise from factors or actors
which are sub-state or trans-state in character, are diffuse, are multi-dimensional and
multi-directional, cannot necessarily be managed by traditional military means, and
often threatening to something beside the state”.36 In contrast, maritime piracy has
traditionally been perceived as a threat that mainly affects the security of the State
itself.
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The transnational nature of piracy and the sea means that States must
cooperate with one another in order to combat it. Unilateral action on the part of a
State, and even bilateral ties between States, are often considered inadequate to
resolve the issue.37 As piratical acts are complex in nature, it is necessary for States
to cooperate on a multilateral level, and in a consistent and comprehensive manner.
It is difficult to define piracy as the term has been used to refer to enemy
combatants as well as common criminals.38 However, there are several ways to
understand the concept. Distinguishing piracy from other illegal acts, and
ascertaining the motive behind piratical acts in terms of time and place, are some of
the measures that have been used. Southeast Asian States might have their own
definition of piracy in their domestic law: the Philippines for example has a
legislative definition backed up by jurisprudence that has broader applicability than
UNCLOS.
As Young has proposed, piracy should not be treated as something which is
static in moral judgement.39 Rather, it should be viewed as a concept that is subject to
change over time, or as Campo has described: “a concept in development”.40
According to Hugo Grotius, piracy should be regarded as any illegal act against
“lawful commerce and [a] state’s sovereignty”. 41 Grotius was previously engaged by
the Dutch government to protect the commercial interests of the government.
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Southeast Asia is an important area in terms of piratical studies. There are
several reasons for this. Firstly, the region experienced the second highest rate of
piratical attacks in the world over the period of five years (2010-2014). Only Africa
exceeds the number of ‘attacks’ that were committed in Southeast Asia in the same
period. The prevalence of piratical attacks in Africa is due to the high number of
cases that occurred in Somali waters. However, in 2013 and 2014 the rate of piracy
and armed robbery incident in Southeast Asia is the highest in the world with 128,42
and 141,43 respectively. According to data from the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre
(which takes into account both ‘actual’ and ‘attempted’ piratical attacks), Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore were highly affected by piracy in the period between 2010
and 2014.

Locations
Indonesia
Malacca Straits
Malaysia
Myanmar (Burma)
Philippines
Singapore Straits
Thailand
Vietnam

2010
40
2
18
0
5
3
2
12

2011
46
1
16
1
5
11
0
8

2012
81
2
12
0
3
6
0
4

2013
106
1
9
0
3
9
0
9

2014
100
1
21
0
6
8
2
7

Table 6: Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which were reported to have
been Allegedly Committed and Attempted in Southeast Asia44

Secondly, the geographical location of the region is very important to world
trade. There are several sea lanes and straits which are commonly used for
international navigation, mainly for trade purposes. In fact, six of the 25 busiest ports
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in the world are located in Southeast Asia. They include Singapore, Port Klang
(Malaysia), Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia) and Tanjung Priok (Indonesia), Laem
Chabang (Thailand), and Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam).45 Furthermore, Singapore is the
second largest container port in the world after Shanghai (China).46 Furthermore,
Singapore boasts the third largest oil refinery industry in the world, as well as being
the third largest port in terms of percentage of global cargo.
Thirdly, the need to eradicate piracy has been an issue for individual States in
the region, as well as groups of States.47 Their failure to address the issue has
compelled the international community to cooperate in suppressing piracy in
Southeast Asian waters.
Piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region is influenced by
numerous factors including economic, political and social forces. These factors,
along with the increased availability and dissemination of information in today’s
globalised world, also play a role in the prevalence of piratical attacks.48
Piracy in Southeast Asia is difficult to define as it differs from piracy in other
parts of the world. As Young has described, piracy in the region has its own
religious, economic and political agenda.49 However, this understanding changed
after the European involvement in the region in the 16th century. The local concept of
piracy was eroded and replaced by the European concept. By the nineteenth century,
European concepts were officially entrenched in most countries in Southeast Asia. It
is for this reason that the European concept of piracy today represents the established
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(international) view. Piracy and armed robbery in Asia is different from Somaliabased piracy. In Somalia, ‘pirates generally attacked ships in order to hijack them
and then hold the crew for ransom’, whereas in Asia, the criminal activities generally
‘revolves around theft of personal property and hijacking of ships for the purpose of
cargo theft’50. Furthermore, in the context of Southeast Asia, attacks on ships often
occur within territorial waters instead of the high seas, which does not strictly fall
under the definition of piracy under the LOSC. Contemporary forms of piracy and
piratical operations in Southeast Asia are more in the nature of opportunistic crimes
rather than large-scale, organised operations conducted by petty criminals, relatively
random in nature and disorganised.51 They usually occur in congested harbours or
whilst the ships are at anchor.52
In the past, many of the anti-piracy measures identified by researchers, and
later implemented in Southeast Asia, were carried out by actors or States outside the
region. Indeed, Japan and the United States, as well as other shipping nations, have
shown concern over the situation in the region, and have thus offered their assistance
in the form of anti-piracy measures.53 Little action has been taken by States in
Southeast Asia itself, and thus not surprisingly, many of the indigenous approaches
to combating piracy in the region have proved either inadequate or ineffective.
3.3.1

Motives of Piracy

In recent times, pirates have become more sophisticated in their activities. Broadly
speaking, these activities can be classified as either theft or hijacking. In regard to
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theft, several decades ago pirates commonly stole items that were not of high value54
- such as the personal belongings of captains and other crew members. It was also
common for pirates to seize ship equipment and other goods belonging to the ship
that could easily be transported. Today, pirates are more calculated in their actions
and are commonly equipped with weapons. They also execute their activities with
high level planning, often having selected their targets ahead of time.
Hijacking represents another form of piracy. Pirates seek to attack a vessel
and transfer its cargo to another ship. As the movement of the ship is carefully
monitored by the pirates, they can usually seek out their target with a high degree of
precision. This kind of hijacking occurs in circumstances where the value of both the
ship and its cargo are high. Pirates are not only equipped with guns, but also other
weapons such as knives. They also have the skills to navigate their ship without the
presence of experienced crew members. Pirates often provide fake ship papers, cargo
papers and even passports in order to carry out their plans. Unfortunately, there is no
guarantee as to the treatment of crew members captured by pirates. Some crew
members are intimidated and tortured, while others are killed. A sombre illustration
of this can be seen in the attacks carried out on the Cheongson and the Tenyu. The
1998 IMB Annual Piracy Report stated that all crew members on board these vessels
were killed during the attacks.55
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Types of Arms
Guns
Knives
Not Stated
Other Weapons
Total

2010
243
88
108
6
445

2011
245
69
117
8
439

2012
113
73
104
7
297

2013
71
81
109
3
264

2014
62
83
93
7
245

Table 7: Types of Arms used during Attacks, January-December 2010-201456

Before 2001, merchant ships were the main targets of piratical attacks, as
they provided an opportunity for pirates to steal both the crew’s valuable belongings
as well as the ship’s cargo. However, after 2001, there were several cases where
pirates were apprehended, convicted and sentenced for their attacks, especially in
India and China. Following these convictions, groups of pirates began looking for
easier targets such as tugs and barges. According to Mukundan, barges in Southeast
Asia usually carry palm oil and timber products, both of which are highly valued and
thus extremely attractive to pirates.57
Collecting ransom from authorities is another motive for piratical attacks.
Indeed, there are several cases where a ransom has been used by pirates as a
bargaining tool - for instance, by militia groups in the southern part of the
Philippines. Here, the pirates captured several crew members and demanded a
ransom in exchange for their release. A similar incident took place in Malaysia in
August 2003, when the Malaysian tanker Penrider was hijacked by a group of
pirates.58 The pirates abducted the crew members pending the payment of their
ransom.
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3.3.2

Incidents of piracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asia

Reports on piracy and armed robbery incidents are produced by numerous
institutions. In this section, piracy incidents which are reported by the prominent
institutions which are widely known and recognised are elaborated upon.

The

institutions referred are the IMO and IMB and the ReCAAP Information Sharing
Centre (ISC) in Singapore.
3.3.2.1 IMO Reports
According to the IMO annual report, there were 291 piracy and armed robbery
against ships incidents in 2014. This number only decreased by seven incidents
compared to the previous year where 298 incidents occurred in 2013. The report also
accumulated the total piracy and armed robbery against ships incidents since 1984.59
There were 7,043 incidents which occurred globally from 1984-2014.

Figure 3: Yearly Statistic of Piracy and Armed Robber 1984-201460
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The 2014 IMO report also pointed out that there was an increase in piracy
and armed robbery incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore from 2011 to
2014. Except for 2013 where the number of incident decreased, piracy and armed
robbery continued to increase every year peaking in 2014 with 77 (committed) and
four (attempted incidents). The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (81 incidents in
total) are the second most affected area by acts and attempted acts of piracy and
armed robbery against ships in 2014 after the South China Sea (93 incidents in
total).61
In terms of the location of these illegal activities, the figures vary to some
degree. In 2011, 2012 and 2014, the number of illegal acts (armed robberies)
occurring in the territorial sea was higher than in international waters, whereas in
2013, the number of illegal acts (piracy) occurring in international waters was higher
than in the territorial sea. The IMO has also reported that there were several attacks
in ports that occurred in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore 2011-2014.62

In International
Waters
In Territorial Waters
In Port Area
Status of Ship when
Attacked
Steaming
At anchor
Not Stated

2011

2012

2013

2014

0

0

0

1

1
0
1

2
0
2

0
1
1

2
1
4

1
0
0

1
1
0

0
1
0

3
1
0

Table 8: Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which were reported to have
been Allegedly Attempted in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 2011-201463
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2011

2012

2013

2014

5
14

2
7

6
4

16
43

2
21

13
22

6
16

18
77

9
8
4

5
16
1

6
4
6

45
29
2

Location of Incident
In Territorial Waters
In International
Waters
In Port Area
Status of Ship when
Attacked
Steaming
At anchor
Not Stated

Table 9: Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which were reported to have
been Allegedly Committed in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 2011-201464

3.3.2.2 IMB Reports
An examination of IMB statistics reveals that globally the number of piracy and
armed robbery has decreased from 2010 to 2014. Within the five-year period (20102014) it peaked in 2010 with 445 incidents and gradually decreased every year 439,
297, 264 and 245 respectively.65 These attacks varied in nature, which includes
attacks in ports, the theft of ship equipment and crew’s valuable belongings, as well
as the hijacking of ships. The IMB’s PRC also reported that in 2013 there were 202
ships boarded, 12 ships hijacked, 304 crews taken hostage, one crew member killed,
21 crew members injured and nine crew members kidnapped. However, these figures
decreased slightly in 2014, where there were a total of 245 piracy and armed robbery
incidents, with 183 ships boarded, 21 ships hijacked, 442 crews taken hostage, four
people killed, 13 people injured and nine people kidnapped.66 Even though the
number of incidents decreased in 2014 compared to the previous years, 245 incidents
is still a huge number and thus should be appropriately addressed.
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Category
Attempted
Boarded
Fired Upon
Hijack
Total

2010
89
196
107
53
445

2011
105
176
113
45
439

2012
67
174
28
28
297

2013
28
202
22
12
264

2014
28
183
13
21
245

Table 10: Comparison of the Type of Attacks, January–December 2009-201267

Types of Violence
Assaulted
Hostage
Injured
Kidnaped/Ransom
Killed
Missing
Threatened
Total

2010
6
1174
37
27
8
0
18
1270

2011
6
802
42
10
8
0
27
895

2012
4
585
28
26
6
0
13
662

2013
0
304
21
36
1
1
10
373

2014
1
442
13
9
4
1
9
479

Table 11: Types of Violence to Crew, January–September 2009-201468

It is important to note that the decrease in the total number of incidents in
2014 does not affect the total percentage of piracy and armed robbery incidents
committed in Southeast Asian waters. Indeed, in 2014, Southeast Asia was the most
piracy and armed robbery affected region in the world. Of a total of 245 attacks, 141
were committed in Southeast Asia. On a regional basis, Africa is the second highest
with 55 incidents in 2014. In Southeast Asia, there was significant increase in piracy
and armed robbery incidents (committed and attempted) from 15 incidents in 2013 to
81 incidents in 2014.69
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Region
Far East
America
Indian Sub-Continent
Africa
Southeast Asia

Number of Attack
8
5
34
55
141

Table 12: Total Incidents per Region, January-December 201470

3.3.2.3 ReCAAP Reports
The ReCAAP annual report showed a significant number of piracy and armed
robbery acts committed in Southeast Asian waters in 2014. Out of 183 (actual and
attempted) incidents in Asia in 2014, 153 incidents occurred in Southeast Asia. The
report also divided the incidents into several categories such as very significant,
moderately significant, less significant and minimum significant.

Figure 4: Number of Incidents Occurred in Asia (actual and attempted) 2010-201471
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Figure 5: Significance level of Incidents (2010-20104)72

The number of piracy incidents in 2014 which occurred in Southeast Asia is
the highest in the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. Except in 2012, piracy and
armed robbery incidents have been increasing since 2010. The number of incidents
reported in 2010 were 99 (actual) and 21 (attempted) whereas in 2014 there were 140
(actual) and 13 (attempted) incidents. In 2014, incidents which occurred in the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore increased more than three times higher compared to 2013.
Nonetheless there is a significant decrease in Indonesian waters from 83 incidents in
2013 to 41 incidents in 2014. The improvement occurred in several Indonesian ports
including Dumai, Belawan, Samarinda and Pulau Nipa.73
Despite the decrease in piratical incidents, the ReCAAP annual report
highlighted that compared to other areas in the region within the five-year period
(2010-2014) Indonesia still has the highest number of incidents at its ports and
anchorages. During such incidents in 2014, the report pointed out that the offenders
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were armed with guns and knives (three incidents) and several crew members were
held hostage (five incidents).74
2010
Gulf of
Thailand
Indian Ocean
Indonesia
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
South China
Sea
Straits of
Malacca and
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Sub-Total

2011

2012

2013

2014

Actual
1

Attempted

Actual

Attempted

Actual

Attempted

Actual

Attempted

Actual

Attempted

37
18

10

2
3

66
11

6

83
6

7

41
4

1
5
1

2
6

3
2
7

5
2
17

8

47
14
1
4
3
12

5

3

24

2

12

1

12

1
13
99

21

8
113

15

3
104

1
8

8
124

5
10

5
1

1
9

40

2

44

4

6
140

13

Table 13: Incidents occurred Southeast Asia from 2010-201475

The IMO, IMB and ReCAAP reports suggest that Southeast Asia is still
regarded as a region prone to piracy and armed robbery. The reports also revealed
that in several incidents the perpetrators were armed with weapons.
3.4

Overview of the International Legal Frameworks on Piracy

This section will analyse the different international legal frameworks that govern
piracy. The two international frameworks which are highlighted are the LOSC and
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA Convention).76 Before going into the discussion of the legal
frameworks, this section elaborates several definitions of piracy which are widely
acknowledged by States.
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3.4.2

Law of the Sea Convention

The Security Council has repeatedly affirmed that international law, as reflected in
LOSC, regulates the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed
robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities. In particular, the United Nations has
regulated the problem of piracy in Articles 100 to 107 of the LOSC.77 Article 100 of
the LOSC obliges all States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy.78

State

Signature

Ratification/accession;

dd/mm/yy

dd/mm/yy

Brunei Darussalam

05/12/84

05/11/96

Cambodia

01/07/83

Indonesia

10/12/82

03/02/86

Lao PDR

10/12/82

02/05/86

Malaysia

10/12/82

14/10/96

Myanmar

10/12/82

21/05/96

Philippines

10/12/82

08/05/84

Singapore

10/12/82

17/11/94

Thailand

10/12/82

15/05/11

Timor-Leste
Viet Nam

08/10/13(accession)
10/12/82

25/07/94

Table 14: Ratification of the UNCLOS by Southeast Asian States
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Article 103 of LOSC defines a pirate ship or aircraft.79 According to this
provision, where a ship or aircraft is under the dominant control of a person who
intends to commit one of the acts stipulated in Article 101, then it is deemed to be a
pirate ship or aircraft. Furthermore, the same provision applies to those ships and
aircrafts which have been used to commit piracy and which are still under the control
of the pirate who committed the act.
Where a mutiny takes place on board a warship, government ship or
government aircraft, then the vessel or aircraft will be treated as though it is a private
ship, provided it commits one of the acts mentioned in Article 101.80 This provision
is stipulated in Article 102 of LOSC. In any event, if the crew of a warship,
government ship or aircraft rebels and takes over the ship or aircraft, and proceeds to
commit an act of piracy, this activity is considered illegal and will constitute piracy.81
Under Article 104 of LOSC, a flag State may retain or lose the ownership of a
ship or aircraft which has become a pirate ship in accordance with the domestic law
of the flag State.82 Therefore, if a State has, under its national law, determined that a
pirate ship shall retain the ownership of the flag State, then according to Article 104
of the LOSC, the State has the right to own the pirate ship.83
The right of a State to seize a pirate ship or aircraft is permissible under
Article 105 of LOSC in certain circumstances.84 Importantly, the seizure must take
place on the high seas or in another place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
Moreover, the State conducting the seizure is entitled to arrest the pirates and seize
79
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the property on the ship or aircraft. The State conducting the seizure has, through its
courts, the right to impose sanctions on the pirates, as well as determine what action
to take in respect of the property on board the ship or aircraft.
Article 107 of the LOSC specifies those ships or aircraft which have the
authority to conduct a seizure on account of piracy. These include warships, military
aircraft, as well as any other ship or aircraft which is authorised by the government
and has a sign or mark which is clearly identifiable as a government service ship or
aircraft.
There have been debates as to whether a State’s EEZ qualifies as part of the
‘high seas’ when dealing with piracy. Interestingly, LOSC has defined ‘high seas’ in
two different ways. Some parts of LOSC refer to the area outside the territorial sea as
the high seas. This includes the contiguous zone as well as the EEZ. In contrast,
Article 86 of LOSC states that the high seas include all parts of the sea except the
EEZ, territorial sea, internal waters and archipelagic waters.85 This debate arises due
to the existence of some rights which could be enjoyed not only on the high seas, but
also in the EEZ. According to Article 58(1) of LOSC, every State, whether it is
landlocked or coastal, enjoys freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as the
laying of submarine cables and “other internationally lawful uses of the sea” in the
EEZ.86
The LOSC in Article 58(2), explicitly states that the high seas provisions of
the convention, including the rules on piracy, apply to the exclusive economic zone.
The Article states that the contents of Articles 88 to 115 (which include piracy and
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other international maritime law provisions), apply to the EEZ, so long as they are
not incompatible with the provisions of Part V.87 In other words, if one of the illegal
acts stipulated in Article 101 is conducted beyond the outer extent of the territorial
sea - that is, the contiguous zone or the EEZ, then such an act is considered piracy.
The seizure of pirated ships is not always lawful. Under Article 106 of LOSC,
where the seizure is carried out by a State without adequate grounds, the State
conducting the seizure will be liable for any loss or damage to the State of nationality
of the seized ship or aircraft.88
The next issue for consideration is whether the articles in the LOSC that seek
to regulate piracy are effective. From the outset, it is important to note that piracy
continues to take place, and more importantly, that LOSC does not cover the whole
issue of piracy. Indeed, a large number of piratical incidents are committed at sea
each year,89 especially in the Southeast Asia region. IMB reported that in 2014 there
were 245 incidents which occurred globally. Out of 245 incidents, 57.55 per cent or
141 incidents occurred in Southeast Asia.90 Cases such as the piracy committed on
board the Trimaggada in 2003, the sea robbery in Panjang in 2003,91 incidents
involving Sunrise 689 and Srikandi 515 in 2014, are examples of sea-based crimes
perpetrated in the Southeast Asia region.92 These cases occurred despite the
widespread ratification of LOSC in the region, so it could be argued that the
regulations governing piracy in LOSC are not sufficient to eradicate the problem.
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In light of the above difficulties, it is proposed that States in Southeast Asia
(and particularly those with large maritime areas) try to find a more effective
solution. One step that could be taken is the creation of new regional legal
instruments that seek to penalise perpetrators of piracy. However, before considering
such a solution, States should clearly define the elements of the offence of piracy
itself.
3.4.3

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime
Navigation

The SUA Convention is a legal instrument addressing illegal acts conducted at sea,
including piracy. Although this convention does not specifically address piracy,
piratical acts are subject to it. The SUA Convention was initiated after the hijacking
of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1988 – an act which was allegedly
motivated by political ends.93 Unfortunately, the perpetrators of this hijacking were
not able to be apprehended pursuant to Article 101 of LOSC,94 as the act did not meet
the requirement of having been “committed for private ends.” Therefore, it was
incumbent upon States to create a legally binding instrument which could be used to
arrest perpetrators of criminal acts conducted at sea in circumstances where such acts
had been committed for political and other ends.
The SUA Convention fills the gap left by LOSC – namely, that piratical acts
must involve two or more ships on the high seas or another area beyond the national
jurisdiction of States.95 The SUA Convention96 in Article 3 provides that it is an
offence for any person to unlawfully and intentionally: (i) seize or exercise control
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over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation97; (ii) perform an act of violence against a
person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the
ship98; (iii) destroy or cause damage to a ship or its cargo which is likely to endanger
the safe navigation of the ship99; (iv) place or cause to be placed on a ship a device
which causes damage to the ship or its cargo100; (v) destroy maritime navigational
facilities101; (vi) communicate false information102; and (vii) injure or kill any person
in connection with the commission of an offence set out in the convention.103
As mentioned above, piratical acts under the SUA Convention do not require
the involvement of two ships on the high seas. Indeed, the mere act of taking control
of a ship with the use of force or intimidation qualifies as an offence under the
Convention, even if the perpetrator is from the same ship. Furthermore, to bring
proceedings against an offender, the SUA Convention does not require the act to have
been committed on the high seas. Rather, Article 4 explains that the Convention will
apply “if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea”.104
The SUA Convention also aims to punish perpetrators of sea based crimes.
Article 10(1) expounds that a State has the responsibility to prosecute or extradite
offenders committing one or more of the crimes stated in Article 3 of the
Convention.105 Article 11(1) elaborates that offences in Article 3 are extraditable
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based on the existence of any extradition treaty between States.106 Where States do
not have an extradition treaty, the Convention allows states, through Article 11(2), to
use the SUA Convention as the legal basis for extradition.107 In terms of prosecution,
the Convention clearly states in Article 6(1) that each State party has the right to
establish jurisdiction if the offence meets one of the following requirements: (i) the
offence is against or on board a ship flying the flag of a State;108 (ii) the attack is
committed in the territory of the State, including its territorial sea;109 or (iii) the
perpetrator is a citizen of the State.110

SUA Convention
1988
ü

Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia

ü

Indonesia
Laos

x
ü

Malaysia
Myanmar

x
ü

Philippines

ü

Singapore

ü

Thailand
Vietnam

x
ü

Timor Leste

x

Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded

Table 15: Accession Status of SUA Convention in Southeast Asia111
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3.5

Overview of the Regional Legal Frameworks on Piracy

This section explains the measures taken by States at the regional level in order to
address the problem of piracy. This section will discuss various regional efforts such
as the Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP); Malacca Strait Patrol; and measures within the Association
of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework.
3.5.1

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia

Cooperation is a key element in preventing, deterring, as well as suppressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery. This cooperation could be enhanced at the multilateral,
regional as well as bilateral level. In Resolution 63/111, the United Nation General
Assembly (UNGA) stated that international, regional, sub-regional and bilateral
cooperation plays a significant role in combating piracy, armed robbery and other
threats to maritime security.112 This Resolution, which was passed on 12 February
2009, also demonstrated the concern of the international community over the
escalation of piratical acts around the world.113 Furthermore, the IMO Code of
Practice for Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
echoed this concern, urging States to adopt and implement agreements as a
cooperation tool, as well as to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships.114
In accordance with the above concerns, Asian states, especially those in
Southeast Asia, have adopted the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
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Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia.115 The Japanese initiative was
positively received by the international community. In March 2006, the UNGA
passed Resolution 60/30, which in principle welcomed ReCAAP and urged States to
conclude, adopt and implement regional agreements in high risk areas.116 ReCAAP
also served as a guide for the adoption of similar regional measures in the Western
Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.
ReCAAP went through a protracted negotiation process and was the result of
a multilateral legal framework in which States in the region sought a tool to prevent
and suppress piracy and armed robbery. The drafting of ReCAAP involved ten
members of the ASEAN, as well as another six countries from South and Northeast
Asia. In accordance with Article 18(5), ReCAAP is open to any State interested in
joining.117 However, before 4 September 2006, it was only intended that regional
States could accede to the agreement.118 Currently, ReCAAP consists of 20 parties,
but the two main players in the region – namely, Indonesia and Malaysia, are not
members. This poses a challenge to the successful implementation of the lofty goals
of ReCAAP.119
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Malaysia and Indonesia have different reasons why they remained outside the
ReCAAP arrangement.120 Malaysia did not agree that the ReCAAP ISC should be
located in Singapore. Malaysia argued that since the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre is
located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to have another reporting centre is close
proximity is unnecessary.121 Furthermore, Indonesia has concerns regarding the
presence of ReCAAP, arguing that it would undermine its sovereignty.122 The
sensitivity of Indonesia over its sovereignty in the Malacca Straits, as well as its
preference of conducting security cooperation within a bilateral framework with its
neighbours, instead of a multilateral one, account for its reservations toward
ReCAAP.123 It was also concerned that the ISC may publish reports which are unfair
to littoral States.124
Thus, both Indonesia and Malaysia do not share their information openly with
ReCAAP compared to other Southeast Asian countries which are signatories to the
arrangement. Neither State has joined ReCAAP, possibly because they fear of
exposing blind spots in their intelligence-gathering. Indonesia, according to
numerous reports125, are prone to maritime attacks and its patrol boats are old and
costly to run. But both States have stated that they would cooperate with ReCAAP126.
In case of a body aimed at information sharing (ReCAAP), this is a major issue.
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3.5.1.1 Content of ReCAAP
The constitutive text of ReCAAP defines ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery’. Indeed, these
definitions are not new to member States, as the agreement adopts the definition of
piracy from Article 101 of LOSC127, and the definition of armed robbery from the
IMO Code of Practice for the Investigation of Armed Robbery against Ships128. The
agreement also explains, in Article 3(1), that States must take necessary steps in
accordance with national and international law to: (i) prevent and suppress piracy
and armed robbery;129 (ii) arrest pirates or persons committing armed robbery;130 (iii)
seize ships or aircrafts committing piracy or armed robbery;131 and (iv) rescue victim
ships as well as victims of piracy and armed robbery.132
ReCAAP acts as a hub for information sharing, cooperation, as well as
capacity-building for member States. Through its Information Sharing Centre (ISC),
created pursuant to Article 4 of the agreement, ReCAAP operates as an information
body which shares collected information with member States.133 The ISC acts as an
international organisation which operates under the guidance of a Governing
Council. The ISC consists of representatives from each contracting party and also has
a Secretariat in Singapore, which operated for the first time on 29 November 2006.
In addition, Article 7 elaborates that the ISC serves as an information exchange
centre, as well as an organisation which analyses various reports prepared by
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127
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member States.134 In order to fulfil its function, the ISC requires focal points from
each State in order to ease the communication between itself and contracting
parties.135 Hence, Article 9 requires every State to submit their focal points that will
act on behalf of the State to inform and receive information regarding ReCAAP.136
Through the ISC, States are also able to request other States to cooperate in
identifying perpetrators of piracy or armed robbery, as mandated in Article 10.137
ReCAAP provides extradition measures. According to Article 12, member
States, in accordance with their respective national laws, must cooperate to extradite
persons who have committed piracy or armed robbery.138 If the perpetrators are
present in the territory of a member State, then upon request by the other contracting
States, the State is urged to cooperate and extradite the perpetrators to the State that
has jurisdiction over them. Furthermore, ReCAAP enables member States to seek
mutual legal assistance and share evidence in accordance with Article 13.139 In this
context, however, ReCAAP recognises the supremacy of a State’s national laws, and
therefore any prosecution, extradition or mutual legal assistance measures must be in
conformity with the prevailing national laws of the States concerned.
As a regional measure, ReCAAP does not supersede the enforcement
measures of LOSC. In line with this view, the agreement does not facilitate member
States to seize pirate ships in other States’ territorial waters. Although piracy is
subject to universal jurisdiction, ReCAAP respects the sovereignty of other States
and does not interfere in the national jurisdiction of a State. This assessment is
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embedded in Article 2(5) of the general provisions, which in principle explains that
no State is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over another State’s territorial sea.140
Although ReCAAP is unlikely to make a great impact in terms of joint
maritime enforcement operations (but does provide for operational cooperation), it is
believed that the agreement is promising and will lead the way in eradicating piracy
and armed robbery against ships.141 As stated in Article 7(9), the ISC is also entitled
to perform other functions which are considered necessary upon the consent of the
Governing Council.142 Such consent requires the Governing Council to reach a
consensus as mandated by Article 4(6)143, with a view to preventing, suppressing and
deterring piracy and armed robbery. Although this measure might seem promising,
the limited enforcement measures provided in Article 2(5) forms a barrier to the
agreement breaking through the loopholes of the high seas requirement in LOSC.144
Nonetheless, ReCAAP is a valuable tool for fostering cooperation and coordination
between States in combating piracy and armed robbery in Asia, and particularly in
Southeast Asia. Therefore, although ReCAAP lacks robust enforcement measures, its
ability to enhance mutual trust and confidence building between States may pave the
way for stronger cooperation in the future. Indeed, it is possible that ReCAAP may
lead to joint or coordinated patrolling between States over Southeast Asian waters, as
well as even more significant enforcement measures in other State’s territorial
waters.
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Southeast Asian States
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar

ReCAPP
ü
ü
x
ü
x
ü

Philippines

ü

Singapore

ü

Thailand

ü

Vietnam

ü

Timor Leste

x

Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded

Table 16: Accession Status of ReCAAP in Southeast Asia145

3.5.2

Malacca Strait Patrol
Another regional effort to suppress piracy, especially in the Malacca Straits,

is the MALSINDO (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) operation, which was
introduced in July 2004. MALSINDO is composed of navies from three littoral
States in the Malacca and Singapore Straits – namely, Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia.146 Its task is to conduct coordinated patrols within their respective
territorial seas in the Strait of Malacca. One of the weaknesses of this patrol is that it
does not allow cross border pursuit into other States’ territorial seas, as this is viewed
as an interference with State sovereignty. Indeed, even in hot pursuit, the contracting
States are not allowed to enter the territorial waters of other States.147 Thus, it is not
surprising that even after the introduction of this measure, there was no significant
reduction in piratical attacks in the Strait of Malacca since its inception until late
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2004. Nonetheless, this is understandable as MALSINDO was only able to function
for several months before the tsunami occurred in December 2004.
A significant reduction in piratical attacks around the Malacca Strait was
reported in 2005. One of the main reasons for this was the Asian tsunami, which
affected the northern part of Indonesia, Aceh and surrounding coastlines. The
tsunami resulted in the death of a vast number of people living in the northern part of
Indonesia, in Aceh, which was considered a haven for pirates. As a result, the IMB
reported that there was a 60 per cent reduction in piracy and armed robbery attacks in
2005 compared to the previous year. Furthermore, even after the recovery of the
region in the wake of the disaster, and the concomitant increase in the number of
people living in Aceh, the number of piracy cases has not been as high as in 2004.
Another reason that could account for the drop in piratical attacks in the
region is the political situation in Aceh. This province was once heavily occupied by
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), particularly before the 2004 tsunami. Indeed,
GAM had been in conflict with the Indonesian government for more than 20 years.
However, after the tsunami, both GAM and the Indonesian Government participated
in negotiations and decided to bring an end to the conflict. GAM agreed to surrender
their weapons, and the Indonesian Government agreed to withdraw thousands of
troops from the province.
The reduction in the number of piratical attacks was also influenced by the
launching of an aerial patrol over the Malacca Straits, known as the “Eyes in the
Sky” (EiS) Plan.148 This plan which is an adjunct to MALSINDO, allows patrolling
aircraft to fly over the territorial sea (up to three nautical miles) of other States. This
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measure was introduced to strengthen water patrols, which are limited to the
territorial sea of the respective States.
In 2006, the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) was formed, consisting of both
MALSINDO and EiS. The Malacca Straits Patrols Information System (MSP-IS),
which used to operate separately, later joined MSP and was re-named the
Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). This group plays an important role in the
exchange of data among member States. In 2008 and 2009, Thailand joined
MALSINDO and EiS respectively.149
3.5.3

ASEAN Measures
Piracy has also been a lingering concern for the ASEAN regime. Indeed, over

the years, various measures to combat piratical attacks have been initiated by several
ASEAN members. However, maritime security issues including piracy do not affect
all members of the organisation.150 Therefore, to date, no anti-piracy measures have
been adopted which involve all members of ASEAN.
Nonetheless, ASEAN has been committed to discussing issues related to
maritime security in their meetings. As a result, there have been three prominent
forums to address maritime security - namely, the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF),
the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting (ARF-ISM) on Maritime
Security, and the Maritime Security Expert Working Group (MSEWG)151.
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The AMF was established in July 2010 to address not only maritime security
issues such as piracy, but also other issues including the protection of the marine
environment, illegal fishing, maritime transportation as well as people smuggling.152
Moreover, it was agreed that the AMF would facilitate ASEAN connectivity through
the establishment of maritime linkages.153
The ARF-ISM, which was established in July 2008 (at the 15th meeting of the
ARF) aims to facilitate clear dialogue concerning maritime security. This dialogue
includes, but is not limited to, piracy and armed robbery, the smuggling of goods and
people, as well as capacity building and cooperation.154 The first ARF-ISM meeting
took place in Indonesia in 2009 and has since been held annually. On the third
meeting, which was held in Tokyo, the Work Plan for the group was devised. It
identified three main objectives: (i) information/intelligence exchange and sharing of
best practices, including transparency around naval capacity building operations; (ii)
confidence building measures based on international and legal frameworks,
arrangements and cooperation; and (iii) capacity building of maritime law
enforcement agencies in the region.155
The MSEWG was initiated by the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus
(ADMM Plus) during its inaugural session in October 2010. The ADMM Plus agreed
to oversee regional security issues including maritime security. The objective of the
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MSEWG is to discuss issues including, but not limited to, piracy, search and rescue
operations and illegal trafficking.156
In addition to the three forums mentioned above, ASEAN has also devised
initiatives to address maritime security threats including piracy. These initiatives
include the ASEAN Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational
Crime157, the Hanoi Declaration of 1998158, the Bali Concord II 2003159, the ASEAN
Security Community Plan of Action and Vientiane Action Programme 2004–2010160,
as well as the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint.161 In addition, in
2003, the ARF produced the ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and
Other Threats to Security.162 This statement was issued during the tenth ARF
meeting in Cambodia. The statements generally urged to promote regional
cooperation to maintain peace and stability, build upon existing modes of pacific
settlement of disputes and consider strengthening them with additional mechanisms
as needed. It also explained that maritime security is an indispensable and
fundamental condition for the welfare and economic security of the region.
Furthermore, the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters is another
instrument that could be used to enhance the investigation, prevention and
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prosecution of criminal activities by law enforcement authorities. The treaty enables
member states render to one another the widest possible measure of mutual legal
assistance in criminal matters, namely investigations, prosecutions and resulting
proceedings.163 Another political document that addresses maritime security is the
EAS Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Security Cooperation, which, in
principle, highlights the importance of enhancing regional cooperation in promoting
maritime safety and security. It also tasked member States’ respective officials to
explore the possibility of including maritime cooperation as a priority area of EAS
cooperation. 164
3.6

Analysis of the Prevailing International and Regional Legal Framework

Piracy still poses a serious threat to the region, affecting both international commerce
and human safety. The international legal frameworks governing piracy, as embodied
in the LOSC and the SUA Convention, do not appear to be adequate to resolve the
problem.165 Indeed, the definition of piracy contained in LOSC is too narrow to
encompass most of the piratical acts that occur in the Southeast Asia region. In
particular, a significant proportion of piratical attacks occur in territorial waters, but
LOSC only covers acts committed in waters beyond the territorial sea.166 Moreover,
the SUA Convention, which was intended to fill the gap left by LOSC, has failed to
gain popularity in the region. In fact, two important littoral States in the region,
Indonesia and Malaysia, are not party to the SUA Convention 1988 or its Protocol.
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Therefore, at present, the SUA Convention is essentially inapplicable in the region’s
most piracy/armed robbery afflicted waters.
Regional forums have also been used to address the issue of maritime
security, with a particular emphasis on the eradication of piracy. Forums such as the
AMF, the ARF-ISM and the MSEWG could be used as a tool to foster understanding
between States on anti-piracy measures, and to discuss the issue in an open and
transparent manner. Political instruments that were produced by some of these
forums are as follows: ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Statement on Enhancing
Cooperation among Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies issued by AMF, which, in
principle, encourages members States to promote concrete and practical cooperation
between respective Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies, and ASEAN Regional
Forum Work Plan for Maritime Security 2015-2017 issued by the ARF, which
creates a practical, long-term, coordinated and comprehensive plan that creates a
compilation of shared experiences and lessons learned between member States. It
should be noted, however, that many of these forums, including those mentioned
above, are often regarded as ‘talk shops’, and hence a more technical approach to
involving a majority of Southeast Asian states is needed.167 In light of the Malacca
Strait Patrol playing a significant role in suppressing piracy in the Strait of Malacca,
similar efforts involving a larger number of countries in the region could be part of
the solution. Furthermore, the doctrine of territorial sovereignty, which has as one of
its chief tenets the principle of non-intervention, still plays a pivotal role in the
foreign policy of regional States. The application of this approach should be
reconsidered, as it forms one of the barriers to multilateral cooperation. Indeed, it is
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proposed that a cooperative mind-set should be developed and promoted among
Southeast Asian States, along with an understanding that regional cooperation does
not preclude respect for a State’s territorial sovereignty.
Extra-regional actors could also play a role in enhancing maritime security in
the region. Their understanding of maritime security issues (including piracy), could
help in the capacity building of people and communities in Southeast Asia.168
Moreover, extra-regional actors could be involved in enhancing interregional
initiatives such as ReCAAP. Indeed, they could join ReCAAP and promulgate
initiatives to eradicate piracy. The involvement of Thailand in the Malacca Strait
Patrols, as well as the growing number of States joining ReCAAP, demonstrates the
possibility of expanding regional cooperation.169 Furthermore, ReCAAP’s growing
membership can be seen as an indication that States in the region are becoming
increasingly aware of the importance of cooperation to combat maritime security
challenges. ReCAAP was proposed by Japan, ‘which emphasized sharing
information about ships victimized by and suspected of committing piracy and armed
robbery’170. Its inception has changed Japan’s aid distribution pattern. Japan
channelled

aid for maritime security capacity building through the multilateral

ReCAAP.171 Most of the Southeast Asian States perceived this Japanese initiative as
a positive measure to address maritime security in the region. Japan’s contribution,
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particularly funding of ReCAAP, was also welcomed by most Southeast Asian
States.
Building trust and confidence among Southeast Asian States could also play a
pivotal role in solving maritime issues such as piracy. Trust and confidence-building
measures, such as information sharing would diffuse tension and uncertainly between
States, resulting in better relations. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, which
is based in Singapore, collects, analyses and disseminates information regarding
piratical attacks and threats in the region. Another information sharing framework is
the Information Fusion Centre (IFC), which is hosted by the Republic of Singapore
Navy’s Changi Command and Control Centre (C2C). The IFC communicates with
relevant agencies in order to share maritime security-related information.
Furthermore, the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Community Information Sharing
Portal (AMSCIP), which was established by the ADMM-Plus EWG on Maritime
Security, facilitates information sharing between the member States172. Nonetheless,
despite of the presence of numerous information sharing arrangements, the current
situation is far from perfect and there are definitely gaps since there is no single
institutional measure that sufficiently covers all information sharing across all States
in the region. However, this can only be achieved if the political environment in the
region is supportive.173 Therefore, issues surrounding security and arms race
escalation would need to be set aside. Moreover, the expansion of military forces
should not occur because of an arms race, or security dilemma, but more to facilitate
the need of cooperation.
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Despite the sharp decline in the number of piracy cases in the Malacca Straits
since 2004, piratical attacks continue to occur.174 Indeed, the current situation could
be improved if Indonesia and Malaysia (as coastal States) would enhance the
economic condition of their citizens, reduce poverty and unemployment. In addition,
measures such as the MSP continue to play an important role and should therefore be
continued. Whilst it is imprudent to suggest that the MSP directly caused the dip in
reported cases of piracy since 2004, it can be securely asserted that regional
cooperation and coordination in anti-piracy operations among littoral States
contributed to this decline.175
It is evident that the current maritime security focus in the Strait of Malacca
must be extended to other parts of the region. The significant decline in piracy cases
post-2004 is not only due to the Asian tsunami, but a variety of measures taken by
littoral States. It is proposed that these same measures be adapted and applied in
other piracy prone areas in the region such as the Sulu and Celebes seas.176
3.7 Conclusion
Piracy still constitutes a serious threat to maritime security in Southeast Asia.
Numerous piratical attacks, which have been reported by the IMO, IMB and
ReCAAP, show that the problem is still prevalent. Although piracy attacks continue
to occur, States are taking actions at both the international and regional levels. At the
international level, anti-piracy measures have been addressed by international
conventions such as LOSC and SUA Convention. At the regional level, measures
have also been taken through ReCAAP, the Malacca Strait Patrol and ASEAN.
174
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However, from the discussions of this chapter, it could be concluded that the current
international and regional frameworks are inadequate in addressing the problem.
Piracy/armed robbery against ships are transnational crimes which cannot be solved
nationally and therefore cooperation among the regional States is needed.
Furthermore, enhancing cooperation with extra regional players is also another
option that could be taken by regional States in combating the problem.
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CHAPTER IV
4 Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia

4.1

Introduction

Maritime terrorism is considered a critical maritime security threat in Southeast Asia.
As mentioned in the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter
Terrorism: the ‘ASEAN heads of states view acts of terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound
threat to international peace and security which require concerted action to protect
and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world’1. In order to address
this, the ARF member States committed to continue existing activities, including
joint coordinated patrols, intelligence and information exchange, and exercises to
combat piracy, armed robbery against ships at sea and other transnational crimes
(including terrorism).2 Terrorism involves a group of people who are associated with
a particular organisation conducting criminal activities to fulfil their political
ambitions.3 It involves violence (or the threat of violence) being intentionally
directed against civilians to create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.
In order to exert political pressure, terrorists often target their attacks to
achieve maximum publicity, usually claiming credit for what they have done.
Furthermore, terrorists seek to create enduring damage through their actions. This
1
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damage can be psychological, in the sense of cultivating an atmosphere of fear and
panic, or it may take the form of physical acts causing damage or destruction, the
intention being that the relevant authorities may concede (or partially concede) to the
terrorists’ demands.4
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the international and regional
frameworks governing maritime terrorism. In order to understand the extent of the
problem in Southeast Asia, as well as the counter-terrorism measures that have been
implemented, this chapter will explore: (i) maritime terrorism as a security threat; (ii)
the type of maritime terrorism threats in Southeast Asia; (iii) the international legal
framework governing maritime terrorism; (iv) the regional legal framework which
seeks to address maritime terrorism; and (v) the prevailing gaps that exist in both the
international and regional frameworks.
This chapter concludes that the existing frameworks at both international and
regional levels are inadequate to address maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, because of its transnational nature, maritime terrorism cannot be
addressed through unilateral State action. Indeed, regional cooperation involving all
States in Southeast Asia is required in order to eradicate maritime terrorism in the
region.

4.2

Maritime Terrorism as a Maritime Security Threat

Maritime terrorism is widely recognised as a maritime security threat. Terrorists
operate in maritime areas and target naval and civilian vessels.5 A definition of

4
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maritime terrorism was introduced by a Working Group of the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)6 in 2009. It defined maritime terrorism as:
the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment,
using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of
their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including
tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.7

Although the definition formulated by the CSCAP Working Group sheds
some light on the issue, the definition lacks detail about terrorism itself, and leaves
unanswered the question of whether attacks against military vessels or merchant
ships would fall within the ambit of maritime terrorism. In the past, domestic courts
have treated terrorist attacks against ships as acts of piracy under their respective
national legislation. Indeed, this has occurred even though the acts in question were
not committed for private ends and only involved one ship. The reason for this was
that, at the time, there was no international regulation punishing terrorists, and so in
order to bring the perpetrators to justice, domestic courts treated terrorist attacks as
forms of piracy.8
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea9 (LOSC) has defined
piracy in Article 101, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.10 Although the
definitions of piracy and maritime terrorism are quite similar, there are several
factors that differentiate the two illegal acts. The first concerns the aim or motivation
of the attacks. Piracy is associated with acts which are perpetrated for private ends

6
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(such as financial rewards), whereas maritime terrorism seeks to fulfil political
motivations. The second factor relates to the means by which the illegal acts are
conducted. Piratical attacks usually involve basic tactics such as boarding vessels and
stealing valuables, as well as the use or threatened use of force or violence. On the
other hand, while maritime terrorism may involve the basic tactics of piracy, the
ultimate objective of terrorist acts is obtain strategic political benefits. Even though
these factors distinguish the two acts, the possibility exists for offenders to carry out
piratical attacks in order to finance maritime or other terrorism.11
Speculation has arisen of a link between piracy and maritime terrorism with
regard to numerous maritime attacks in Southeast Asia. Although the modus
operandi of the two acts is quite similar, the distinction lies in the motive behind the
particular attack. As stated earlier, maritime terrorism has political motives, whereas
piracy is conducted chiefly for private ends. In conducting their attacks, maritime
terrorists require specialised knowledge and skills that pirates tend to possess.
However, such skills may not be sufficient where the intention is to stage a major
terrorist attack, and therefore terrorists are also suspected of having links with former
naval personnel and commercial seafarers in Southeast Asia.12 Furthermore, it is
believed that pirates in the region have been receiving assistance from other actors
when hijacking marine assets (including any cargo) and then on-selling it to other
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parties.13 Indeed, it would be almost impossible for pirates to on-sell hijacked assets
without comprehensive planning and connections to other criminal syndicates.14
It is important to note the different motives of piracy. One of the motives of
piracy is to obtain a financial benefit. Indeed, this view was emphasised at the 2004
Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific (MSAP) Conference, which identified that the
most pressing issue in the region was the need to fight pirates, not terrorists.15 This is
because pirates are now fully trained and are most often armed with grenades,
automatic weapons, as well as anti-tank missiles. Furthermore, they tend to be
equipped with global positioning and satellite system phones.16 As major sources of
funding for terrorist groups are increasingly being frozen by the international
community, terrorists may turn to piracy to support their activities. Moreover, as both
terrorists and pirates have operated in the same areas for extended periods of time,
such as in the Sulu Sea and the Arabian Sea, it is not difficult for them to work
together and mutually support each other’s activities.
During the 1990s, terrorism was not considered a major international
maritime security threat. Therefore, unlike other maritime security threats, such as
piracy and armed robbery at sea, maritime terrorism was not regulated by a specific
international instrument.17 The international community only developed a formal
response to maritime terrorism after the Achille Lauro incident which occurred in
1985. During this incident four armed terrorists hijacked the Achille Lauro in the
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Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Alexandria, Egypt. Approximately 320
crewmembers and 80 passengers were taken hostage.18 The terrorists identified
themselves as members of the Palestine Liberation Front and demanded the release
of 50 Palestinian militants imprisoned in Israel. The first international legal
framework which was adopted to suppress the act of maritime terrorism was the
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime
Navigation19 (SUA Convention).
There have been several other instances of maritime terrorism that have
occurred since then. For instance, on 4 May 1991, a maritime terrorism incident
occurred against Abheeta, a Sri Lankan naval ship.20 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) claimed responsibility for the attack, which took place on the north
Sri Lankan harbour at Kankesanthurai. A similar terrorist attack occurred in October
2000 against the USS Cole, this time off the coast of Yemen. During this incident
United States Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) was attacked by
Al-Qaeda while it was being refuelled in the port of Aden. It was reported that 39
sailors were injured and 17 were killed.21 Despite these attacks, history has shown
that maritime terrorism is not a common form of terrorism.22 Indeed, terrorists are
more likely to target domains which allow for easy planning and will result in a
greater number of casualties. These include the aviation sector and land-based
targets. Furthermore, to conduct maritime terrorism, terrorists require certain
18
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equipment, such as ships and weapons, as well as particular skills, such as boarding
techniques and knowledge of ship operations. Therefore, terrorists who choose to
commit illegal activities in the maritime domain most often have naval skills and
usually originate from coastal States.23
Nonetheless, after the 9/11 attacks, terrorist groups widened their attention
from the aviation sector and land-based targets to include the maritime domain,
targeting container traffic, port infrastructure and the shipping industry. This shift is
due to the fact that international community has gone to great lengths to stem the tide
of terrorist attacks in the sky and on land, whereas the maritime sector had been left
largely unprotected and is thus vulnerable to attack.24 This shift towards maritime
targets has been identified by terrorists themselves. Following their apprehension in
2001, members of the militant group Jemaah Islamiah stated that they intended to
attack naval ships and facilities which belonged to the US. In early 2002, terrorists
planned to attack a US warship in the Indian Ocean by hijacking a civilian aircraft
and then crashing it into the warship. Although Moroccan authorities foiled a
terrorist plot to attack merchant ships in Strait of Gibraltar in mid-200225, a ferry, the
Super Ferry 14, was bombed by terrorists in Manila Bay in the Philippines in
February 2004.26

23

Brian Michael Jenkins et al, A chronology of terrorist attacks and other criminal actions against
maritime targets (1983) 4.
24
Chalk, above n 23, 22.
25
Tanner Campbell and Rohan Gunaratna, Maritime terrorism, piracy and crime (Singapore, Eastern
Universities Press, 2003), 77-80.
26
Acharya, above n 21, 116.

108

Figure 6: Global Terrorism Index 2002-201127

Terrorists are able to use sophisticated tactics when conducting their
activities. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks represent the most prominent example of the high
level tactics that can be used in the commission of terrorist activities. Unfortunately,
terrorist groups are able to imitate these types of attacks in the maritime domain.28
On 23 October 2000, LTTE suicide boats breached the heavily guarded port of
Trincomalee in Sri Lanka, destroying a fast personnel carrier in what was similar to
27
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the attack on the USS Cole on 12 October 2000. An Israeli naval craft was also
attacked one month later by a Hamas suicide boat, although the attack was not
entirely successful, with the boat exploding prematurely and causing only minimal
damage to its intended target. In addition to the suicide attacks described above, the
maritime domain could provide an opportunity for terrorists to explore new methods
of attack. Indeed, the impact of such attacks to maritime assets would undoubtedly
command the attention of both government officials and the general public.29 The
Global Terrorism Index figure above shows those States that were victims of terrorist
attacks in the period 2002-2011. Even though terrorist attacks are distributed widely
around the world, the majority are concentrated in just a handful of countries such as
Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but with numerous attacks in maritime Southeast
Asia.
Another explanation for the shift towards maritime terrorism is the link
between terrorism and other forms of organised crime, such as piracy. Terrorists and
other criminal actors stand to mutually benefit by working with one another.30 In
order to sustain and support their activities, terrorists require sources of funding. By
working with other criminals, such as pirates, terrorists are able to gain access to the
proceeds of crime and thus finance their activities. The final reason for the shift of
terrorism into the maritime domain is that terrorists have become increasingly aware
of the importance of the sea to global trade. Approximately 90 per cent of the
world’s cargo is transported by sea, and therefore any interruption to maritime assets,
such as shipping lanes or port infrastructure, would affect world trade. This situation
29
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fits the ultimate objective of terrorist groups – that is, to gain the attention of major
stakeholders (including governments) through their attacks, and then force the
relevant parties to fulfil their demands. This type of attack would produce the
maximum impact for the minimum cost.31
In the same way that the US World Trade Centre functioned as a hub of
international trade, major sea lanes, such as the Strait of Malacca, serve as strategic
routes for global trade and commerce.32 The supply chains of goods, which are based
on real-time accuracy, are connected to one another and interdependent. Therefore,
any disruption to major sea lanes would seriously impact the world economy. One of
the strategists of the global jihadist movement, Abu Musab al-Suri, has
acknowledged the importance of the maritime domain, stating that global trade could
be brought to a halt by closing down the sea passages through which the world’s oil
supply is transported. This could be achieved by attacking or sinking US ships or
those of its allies.33 Jihad Press, which is linked to al-Qaeda, posted an article in 2008
which stated the necessity of waging battle in the maritime domain.34 Jihadist forums
conducted in late 2009 also planned to launch a campaign which would specifically
deal with targets in the maritime domain. This campaign was popularly known as the
‘Battle of the Masts Media Invasion’. Its aim was to attack strategic American
military assets at sea, specifically submarines, vessels and ships.35
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4.3

Types of Threats of Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Terrorist attacks in the maritime domain are of great concern due to their potential
flow on effects on trade and commerce.36 Indeed, the maritime sector is vulnerable to
terrorist attacks, as the international community has largely concentrated on
developing sets of measures that guard against land-based terrorism. Maritime
terrorism can be seen in recent attacks directed at assets in the maritime space.
Arguably, terrorists have been able to deal with the operational constraints of the
maritime sector by working with other criminal syndicates which are experienced in
sea-based crimes.37 Nonetheless maritime terrorism is different from other sea-based
crime. Terrorists are motivated by their political objectives and not for financial gain.
The objective of maritime terrorism is for immediate or strategic political goals.
Terrorists are willing to learn from previous mission failures and can have the
patience to wait until they have expanded their capabilities to ensure a higher
probability of mission success. Other sea-based crime such as piracy, for example, is
committed for financial gain. Pirates are looking for the greatest return on their
investment, and are willing to redirect their efforts on targets of opportunity that
offer the highest probability of success.
Southeast Asia is well known for its waterways, which are highly significant
for global trade and commerce.38 Straits such as the Malacca Strait, the Singapore
Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait are among those important straits
which are located in Southeast Asia. Thus, from a geographical perspective, any
disruption to these waterways would have serious consequences for relevant
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stakeholders, including government and industry organisations. These waterways are
positioned between islands of Southeast Asian States which are populated by people
who do not have ideal economic, social or political conditions.39 Furthermore, the
region is known for its shallow reefs, tiny islands and narrow channels. This
geography creates a volatile environment which is ideal for the commission of
maritime crimes such as piracy and terrorism.
The chokepoints, which are located in different parts of the narrow channels,
provide a perfect opportunity for terrorists to conduct illegal acts. The Malacca Strait
connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. This 1000kilometre-long strait serves as one of the busiest shipping lane in the world, with
approximately 50 per cent of the world’s large ships traversing through it each year.
These ships include container ships, bulk carriers, as well as oil tankers.
Furthermore, it is through the Malacca Strait alone that approximately 50 per cent of
Asia’s oil supply is transported.
The Singapore Strait also has narrow points which make it ideal for
perpetrators to conduct maritime crime. The narrowest point of the Phillips Channel
located in the Singapore Strait is only 1.5 miles wide. A planned attack on US ships
in this area by members of the Jemaah Islamiah was uncovered by Singaporean
authorities with those involved being apprehended. The strategy of the terrorists was
to bomb US ships travelling eastwards from Sembawang Wharf by means of a small
suicide vessel. Due to the channel being very narrow, the possibility of the US ship
escaping from the suicide vessel would have been low.40
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Therefore, ramming a suicide vessel into a targeted ship (in a similar style to
the attacks on the USS Cole and the Limburg) could be a potential tactic used by
terrorists. The incident involving Limburg occurred in October 2002 in the Gulf of
Aden where an explosives-laden dinghy bumped into the side of the vessel, is an
example of this mode of terrorist attack. The Limburg, which was carrying more than
390,000 barrels of crude oil caught fire and around 90,000 barrels of oil leaked into
the ocean and caused pollution to the marine environment. It was reported that one
crew member was killed and 12 others were injured.41

Another tactic which

terrorists could use to disrupt the flow of world trade would be to place huge ships at
chokepoints, thus causing container and other ships to find alternative routes and
undoubtedly increasing transport costs for industry.42
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in
2003 produced a report which discussed the risks posed by terrorist organisations to
the international merchant maritime transport system.43 The report elaborated the
economic impact of terrorist attacks against maritime transport assets. Some of the
risk factors identified by the OECD which are relevant in Southeast Asia include risk
to vessels, financing and logistics support, and risks to people.
The motivations of terrorists to attack vessels include holding the crew
hostage for ransom, to hijack its cargo or sink the vessel.44 In order to support
terrorist activities of their linked groups, major terrorist groups are able to provide
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financial as well as logistics support using maritime transportation. Furthermore, the
involvement of a large number of seafarers in international trade on commercial
vessels makes them vulnerable as victims of terrorist attacks directed against
vessels.45
Maritime terrorism poses a threat to trade and commerce in Southeast Asia.
Ports serve as hubs for the transport of logistics from one region to another46. These
logistics are usually stored in containers and transported to destined ports.
Containerisation has changed the delivery of logistics from the traditional port to port
method to a modern door to door delivery service. Therefore, goods are able to reach
their final destination without ever being opened during the shipping process.
Although every port has a certain level of capability, the most heavily
frequented ports are those which can provide complete logistic networks and
accommodate large container ships. Indeed, there are only several ports which are
large enough to handle the high volume of containers required for global seaborne
trade and commerce. Apart from their capability, these mega ports must be located in
areas or along the sea lanes through which a high density of ships traverse. To
illustrate the importance of ports to sea trade, one estimate has been made that if the
Port of Singapore were to close, the toll to the global economy would exceed $200
billion per year.47 Another prominent example is the 2002 shutdown of ports on the
west coast of the US. This closure caused losses of approximately a billion dollars
each day.48
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Given the importance of ports (and especially mega ports) to the world’s
economy, it is easy to see why terrorists would choose to target them. Terrorists are
able to create bombs from liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), first by hijacking LPG
carriers and then exploding them in order to disrupt port activities.49 Through this
kind of attack, not only would port facilities be damaged or destroyed, but the real
potential exists for the loss of human life.50 A fireball 1,200 meters wide could well
be generated by the explosion of a ship tanker carrying 600 tonnes of LPG.51
The planting of bombs in ports could also be achieved by smuggling them in
containers carrying logistics. Maritime terrorists not only target ports, but also carry
out attacks on ships.52 In order to reduce the risk of being attacked, ship owners or
captains could choose alternative routes which are less likely to be targeted by
terrorists. However, this is likely to increase transportation costs for business – costs
which would then have to be passed on to consumers.
Terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia have significant maritime
capabilities. Organisations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group, Laskar Jihad, Jemaah
Islamiyah, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, Al-Qaeda and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front have all allegedly committed maritime attacks since 2000. Marine
areas are also being used by terrorists to ship weapons from one place to another.53
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4.3.1

Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia

There are several terrorist groups in the region which have maritime capabilities, and
are thus well placed to carry out terrorist attacks against maritime targets. They
include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in
the Philippines, Jemaah Islamiah and Al-Qaeda.54 One of the pioneers of maritime
terrorism in Asia was the LTTE. This militant group had approximately 3000
personnel and equipped with more than one hundred surface and underwater
vehicles. Furthermore, LTTE had a dedicated maritime division for developing
marine engineering and boat-building capabilities, as well as underwater demolition
teams. The LTTE only operated in Sri Lanka, but was known to share information
regarding maritime techniques and tactics with other terrorist groups, such as MILF
and ASG.55
Although not every terrorist group in Southeast Asia is able to conduct
maritime terrorism, each group does have its own agenda and individual capability to
commit maritime crime. Some of the groups which are well placed to carry out
maritime terrorist attacks include ASG, MILF, GAM, JI and Al-Qaeda.56
4.3.1.1 Abu Sayyaf Group
The coastal area of the southern Philippines is favourable for terrorists to conduct
their activities. This area is composed of islets, reefs, thick jungles and rockymountains, creating an ideal environment for illegal maritime activities. Most of the
people living in the area belong to the ‘Bajau’ or ‘Sea Gypsy’ tribe – a group that
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relies on fishing (particularly in the Sulu Sea) for their livelihood.57 The Muslim
‘Moros’, one of the local clans in the southern Philippines, maintain their maritimebased sultanates because Spanish colonialists were not able to integrate them into the
local population. They also rejected the transfer of sovereignty of the Philippines to
the US. Even after the US granted the Philippines independence in 1946, the Moros,
whose territories were also previously subject to US rule, demanded freedom.58
Most ASG members are based in the island of Basilan in the Sulu
archipelago, in the southern Philippines.59 They are known to have maritime
capabilities and have engaged in banditry and piracy in the region. ASG is divided
into different factions, each being led by veterans of the Afghan Jihadi. They have
previously attacked numerous targets in their operational areas including in and
around the Sulu and Celebes Seas in the southern Philippines, Kalimantan in
Indonesia and east Malaysia.60
The group is also known to smuggle weapons to different regions within
Southeast Asia. Indeed, ASG has smuggled weapons as far as Indonesia’s Maluku
and Sulawesi Islands. The Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in the East
Timor Sea considers ASG a threat to their operations.61
The Abu Sayyaf Group is known to have committed a series of attacks,
particularly in Manila, the eastern part of Malaysia, as well as in the southern part of
the Philippines.62 Their first attack occurred on the 11 August 1991 against MV
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Doulos which was stopping in the southern Philippine port of Zamboanga City. A
member of the Abu Sayyaf group threw a grenade on the vessel and killed more than
five people and 32 people were injured. Another major attack occurred in April 1995
in the Philippines, when terrorists landed by boat in the town of Ipil and killed more
than fifty people. During the same attack, they were able to rob no less than five
banks. The terrorist group gained increasing notoriety after they were successful in
kidnapping people in and around the Sulu and Celebes Seas. Between 2000 and
2001, Abu Sayyaf was successful in abducting people from the Philippines,
Malaysia, America, Europe and China. According to Philippine authorities, the
bombing and sinking of the SuperFerry 14 in early 2004 was carried out by Abu
Sayyaf. This attack, which occurred near Manila, killed more than one hundred
people. Furthermore, a 2005 bomb attack against the ferry Dona Ramona was
allegedly attributed to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A bomb which was hidden in a
trash can exploded on Dona Ramona which was docked at the wharf at Lamitan, on
the island of Basilan. The incident killed two people and caused injury to more than
20 other.63 In order to address this issue, authorities are now required to take
necessary measures to ensure the safety of people on passenger ships, such as
tightening security and screening luggage and passengers boarding the ship.
The kidnapping raids on Sipadan in 2000 and Palawan in 2001 were among
Abu Sayyaf’s criminal maritime operations. The group also claimed responsibility
for the bombing of Davao City port in 2003, which caused the death of 16 people and
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injured more than 50.64 Even though their blue (high seas) water capability is
inadequate, they are certainly capable of executing brown (riverine) and green
(coastal and archipelagic) water operations.
During their operations, ASG members use boats which are equipped with
machine guns. These boats, which are usually made out of wood, can travel at fast
speeds, sometimes outrunning naval vessels.65 ASG members are able to navigate
these boats in areas where reefs and swamps predominate. In addition to small boats
which allow for maximum speed across shorter distances, the group owns larger
ships which are able to travel on longer journeys.66 In terms of weaponry, ASG units
are armed with hand guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), grenade launchers and
assault rifles. Their strategy is to hit and run; therefore, after mounting an attack,
ASG members tend to run into reefs and swamps to avoid being apprehended by
authorities. Most ASG attacks involve kidnapping (the attack on Superferry 14 is an
exception in this regard), in order to extract ransoms from victims’ families,
companies and/or the relevant authorities. For these types of operations, ASG prefers
small craft to bigger boats, as they are able to travel at faster speeds and stop quickly
at any point.67
4.3.1.2 Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Although the Moros are located in the southern Philippines, many of them still refuse
to regard themselves as Filipinos and are motivated to create their own Muslim state.
The MILF’s maritime domain operations are supported by their land-based
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capabilities.68 The group is known to possess and effectively operate numerous types
of weapons including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are equipped with
electronic detonators. Apart from using IEDs on their targets, which include ferries
and ports, MILF are able to conduct green water and brown water operations. They
carry weapons from one place to another and engage in people smuggling activities.
Even though the MILF are able to navigate the Philippine/Indonesian archipelago,
they are not able to conduct extended operations due to a shortage of logistical
capability.69 Therefore, their blue water capability is not as strong as their brown and
green water operations.
Some of the operations undertaken by MILF include attacks against seaports
and ferries using IEDs, smuggling, as well as minor clashes with government forces.
Their intention is to destroy critical infrastructure and create civilian casualties. In
order to avoid apprehension by government forces, the Moros are unlikely to engage
in untoward behaviour in the presence of authorities; but when their liberty is
threatened, they will try to escape into reefs and swamps using speedboats. It is
important to note, however, that the operations conducted by MILF – such as
kidnapping for ransom, sabotage, assassination and piracy, have been in steady
decline. This is because the group has been engaged in peaceful negotiations with the
Philippine government in an effort to find the best resolution for both parties. So as
to not jeopardise these talks, and to demonstrate their commitment to a peaceful
settlement, the Moros have scaled back their maritime operations.70
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4.3.1.3 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
Located in Aceh province of Indonesia, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or the Free
Aceh Movement is well known for having conducted maritime operations.
Nonetheless, the group signed a peace agreement with the Indonesian government in
2005 and participated in the local elections. The 2004 tsunami and the constant
operation of the Indonesian military were among the reasons GAM decided to
reconcile with Indonesia.
Aceh, which is located in the northernmost part of the Sumatera Island, has a
number of small islands on its western coast. The area is favourable for maritime
operations as it has an abundance of reefs, islets, small coves and mangrove swamps.
The province also serves as the gateway to the Malacca Strait, as it is located on the
northern tip of the strait.71 Numerous people living near the coast of Aceh province
rely on smuggling and other maritime crimes as a source of income. Attacks against
merchant ships were carried out by the people of Aceh since the 19th century.72 In an
effort to stem the tide of these attacks, more control started to be exerted by
Indonesian, Dutch and Japanese forces during those times.73
In terms of natural resources, Aceh is known to have abundant natural gas
fields.74 Indeed, GAM perceived Aceh to be favourable not only in terms of the
marine environment, but also as an area rich in natural gas. This was one of the
reasons that spurred GAM to pressure the Indonesian government for its own state.
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GAM operated in several areas, including the Strait of Malacca, the
Singapore Strait, southern Thailand and Myanmar and west Malaysia.75 Although
GAM was not capable of blue water operations, their crafts are able to navigate into
high seas areas. Despite this lack of capacity in blue water operations, GAM was
capable of conducting brown and green water operations. During their operations,
GAM usually used speed boats, fishing boats and tug boats to smuggle both people
and weapons. GAM was also known to target facilities and personnel of the
International Petroleum Company, as well as Indonesian forces working in Aceh. In
order to gain financial benefits, GAM was accused of committing maritime crimes
such as kidnapping and piracy. With two or three boats operating together, GAM
usually intercepted passing ships and demanded that valuables be handed over. In
order to coerce crews to surrender, GAM members resort to firing shots against the
pilothouse of ships.
GAM was linked to piracy rings operating in the Malacca Strait, as well as to
criminal syndicates which smuggle arms, narcotics and petroleum.76 They also
received support from ethnic Acehnese in Penang, Malaysia, and Islamic mariners in
southern Thailand.77
In addition to targeting the international shipping sector in the Strait of
Malacca, GAM committed attacks against ships which provide offshore oil facilities
with services and logistics. However, a drastic reduction in piratical attacks
(especially in Indonesia’s maritime area), was seen after the tsunami that occurred in
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2004.78 Indeed, many coastal fishing villages in Aceh – the point of origin for many
Southeast Asian maritime attacks - were damaged or totally destroyed in the disaster.
Significant numbers of GAM personnel, many of whom were suspected of having
been engaged in piracy, also died in the tsunami.79
4.3.1.4 Jemaah Islamiah
Unlike other terrorist groups, Jemaah Islamiah (JI) does not possess intensive
maritime capabilities. However, they have used Southeast Asian waterways to
transfer recruits, especially from Indonesia to the Philippines where their training
camps are conducted. The group has also undertaken surveillance operations of oil
refinery facilities on Jurong Island located in Southwest of Singapore and closely
observed a US vessel at the Changi naval base.80 Despite their limited maritime
capabilities, JI have established communication networks with other, well-equipped
terrorists groups in the region, including ASG and MILF. In this regard, it is
important to note that the attack against Superferry 14 is suspected of having been
committed by several terrorist groups, among them ASG, JI and Raja Suleiman
Islamic Movement.81
Jemaah Islamiah is one terrorist group that poses a severe threat to the Strait
of Malacca. Not only has the group attempted to attack ships passing through the
Strait, but it has also targeted US vessels headed for Singapore.82 In 2003,
Singapore’s then-Deputy Prime Minister, Tony Tan, speaking at the Shangri-La
Dialogue, asserted that terrorists would start focusing their efforts in the maritime
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domain. The Deputy Prime Minister also noted that that the shift towards terrorists
targeting assets in the maritime domain (and especially those in the commercial
shipping sector), was due to difficulties they had encountered when targeting land
and aviation targets.83
4.3.1.5 Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda is another terrorist group that is present in the region. Its willingness to
attack maritime assets is well documented, especially in a file called ‘targets of
opportunity’. The file was discovered following the apprehension of Abdulrahim
Mohammed Abda al-Nashiri, chief of Al-Qaeda’s naval operations. This file lists the
terrorist group’s maritime targets, which include large cruise liners and naval vessels.
Another Al-Qaeda member, Tawfiq bin Attash, popularly known as Khallad, was the
master planner of the attack on the USS Cole. Khallad was also present at an AlQaeda meeting in 2000, during which the 9/11 attacks and other operations
(including those committed in Southeast Asia), were discussed.84
Documents that provide diving instructions, as well information on the use of
equipment for military operations, have been found in the house of the Al-Qaeda’s
commander of military operations, Mohammad Atef. The capability of Al-Qaeda to
create a naval fleet that could carry cargoes of lethal chemicals and nuclear weapons
was revealed in a report published in September 2003.85 Furthermore in 2005 it was
reported that Al-Qaeda was working together with their linked groups to “train
militants in scuba diving for seaborne terror attacks.” 86
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Al-Qaeda has links to other extremist organisations such as ASG and Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), with the three organisations conducting joint training camps in the
southern Philippines. They use ferries and speedboats to move from one camp to
another, usually between Sabah and Borneo.87 Furthermore, Al-Qaeda, in concert
with Jemaah Islamiyah and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, has planned to disrupt
global trade and attack US naval forces in Southeast Asia. However, such attacks
have been disrupted on numerous occasions due to the intervention of regional
security forces.
Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda concealed and transferred their assets to
Southeast Asia as result of the crackdown on Middle Eastern funding mechanisms.88
Even though concerns have been raised over terrorist activities in Southeast Asia,
particularly after the 9/11 attacks, effective measures are still lacking to combat
maritime terrorism in the region. Several reasons have been proposed for this deficit
of action, including the poor enforcement capacity of States, a general lack of
political will, as well as the unavailability or weakness of States’ domestic legislation
governing terrorism.89 Due to these shortcomings, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda
are still able to use Southeast Asia as their financial hub, and therefore States in the
region must pay more attention to the issue and implement concrete measures to
disrupt terrorist activities.90

87

Bradford, above n 54, 71.
Jane MacCartney and Simon Cameron-Moore, ‘US to Freeze ‘Terror’ Funds in SE Asia’ (March
2003) 13 Reuters
89
Zachary Abuza, ‘Funding terrorism in Southeast Asia: the financial network of Al Qaeda and
Jemaah Islamiya’ (2003) Contemporary Southeast Asia 169, 169-199. Also see Rommel Banlaoi,
Philippine Security In The Age Of Terror: National, Regional, and Global Challenges In The Post9/11 World (CRC Press, 2009), 75-91.
90
Hong and Ng, above n 6, 53.
88

126

Terrorist Group

Attack

Year

Maritime
Attack

Abu Sayyaf

Attack against MV Doulos. This
incident killed more than five people
and 32 people were injured.
Raided the mostly Christian town of
Ipil in the southern Philippines,
killing more than 50 people after
robbing banks and stores and burning
the town center
Gunmen seized 21 people, including
Western tourists, from a Malaysian
resort and took them to their
Philippine stronghold in Jolo Island;
most are released in exchange for
millions of dollars in ransom
reportedly paid by Libya.
Americans and other tourists are
snatched from the Dos Palmas resort
in the southwestern Philippine
province of Palawan, starting a year
long kidnapping saga that left several
hostages dead, including Americans
Guillermo Sobero and Martin
Burnham.
33 Christian residents of Balobo
village on southern Philippine
Basilan Island are taken hostage and
10 are beheaded.
Triple bombings on Bali, Indonesia,
kill 202, mostly foreign tourists,
including 88 Australians.
A nail-laden bomb detonates in
Zamboanga city in southern
Philippines, killing four, including an
American Green Beret. Four more
bomb attacks during the month,
killing 16.
A suicide bomber attacks the J.W.
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 11.
A bomb on a passenger Superferry
14 in Manila Bay kills 116 in the
Philippines’ worst terrorist strike.
Three crewmen of a Malaysian
tugboat are abducted off Malaysia’s
Sabah state; they are believed to have
either died of illness or killed by their
captors.
A suicide bomber detonates a ton of
explosives packed into a delivery van
outside the Australian Embassy in
Jakarta, killing 11 and wounding
200.
Almost simultaneous bombings in

August 1991

Yes

April 1995

No

April 2000

No

May 2001

No

August 2001

No

October 2002

No

October 2002

No

August 2003

No

February 2004

Yes

April 2004

Yes

September 2004

No

February 2005

No

Abu Sayyaf

Abu Sayyaf

Al-Qaida helped
fund the attacks
Abu Sayyaf

Abu Sayyaf
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Abu Sayyaf

Manila and two southern cities kill
eight and wound more than 100.
Triple suicide bombers kill 20 in
attacks on restaurants in Bali.
Attack against a ferry Dona Ramona.
The incident killed two people and
caused injury to more than 20 others
Gunmen on Jolo kidnap three aid
workers of the International
Committee of the Red Cross from
Switzerland, Italy and the
Philippines. They are freed
separately, reportedly after ransom is
paid.
Filipino militants kidnap an
American, her teenage son and
Filipino cousin. She is freed two
months later and the boy escapes in
December.
Gunmen seize two tourists, one
Dutch and one Swiss, in Tawi-Tawi
province in southern Philippines.

October 2005

No

August 2005

Yes

January 2009

No

July 2011

No

February 2012

No

Table 17: Major terror attacks in Southeast Asia91

4.4

International Framework on Maritime Terrorism

This section discusses the international framework to combat maritime terrorism,
including the SUA Convention and its Protocol and the International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code.
4.4.1

The SUA Convention and Protocol

Maritime terrorism was not a significant issue when the LOSC was signed in 1982,
and therefore provisions on terrorism were excluded from the agreement. Even
though, to some extent, there are similarities between piracy and maritime terrorism,
91
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there is a unique feature that differentiates the two crimes. Indeed, whereas maritime
terrorism is conducted to achieve political ends, the main motivation of piracy is to
obtain financial gain for private ends. Some maritime crimes have been included in
LOSC, such as illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, illegal dumping, piracy as well as the
discharge of pollutants. However, after the LOSC was adopted, other maritime
crimes came to the fore which needed to be addressed at the international level.
Maritime terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are
among those crimes which have created concern amongst the international
community, particularly after the 9/11 attacks.92
The SUA Convention was the first international legal instrument which
addressed the issue of maritime terrorism. Even though the convention does not
specifically use the term ‘maritime terrorism’, an offence is committed under Article
3 when any person unlawfully or intentionally:
seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of
intimidation; or performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or destroys a ship or causes damage to a
ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or places or
causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely
to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship…93

Unlike the provision of piracy found in LOSC, the SUA Convention does not
specifically mention that the act needs to be conducted for private ends. Therefore,
any act of piracy, even where it is conducted for a political end, is punishable by this
convention. Furthermore, the instrument echoes the ‘extradite or prosecute’
provisions of anti-terrorist conventions. The SUA Convention imposes an obligation
on State parties to prosecute offenders which are present in their territory in
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accordance with their domestic legislation.94 This rule applies regardless of whether
the illegal act was committed within or outside the territory of the particular State. If
a State party does not wish to prosecute, then the convention requires the State to
extradite the perpetrator(s)95 to another State that is party to the convention.96
Furthermore, in order to make sure that the perpetrators are punished, the
SUA Convention urges State parties to extradite the perpetrators present in their
territory. In case the State party is not able to extradite then they are liable to
prosecute the offenders in accordance with their domestic law. Likewise, provisions
that are found in the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf are in line with the SUA
Convention. Unlike LOSC where the provisions on piracy only apply in the EEZ and
on the high seas, the offences created by the SUA Convention apply both on the high
seas and in the EEZ and also waters within national jurisdiction. Therefore, whether
an attack is committed in a State’s national jurisdiction, such as in a port or territorial
sea, or outside the nation’s jurisdiction, as in the case of a hijacked ship on the high
seas, the offenders will be subject to prosecution under the SUA Convention.97
In relation to Southeast Asia, if the SUA Convention were to be accepted and
ratified by all States in the region, then any person conducting maritime terrorism in
the region would become an international criminal, and would thus be liable for
prosecution or extradition. Indeed, even if offenders were able to flee from one State
to another, any Southeast Asian State would be able to prosecute them in accordance
94
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with their domestic laws. If this was the prevailing situation, it would be extremely
difficult for any terrorist to run away or hide in any Southeast Asian State. However,
despite widespread concern amongst the international community over terrorism, and
mounting pressure by maritime powers for other States to ratify the convention, there
are 166 States which are party to the SUA Convention.98 Furthermore, Indonesia and
Malaysia - two maritime powers in Southeast Asia – are yet to ratify the
convention.99
The reason for non-ratification by some countries in the region stems from
their apprehension that ratification of the convention would derogate their
sovereignty as a State. For other countries, there was a fear that the convention
would allow foreign navies and vessels to enter maritime areas that are within their
national jurisdiction. There was also a perception that the convention favoured States
which did not have maritime delimitation disputes. Southeast Asia is certainly a
region where maritime boundaries are not completely delimited, particularly in the
South China Sea.100 The concern of some States was that, rather than making
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progress in the fight against maritime terrorism, the regime created by the SUA
Convention would lead to greater friction between States. The reason why Indonesia
is hesitant ratify the 1988 SUA Convention is because it is perceived as not consistent
with general international law and UNCLOS101. Also, it is perceived to potentially
infringe Indonesian sovereignty, particularly the provision of article 4, which states
that the ‘Convention applies if the ship is navigating of is scheduled to navigate into,
through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State,
or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States’102. Furthermore,
Indonesia is also concerned on the extradition provision contained in Article 11 of
the Convention, that those States that do not have mutual extradition treaties, could
directly use the SUA Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect to the
offences stated in Article 3 of the Convention.103
The lack of a preventive approach is another weakness and limitation of the
SUA Convention. While it is true that the convention provides jurisdiction for
member States to extradite or prosecute offenders, it does not contain a preventive
measure that deters perpetrators from committing maritime crimes in the first place –
crimes that could include attacks on ships, pipeline facilities, ports, as well as
platform structures. Nor does the convention allow marine police to immediately
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intercept terrorists once they receive credible information regarding the planning of a
terrorist attack.104
In order to address some of the above concerns, and to expand the scope of
the convention, in 2005, the international community adopted the Amendments to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation 1988 (SUA Protocol 2005).105 One of the highlights of the SUA Protocol
2005 is the preventive measure allowing authorities of one State party to board a
vessel of another State party on the high seas, once authority has been granted by the
ship’s flag state. This system is regulated in Article 8bis of the SUA Protocol
2005.106
Other significant offences not regulated by the SUA Convention but
addressed in the SUA Protocol 2005 include:
(i) the use of vessels as instruments of or platforms for terrorist activities; (ii) the
transportation of suspected materials, biological, chemical or nuclear weapons; and
(iii) the transportation of people who have committed acts that are offences under
any of nine terrorist conventions.107

While the broadening of offences in the SUA Protocol 2005 may reduce the
incidence of terrorist attacks, it also has the potential to instil apprehension amongst
States, particularly in relation to provisions that grant boarding access to vessels.108
Thus, it not surprising that no State in Southeast Asia is party to the SUA Protocol
2005.109
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Another concern associated with the Protocol is that it regulates logistics in a
very general way. Indeed, the reference to ‘any equipment, materials or software or
related technology that significantly contributes to the design, manufacturing or
delivery of a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon’ is quite a broad description,
such that almost any logistics carried by merchant vessels would fall foul of the
regulation. Therefore, States are reluctant to allow other contracting States to
investigate their commercial vessels. Furthermore, knowing the above provisions are
in place, States which are actively engaged in weapons proliferation are unlikely to
become parties to the SUA Protocol 2005.110
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4.4.2

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

Southeast Asia is home to many ports, with many being significant for world trade
and commerce. More than 135 international ports can be found in Indonesia alone,
while the Philippines and Malaysia have in excess of 55 and 20 international ports
respectively.112 International provisions on port security are produced by the IMO.
This organisation also produced the International Ship and Port Facility Security113
(ISPS) Code, which was introduced in 2002. The International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention)114, which provides minimum safety
arrangements for ships, ports and government agencies, was amended by the ISPS
Code to include new security provisions.115
Since the 9/11 attacks and Limburg incident, developments in the
international legal framework have been rapid. The ISPS Code, which was
effectively implemented in mid-2004, was agreed to by more than 100 contracting
parties to the SOLAS Convention, which was adopted in late 2002.116 The Code also
regulates maritime security on ships and in ports.117 Vulnerability assessments and
security plans are required for ships over 500 gross tonnage, as well as for critical
facilities within ports. These security plans describe the measures to be undertaken in
order to avoid or minimise the effects of terrorist attacks. Such action may include
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security patrols, screening passengers and baggage, the installation of surveillance
equipment, as well as the implementation of access control systems.118
As stated in Annex1, Part A of the Mandatory Requirements Regarding the
Provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention, the objectives of the ISPS
Code are as follows:
1. to establish an international framework involving co-operation between
Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and
the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive
measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in
international trade; 2. to establish the respective roles and responsibilities of
the Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations
and the shipping and port industries, at the national and international level for
ensuring maritime security; 3. to ensure the early and efficient collection and
exchange of security-related information; 4. to provide a methodology for
security assessments so as to have in place plans and procedures to react to
changing security levels; and 5. to ensure confidence that adequate and
proportionate maritime security measures are in place.119
The Code is a two-part document, with Part A addressing obligatory
requirements for ships and ports, and Part B120 providing security assessments and
plans in the form of guidelines. Therefore, in principle, Part A of the Code is
mandatory (and thus maritime stakeholders must meet the minimum requirements),
whereas Part B is recommendatory, with suggestions and guidelines for states to
consider implementing.121 In light of the detailed provisions of the ISPS Code, the
incidence of maritime terrorism could well be reduced, and the security of port
facilities strengthened, provided States are willing to accept and implement the Code.
Indeed, the IMO has explained that the Code aims to enhance the security of ships
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and port facilities. 122 In addition, it provides alternative guidelines for responding to
threats against ships and port facilities.
Even so, there are several shortcomings associated with the implementation
of the ISPS Code, particularly with regard to ports. Governments are responsible for
maintaining port security, and it is important for maritime security in general, and the
supply chain in particular, that port security is in place.123 However, the control of
the public sector in this regard has the capacity to overshadow the contribution that
non-governmental stakeholders (such as terminal operators), stand to make in
safeguarding ports. The risk is that other stakeholders will simply have to follow the
instructions given by government, effectively hampering their ability to contribute to
port security development.
In order to address this shortcoming, some countries have established port
security committees or working groups which bring together all relevant stakeholders
to discuss port security issues. In the US for instance, all ports have been tasked to
establish an Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC). The AMSC will bring
together all government and non-government stakeholders to discuss port security
plans.124 Furthermore, the US Coast Guard also produced an international port
security program. This program aims to reduce risk to US maritime interests
including US ports and ships, and secure global maritime trade by cooperating with
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their maritime trading partners to assess foreign ports’ compliance with the code
under their international port security program.125
From a broader perspective, in order for States to effectively implement the
Code, they must first be willing to ratify the instrument and enact the relevant
domestic legislation to give it effect. Furthermore, States need to have sufficient
manpower and facilities to implement the provisions of the ISPS Code. In this regard,
it is important to note that the IMO does not have the authority to enforce the
instrument.126 Furthermore, few States had sufficient capabilities and expertise to
implement the Code. Thus, the instrument was only likely to benefit those States
which were able to satisfy all requirements of the Code.127
It must also be borne in mind that ship owners incur increased costs from the
implementation of the ISPS Code. These costs stem from two main sources. Firstly,
in several circumstances, ship owners may be required to add more crew to their
team, increasing wage costs. Secondly, ship owners will most likely be charged
greater port fees and charges to offset the cost of any new security measures being
undertaken in the port and ship security measures.
As an archipelagic state, Indonesia relies on shipping for its international and
domestic trade. At present, ports services are being managed by a state-owned
enterprise – Pelabuhan Indonesia (PELINDO). The authorities engaged by PELNDO
to provide port security include the Sea Police, the Directorate General for Sea
Communications, as well as customs officials. A plethora of domestic legislation is
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also being enacted, such as Regulation No.33/2003, which seeks to enhance
cooperation between agencies. This regulation appoints the Directorate General for
Sea Communications to oversee the implementation of the ISPS Code.128
However, despite the passage of the regulation above, some ports in
Southeast Asia have yet to comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code. This
situation exists in Cambodia and Timor Leste.129 The problems faced by these States
include deficiencies in information sharing, capacity building, as well as training.
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4.5

Regional Framework on Maritime Terrorism

Since State authorities may have more knowledge and experience about local
terrorist cells, it is possible that domestic measures may be suited to combating
maritime terrorism. This argument is made doubly forceful if one considers that, in
committing terrorist attacks, offenders will be breaching numerous State laws, and
could thus be prosecuted in accordance with a State’s domestic legal framework.
Furthermore, the non-interference principle, which is highly respected in Southeast
Asia, means that States are unlikely to readily accept the involvement of other States
in national matters. Therefore, regional efforts which have been implemented in
Southeast Asia (and which remain in place today), aim to supplement and support the
national legislation of States.131 Article 1 (1) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of
Action on Counter Terrorism states tha ASEAN States shall:
Enhance cooperation among the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and
other relevant authorities of ASEAN Member States to counter, prevent and suppress
terrorism, terrorist organisations and their associations, to disrupt their support
networks and impede their plan of terror acts, and to bring them to justice.132

Furthermore, considering the nature of modern maritime terrorism, it is
almost impossible to combat it through unilateral State action.133 Indeed, the
transnational nature of the crime makes it difficult for countries to prosecute
offenders, particularly with terrorists conducting their activities (including their
training camps) across numerous locations throughout Southeast Asia. The planned
terrorist attack on Singapore, which was successfully disrupted by authorities,
131
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involved offenders from different countries, each with their own logistical
strengths.134 In this case, officials were able to intercept the explosive device in the
neighbouring country, Malaysia. Another example is the 2002 Bali Bombings.135
Although this attack was planned in Thailand, the terrorists received money from
their counterparts in Pakistan, which was funnelled to them through Malaysia.136
The close networks established by terrorists can also be seen in the Abubakar
training complex in Mindanao. Although the sprawling complex belonged to MILF,
it was also used by JI to train its militant squad.137 Following the demolition of the
complex by the Philippine military, JI, which has members from numerous States in
Southeast Asia, began conducting training camps in several isolated locations in the
Philippines.138 Dulmatin and Omar Patek, two JI activists from Indonesia, were
known to have close ties with ASG.139 In order to avoid the apprehension by State
authorities, many JI members have claimed refugee status in the southern
Philippines. By this action, not only have they been able to escape arrest, they have
established contacts and shared their expertise with other militants in the area, such
as ASG and MILF. Indeed, due to the favourable geographic and archipelagic nature
of the region, terrorists are able to move from one State to another with little
difficulty. Furthermore, poor border management in several Southeast Asian States
enables terrorist to embark on the journey without fear of apprehension by
authorities. Therefore, counter-terrorism measures are interdependent, and in order to
134
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address the matter comprehensively, cooperation between States is essential. For
instance, it would be almost impossible for Indonesian authorities alone to combat JI,
as many members of the group reside in the Philippines for the duration of their
training. Therefore, it is important that Philippine authorities work together with the
Indonesian government to take concrete measures to disrupt terrorist cells. A similar
situation exists with extremist groups in Thailand. In order to avoid Thai authorities,
militants in southern Thailand cross the borders to hide in the northern area of
Malaysia.140
Even though States in the region are willing to address maritime terrorism,
the networking capabilities of terrorist groups have proved to be a significant
barrier.141 It is clear that the domestic measures taken by States have not been
effective, particularly with regard to combating country-based terrorism. Fortunately,
Southeast Asian States have been eager to address this issue, not only through the
passage of domestic legislation, but also by working closely with other States in the
region. Indeed, cooperative arrangements have been forged at the bilateral, subregional and multilateral level. Furthermore, numerous declarations have been made
by governments in the region to demonstrate both the political will and serious intent
of States to combat terrorism. The outcome of these declarations has been effective
law enforcement and mutual legal cooperation, as well as confidence-building,
information sharing and capacity-building measures. For instance, at the 7th
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Brunei, which was
held in late 2001, ASEAN States acknowledged the importance of cooperation in
combating terrorism, signing the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter
140
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Terrorism.142 This declaration stated that cooperation at different levels is required in
order to comprehensively address terrorism, which poses a threat to international
peace and security. Furthermore, in order to address the issue comprehensively, the
declaration stated that ratification of international anti-terrorist conventions is
required by member States.143 In 2002, the declaration was supplemented by the
adoption of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime.144
The Plan of Action aims to enhance cooperation between States in the
region.145 It urges States to ratify relevant international anti-terrorism conventions
and develop regional capacity-building programs, thereby strengthening the national
legislation of States and cross-border counter-terrorism mechanisms.146 To enhance
capacity-building measures in the region, the Southeast Asia Regional Center for
Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), located in Kuala Lumpur, was established.
Furthermore, existing centres and training facilities which are present in Southeast
Asia are being utilised, such as the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)
located in Bangkok, as well as the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation
(JCLEC), located in Semarang. Information sharing among States is being conducted
through the Association of Southeast Asian National Police (ASEANAPOL).
Another objective of ASEANAPOL is to enhance joint operations on terrorism and
other criminal investigations, as well as facilitate cross-border cooperation on
142
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intelligence.147 These measures are also being addressed at the annual ASEAN
Chiefs of Police conference.
In order to enhance the investigation, prevention and prosecution of criminal
activities by law enforcement authorities, ASEAN member States produced the
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters in 2005.148
The Parties shall, in accordance with this Treaty and subject to their respective
domestic laws, render to one another the widest possible measure of mutual legal
assistance in criminal matters, namely investigations, prosecutions and resulting
proceedings.149

Furthermore, to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism in particular,
ASEAN member States adopted the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism in
2007.150 This convention is unique in that it provides common procedures for
prosecuting offenders, such as the use of video conferencing facilities in court
proceedings. Furthermore, the convention regulates the extradition of perpetrators,
establishes a common database for disseminating information between member
states, enhances cooperation between agencies (particularly law enforcement
agencies), and provides the basis for information sharing among ASEAN member
States. In mid-2009, ASEAN adopted a Plan of Action which aimed to boost
cooperation between law enforcement agencies and between intelligence agencies.
The Plan of Action is called the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-
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Terrorism,151 and clearly notes that member States are committed to preventing and
suppressing terrorism. It also aims to prosecute offenders and foil potential terrorist
attacks.152
In addition, the Plan of Action provides States with detailed measures to
address terrorism by equipping them with information on the political, social,
economic and cultural conditions that lead to terrorism. The protection of people and
infrastructure is also addressed by the Plan of Action. Furthermore, it urges States to
implement regional legal frameworks, establish mechanisms for information
exchange, enhance border control and immigration management, as well as comply
with the UN Security Council Resolutions and international conventions and
protocols on terrorism.153
ASEAN has also made declarations to address terrorism with extra-regional
actors including India, Australia, the Russian Federation, Japan and the Republic of
Korea. These declarations include the 2002 ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for
Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism and the 2003 Joint Declaration on
Cooperation to Combat Terrorism.
Another ASEAN forum which focuses on combating terrorism is the ASEAN
Plus Three framework. In January 2004, the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial
Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC3) was held to discuss issues related to
transnational crime in Southeast Asia, including terrorism, piracy, people smuggling,
as well as money laundering. The meeting also highlighted the importance of
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addressing terrorism, with participants expressing their commitment to conduct
intelligence sharing and enhancing communication between contracting States.154
The attendees also acknowledged that development gaps and poverty are some of the
root causes of transnational crime, including terrorism.155
Measures to combat terrorism are also being conducted through bilateral and
trilateral arrangements. For instance, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have
adopted the 2002 Agreement on Exchange and Establishment of Communication
Procedures.156 The agreement, which has also been adopted by Thailand and
Cambodia, provides the legal basis for members to set up hotlines, participate in joint
operations to hunt suspected terrorists, as well as conduct anti-terrorism exercises.
Counter piracy/armed robbery at sea initiatives are also relevant to combat terrorist
activities, including the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol and the ‘Eyes in the Sky’
program discussed in the previous chapter.
Several terrorist leaders have been apprehended as a result of intelligence
sharing between ASEAN States. Moreover, these partnerships have extended beyond
ASEAN member States, with counter-terrorism efforts being raised at other regional
forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)157 and the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.158 In June 2003, at the 10th ARF PostMinisterial Conference, ARF member States agreed on a Statement on Cooperation
against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security (such as terrorism). The States
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participating in the conference, which was held in Cambodia, also considered
ratifying the SUA Convention and Protocol. APEC explicitly addresses the matter
through several initiatives, including the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF), the
Workshop on Countering the Financing of Terrorism, the APEC Cybersecurity
Strategy and several Counter-Terrorism Action Plans.159
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Table 20: Status of APEC Counter Terrorism Action Plans in Southeast Asia160

Most States in Southeast Asia prefer to devote their counter-terrorism
cooperation efforts at the ASEAN level rather than the multilateral level. However,
the mistrust that exists even among ASEAN States makes it difficult for States to
engage in a greater level of cooperation.161 Even so, in order to maintain domestic
159
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and regional stability, according to Acharya States in the region still prefer to work
together to conduct security coordination as opposed to having third parties from
outside the region intervening.162
4.6

Gaps in the International and Regional Framework

The international community has accepted terrorism as a maritime security threat,
and thus the development and adoption of numerous legal frameworks regulating
transnational organised crime (such as terrorism) has taken place. International
frameworks such as the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol, the ISPS Code form
the main legal bases for combating maritime terrorism. However, these frameworks
still have their limitations and shortcomings, and therefore the further development
of these frameworks is required.
The inability of the LOSC to address issues related to maritime terrorism led
to the development of the SUA Convention. However, even though the convention
attempts to address maritime terrorism from a broad perspective, not all aspects of
the crime are sufficiently covered by the SUA Convention. One of the limitations of
the convention is the need for States to obtain the express consent of the flag State
before boarding and inspecting a suspect foreign-flagged vessel. Indeed, this is a
barrier faced not only by the SUA Convention but also by the PSI Interdiction
Principles. The traditional method of requesting flag State consent before taking
further action with regard to a vessel on the high seas (such as boarding the vessel),
prevents the pursuing State from taking immediate action where required. Therefore,
amendments to the legal frameworks mentioned above are needed in order to
accommodate developments in transnational crime.
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With the ISPS Code there is still a wide disparity in the standard of ports
around the world. In order to create a uniform standard, relevant agencies need to
work together to assist those ports which are unable to meet the ISPS Code
requirements and non-compliant ports create risk into the system.163
Despite the limitations of the current international framework, the possibility
exists to move forward and effect meaningful change. Firstly, international
regulations which only pertain to maritime crimes committed on the high seas and in
the EEZ need to be re-examined and revised, if necessary. International law should
be able to include within its ambit specific crimes (such as terrorism) committed in
other maritime zones such as the territorial sea. Even so, such measures need to be
discussed and agreed upon by States to ensure the measures do not encroach upon
State sovereignty and in order to avoid interference with domestic legal jurisdiction.
Secondly, practical and meaningful cooperative mechanisms need to be developed to
ensure that prevailing international instruments are adopted and effectively enforced.
These mechanisms will hopefully strengthen the capacity of States in greatest need
of assistance. Lastly, the international community must take further steps to persuade
States which are not party to the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol to adopt and
ratify them. Indeed, in order to have uniform legal enforcement mechanisms, States
need to implement the provisions of the convention into their respective domestic
legal framework. If the legal environment could be set up in this way, then
authorities would be better placed to enforce prevailing international law, as every
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State would have similar procedures to investigate maritime crimes and prosecute
offenders.164
In relation to ASEAN counter-terrorism efforts, although the regional
organisation has numerous initiatives in place, ASEAN States seem to be proceeding
very cautiously in developing their response.165 As a result of this tentative approach,
operational measures to combat terrorism are lacking in the ASEAN framework.
Indeed, ASEAN initiatives are more geared towards the declaration of principles
than adopting practical measures to fight the problem of terrorism.166 Moreover, as
ASEAN still abides by the non-intervention principle, there is widespread belief
among member States that the involvement of third parties outside of the region
compromises their sovereignty. This complex situation affects the implementation of
regional treaties. For instance, the ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, which was adopted in 2005, facilitates the domestic
implementation of international criminal instruments by member States. However,
the treaty enables States to implement the relevant international instruments in a way
that best accords with their national interests. As national interests differ between
States, the implementation of the convention is unlikely to be uniform, thereby
undermining the very purpose of the treaty – that is, to create regional cooperation
with regard to transnational crime.
Another example of a regional instrument lacking robust application is the
ASEAN Convention on Counter-terrorism, which was adopted in 2007. Although this
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convention ‘borrows’ definitions of terrorism from existing international treaties and
conventions (thereby seeking to provide a comprehensive response to the crime), it
simultaneously provides exemptions for a State which is not a party to those other
instruments. According to Acharya, the convention also asserts the importance of the
“preservation of sovereignty”, and contains an Article that deals with the “nonapplication” of the convention where the location of the crime, the offender and the
victims all converge within a single State that is party to the convention.167 In this
context, other ASEAN States are prohibited from interfering with the sovereign
rights of the contracting party in any manner.
Another point to consider is that individual ASEAN States prefer to work
bilaterally with other regional powers, such as the US and Australia, to combat
terrorism. While such efforts may prove beneficial for the individual States involved,
these initiatives do not assist the region as a whole. However, counter-terrorism
efforts in the region would not affect the relationship among the ASEAN States.
Even though ASEAN States have expectations of each other in terms of responses to
terrorism and cooperative approaches, it has been argued by Acharya that the main
objective of the political elites is to maintain political legitimacy and obtain financial
assistance from other States.168

4.7

Conclusion

Maritime terrorism has been addressed at both the international and regional levels.
In Southeast Asia, States have produced numerous frameworks in the form of
treaties, plans of action as well as declarations. These frameworks include the Treaty
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on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, the ASEAN Plan of Action to
Combat Transnational Crime, the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism,
as well as the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International
Terrorism. Nonetheless, these frameworks have been unable to completely eradicate
terrorism in Southeast Asia. Several developments need to collectively converge in
order to address all situations wherein maritime terrorist activities could potentially
arise, including commitment of ratification and implementation of international
convention and measures discussed in this chapter. Unilateral State action is very
unlikely to address the issue in a comprehensive manner, and instead allows terrorist
cells to continue their operations with little risk of interference by State authorities.
Indeed, as maritime terrorism is a transnational crime, cooperation among all the
States in the region is vital.
.

152

CHAPTER V
5 People Smuggling in Southeast Asia

5.1

Introduction

People smuggling constitutes a serious threat to maritime security in Southeast Asia.
This issue has become one of the main concerns of the international community, as
people smuggling not only affects countries of origin and destination, but also transit
States.1 A vast amount of money is received by people smugglers in return for their
services. The perilous nature of people smuggling operations which take place via the
sea means that people’s lives are at risk. People are smuggled from and through the
Southeast Asia region, most of whom are asylum seekers or refugees. The issue is
clearly worthy of particular attention, and further measures will need to be
implemented in order to solve the problem.
Southeast Asia continues to serve as an important transit area for migrant
smuggling with routes reaching States as far as Australia and Canada. This is
significant for the region, as smuggled migrants are more difficult to identify among
the increasing number of regular migrants that accompany regional integration. The
smuggling activities cause challenges to States, particularly in combating
transnational crime as well as upholding border security and immigration laws.
Furthermore, the movement to reach the destination State sometimes also causes
deaths. In Southeast Asia, the smuggling of Rohingyas is also a particular concern

*Parts of this chapter were published in the following publications: (i) Ahmad Almaududy Amri,
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where smuggling usually occurs by boat, especially between the months of November
and April when seas are calm.2 Rohingyas take a land route from Myanmar through
Thailand trying to reach Malaysia or Indonesia.
People smuggling is considered an offence under international law. The
offence is committed when people attempt to unlawfully enter another State’s
territory via sea, land or air, and assisted by professional smugglers who know the
best routes to, and drop-off points in, the destination State. The smuggling process
also takes into consideration patrols by border control officials. Successful
smuggling often involves being able to evade detection by these officials.3 In this
way, eradicating people smuggling activities - whether by land, sea or air - becomes
a border control issue.4 For the purpose of this thesis, however, people smuggling by
sea will form the main focus of the discussion.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the international and regional legal
frameworks governing people smuggling. Furthermore, it also examines the gaps in
the prevailing legal framework at both international and regional levels.
This chapter is divided into sections which discuss issues related to the
concept of people smuggling, the regional context of people smuggling, the
international legal framework on people smuggling, and the regional legal measures
to combat people smuggling.
The chapter concludes that the international and regional legal frameworks
governing people smuggling is inadequate to address the complexity of the people
smuggling problem. The nature of the problem is transnational and hence addressing
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it unilaterally by a single State is inadequate. Therefore, cooperation at the regional
level is the primary solution to address people smuggling in Southeast Asia.
5.2

Concept of People Smuggling

This section will give an overview of the concept of people smuggling. It starts with
the discussion with the transnational nature of the problem then it explains the
consequences of people smuggling. The differentiation between people smuggling
and human trafficking also forms part of the discussion. Furthermore, the section
also elaborates the policy implications as a result of the differentiation between
people smuggling and human trafficking.
5.2.1

The Smuggling of Humans
People smuggling is now widely considered one of the fastest growing

transnational crimes. It involves a vast number of countries, as well as numerous
routes which have continued to increase over time.5 Technological advancements,
such as the advent of complex navigational equipment, have also helped people
smugglers refine their activities and escape detection.
The number of illegal migrants via land, sea and air, according to statistics,
are around 30-40 million out of approximately 191 million migrants worldwide.6
This figure accounts for 15-20 per cent of the world’s total immigration.7
Meanwhile, the Global Commission on International Migration has acknowledged
that the number of illegal migrants is estimated to be 2.4 to 4 million people
annually.8 With respect to migration by sea, the UN Secretary General has reported
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that in 2006, there were an unprecedented number of migrants who used maritime
routes to unlawfully enter the territory of other States.9 It has been reported that
between 2001 and 2007, there were more than 1,200 incidents involving more than
61,400 migrants.10 However, these statistics do not represent the actual number of
illegal migrants, as the reported figures only take into account those illegal migrants
who were apprehended by authorities. Hence, the actual number of illegal migrants
worldwide is likely to be much higher.11 In light of these statistics, it is hardly
surprising that people smuggling has caused disruption to the international legal
framework governing issues of migration, as well as to the national immigration
policies of States.
There are several causes of people smuggling. Some people undertake the
journey to flee volatile political situations in their home country, while others are
simply seeking a better place to live. However, poverty has always been one of the
main reasons people choose to ‘migrate’ to another country. Their intention is to find
a better life for themselves by seeking employment opportunities in their destination
country.12 Another factor that compels many people to migrate is discrimination. In
some parts of the world, people face discrimination on the basis of their race or
gender or membership of other identity groups, and therefore are not afforded the
same employment opportunities or other rights as the general population.13
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Furthermore, there are countries where inequalities exist with regard to the treatment
of women. In these places, women are marginalised in economic, social and political
circles and do not receive the same rights enjoyed by men. Humanitarian crises have
also played a role in the rise of people smuggling.14 In some States, people face abuse
on the basis of their race, religion and/or political membership, thus causing them to
voluntarily ‘migrate’ to other countries.
However, the notion of resettling in another country to enjoy a better quality
of life does not always eventuate. During the smuggling process, many people are
treated inhumanely, with some even being subjected to torture. In some
circumstances, ‘immigrants’ have even died during the course of their voyage. In
2001 for example, 356 people died when an overcrowded ship commissioned by
people smugglers sank off the coast of Indonesia.15 Unfortunately, this is not an
isolated case. In other parts of the world, such as in the UK, the US, Ireland and
Libya, there have been reports of various accidents during the people smuggling
voyage, as well as incidents of illegal migrants being treated inhumanely by people
smugglers.16 Furthermore, terrorist groups harness people smuggling activities, using
them as a way to clandestinely enter another State’s territory.17
People smugglers charge exorbitant fees to transfer would-be migrants to
another State.18 People seeking to be ‘resettled’ often require their relatives to
shoulder all or part of the financial burden. It is often the case that these relatives do
not have the required funds, and must thus take out a loan to pay the fee demanded
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by the people smugglers. However, instead of going to established banks, they
invariably choose questionable lending institutions that ask fewer questions
regarding the reason for the loan. However, these lenders almost always charge a
higher rate of interest than the official banks. Thus, in many cases, the borrower ends
up losing their home or what little land they have in order to pay the debt.
During their voyage to the destination country, illegal migrants are exposed
to several risks. Indeed, people smugglers have little regard for the proper treatment
of the people they are transporting. For example, it is common for illegal migrants to
be carried in overcrowded containers for extended periods of time. As a result, they
suffer sickness and are prone to dehydration, malnutrition, as well as exhaustion.
Furthermore, there have been instances where people have been tortured or treated
inhumanely during their voyage. Indeed, incidents of sexual assault and other forms
of violence are relatively common, and serve to earn more money for the people
smugglers. What is more tragic is that there have been cases where illegal migrants
have lost their lives before reaching the destination country.
States have taken measures to combat people smuggling at the multilateral
and regional level. At the multilateral level, people smuggling is considered an
offence pursuant to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air19 (Smuggling Protocol) which is attached to the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime20 (CATOC). CATOC defines an “organized
criminal group” as:
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a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences
established in accordance with this convention, in order to obtain, directly or
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.21

At the Southeast Asian level, the Bali Process has been one of the most
important forums in addressing the issue of people smuggling.22 The Bali Process led
to the creation of an Ad Hoc Group to implement the Bali Process Regional
Cooperating Framework (RCF). Established on 30 March 2011, the RCF aims to
establish practical arrangements for members to respond to the irregular movement
of people through “consistent processing of asylum claims, durable solutions for
refugees, the sustainable return of those not owed protection and [the] targeting of
people smuggling enterprises”.23
5.2.2

Consequences of Smuggling

The definition of people smuggling in the Smuggling Protocol makes clear that the
offence is completed when those smuggled reach their destination State.24 However,
they may still be treated with violence in their new home. As mentioned earlier,
many illegal migrants must borrow money in order to finance their voyage, and are
thus willing to accept any job they are offered when they reach their destination
country, even if the salary and/or working conditions are less than decent.
Indeed, the vulnerability experienced by many of these illegal migrants has
the potential to lead to forced labour or even slavery. In these circumstances, people
smuggling may even be viewed as human trafficking. One illustration of this is
where smuggled people are made to work in the agricultural sector. On a day-to-day
21
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basis they may be in direct contact with dangerous chemicals which have the
potential to affect their health. However, due to their illegal status, and for fear of
being prosecuted, they hesitate to see a doctor and thus remain in their unhealthy
state. Another consequence of people smuggling is the inhumane treatment to
women. Many reports have shown that women who migrate illegally are much more
likely to be sexually and psychologically abused. Furthermore, some people who are
smuggled become ‘trapped’ when they arrive in new their homeland. Indeed, people
smugglers have been known to seize the passports and other documents of the people
they have transported in order to gain control over them, and as a result the illegal
migrants are prevented from moving freely in their destination State.25
Smuggled people also face racism and other forms of discrimination. Indeed,
people may tend to be racist towards new arrivals as the term “illegal migrants” has a
negative connotation in many communities.26 Furthermore, they are often
marginalised due to their poor state of health and lack of knowledge of the local
customs and language used in the destination State. These inequalities persist
because smuggled people are less likely to report discriminatory conduct to
authorities precisely due to their status as ‘illegal migrants’.
Some of the concerns surrounding the treatment of smuggled people are
perpetrated by law enforcement authorities themselves. There are instances where
illegal migrants have been shot by law enforcement officers before entering the
destination State. Such action has resulted in illegal migrants sustaining severe
injuries and, at times, even death. In other cases, authorities have acted unlawfully by
asking for money or sexual favours from illegal migrants in exchange for their
25
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freedom. If they fail or refuse to cooperate, they risk spending a longer period of time
in detention. What makes this situation worse is the poor condition of the detention
centres. They are often unhygienic and ill-equipped to provide adequate medical
assistance. Furthermore, while in detention, illegal migrants are often denied basic
rights such as consular assistance, legal advice and access to interpreters. Although
not every smuggled person suffers these consequences, they invariably find
themselves in highly vulnerable situations and are thus prone to exploitation.27
5.2.3

People Smuggling versus Trafficking in Persons

Many States which are affected by people smuggling, whether as a State of origin,
transit or destination, are highly concerned about the issue.28 The money obtained by
people smugglers is often spent on other illegal activities, such as the trafficking of
drugs and the illicit arms trade. However, more worrying is the fact that some illegal
migrants later become involved in criminal activities, such as theft, the drugs trade
and prostitution, in order to repay their debt to the people smugglers.29 In this regard,
people smuggling can be seen as a modern form of slavery. However, not all illegal
migrants find themselves in this situation, with many enjoying a better quality of life
and a decent living environment in their new homeland.30
In order to gain a better understanding of people smuggling, scholars have
sought to differentiate it from human trafficking. Today, there is an international
legal framework which regulates human trafficking and people smuggling. With
regard to human trafficking, the Protocol to Prevent and Suppress Trafficking in
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Persons, Especially Women and Children31 (Trafficking Protocol) has been adopted
by members of the United Nations. In the case of people smuggling, as mentioned
earlier the United Nations has adopted the Smuggling Protocol. Both of these
protocols are attached to the CATOC, which is also known as the Palermo
Convention. These protocols have helped states, scholars, international organisations
and other parties define and differentiate people smuggling from human trafficking.
Furthermore, these legally binding instruments assist member States to punish
perpetrators engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of people.
The process of entering a State can take place with or without documentation.
Undocumented entry involves migrants entering a State (other than their country of
origin) without proper documentation as required by the visited State.32 If the entry
process is assisted (i.e., from people in the State of origin), then this act could be
considered people smuggling and/or trafficking in persons. The distinctions between
the two offences are clearly articulated in the Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols33.
The Smuggling Protocol defines “smuggling” in Article 3(a) as:
the procurement in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a
national or a permanent resident. 34

Hence, it is quite clear that people smuggling involves three elements: (i)
there must be a physical movement of a person; (ii) the activity must be conducted
across international borders; and (iii) the activity must be conducted in exchange for
payment or some type of material benefit. Furthermore, the main focus of the crime
31
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is on the assistance provided by people smugglers to facilitate the unlawful entry of a
person into the other State. Therefore, the “subsequent treatment of the migrant is not
a constitutive element of the crime.”35
On the other hand, trafficking in persons is a more complex crime. It involves
not only illegal migration, but also other acts such as the use of force, coercion,
fraudulent conduct and the exploitation of people.36 The Trafficking Protocol has
defined “trafficking in persons” in Article 3(a) as:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or service, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs.37

From the above definition, it is clear that trafficking in persons is different
from people smuggling in several respects. Firstly, people smuggling is voluntary in
nature – that is, the act is carried out with the consent of those being smuggled. On
the other hand, trafficking is not voluntary and involves coercion and deception.38
Secondly, the act of people smuggling ends when the migrants reach their
destination, whereas trafficking entails the continuous exploitation of people even
after they have reached their place of destination.39 Thirdly, people smuggling
requires international movements, while trafficking can be carried out either within a
single State or between different States.40 Fourth, in terms of entering a State, people
smuggling is always illegal, and thus those smuggled are categorised as illegal
35
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migrants. Conversely, in a trafficking scenario, the trafficked people may enter a
State legally or illegally.41
The distinctions that exist between the two offences do not preclude them
from overlapping. Indeed, there have been cases where both smuggling and
trafficking has occurred. This arises where people intending to be smuggled into
another State end up being trafficked. In essence, the migrants are tricked on their
way to the destination State and are treated inhumanely.42 Moreover, the migrants are
charged a huge amount of money in order to be transported illegally to the other
State. As a result, they are exposed to exploitation, thus making them the victims of
human trafficking. The overlaps between people smuggling and trafficking in
persons create problems for authorities with respect to law enforcement and
prosecuting offenders.43
5.2.4

Policy Implications

There are different legislative as well as law enforcement approaches to people
smuggling and human trafficking.44 In the context of trafficking, it has been
proposed that the apparent and continuous exploitation of people (in the form of
coercion and deception), requires States to provide assistance and protection to such
people, even though they may have breached national immigration policies. On the
other hand, people smuggling involves people who voluntarily depart their home
State knowing they will violate the immigration laws of the destination State. Many
States consider such conduct to be reprehensible, and therefore believe that the full
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force of the law (including arrest, repatriation, detention or deportation) should be
brought to bear upon them.45
Notwithstanding the above argument, the differences between trafficking and
smuggling have changed the general understanding of exploitation and abuse. It is
clear from the Smuggling and Trafficking Protocols that preferential treatment is
given to those who have been trafficked over those who have been smuggled.
According to the Trafficking Protocol, States are obliged to provide protection to
victims of trafficking. Such protection extends to “[providing] assistance in criminal
investigations and proceedings, [the provision] of accommodation, physical and
psychological assistance, employment and educational opportunities, and [the issue
of a] temporary or permanent residence permit”.46 In contrast, the Smuggling
Protocol does not protect those smuggled as extensively as the Trafficking Protocol
protects trafficked people.
Even though there are some protective measures embedded in the Smuggling
Protocol, such as the right to life and the prevention of torture, the protection
afforded to smuggled people remains limited.47 The protocol supports the right of a
State to prosecute people involved in people smuggling, especially because the act
breaches the domestic immigration laws of States. Furthermore, such action is
affirmed by other international instruments, such as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights48 1966 (ICCPR), the European Convention on Human

45

Anne Gallagher, ‘Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling:
A Preliminary Analysis’ (2001) 23(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1000.
46
Articles 4-7, Trafficking Protocol.
47
Article 16, Smuggling Protocol.
48
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, open for signature 16 December 1966, 999
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1966). Hereinafter referred to as ICCPR.

165

Rights49 1950 (ECHR), the American Convention on Human Rights50 1969 (ACHR),
as well as the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights51 1981 (African
Charter). Although these international instruments may also be enforced in relation
to trafficked people as explained by Obokata, they mainly apply to illegal migrants
because such people are likely to have breached several provisions under the various
instruments.52
5.3

Regional Context of People Smuggling

This section explains the nature of people smuggling in Southeast Asia. It includes a
discussion of the trends of people smuggling in the region, the smuggling process
from Southeast Asia to Australia and Canada, and the networks involved in people
smuggling. Furthermore, this section also explains the costs involved and the number
of migrants being transported in Southeast Asia. Several States in Southeast Asia
serve as the main transit States for those people intending on resettling in Australia
or Canada, and thus such activities undermine regional maritime.
5.3.1

People Smuggling in Southeast Asia

The chief motivation of people smugglers is financial reward. And although they risk
being kept in detention centres for extended periods of time if their activities are
uncovered, this punishment seems relatively ‘light’ compared to the profits they
stand to make from the business. In some cases, people smuggling has been
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connected to other criminal syndicates, such as trade in illicit drugs and arms
trafficking.53
Smugglers facilitate the entry of people into the State of destination by
providing transportation, transit accommodation, as well as fake passports in some
instances. Indeed, as States become more aware of the increased flow of migrants
into their territories, tightening their immigration policies to control the influx,
people smuggling has become more popular.54
Because of the high fees charged by people smugglers, migrants are not
always able to pay the whole cost of their journey at once. Thus, they are often
compelled to work in low skilled jobs and sometimes even the sex industry (where
formal identity documentation is less likely to be required), in order to satisfy their
debt to the people smugglers.
In responding to this threat, several Southeast Asian States have taken
measures to prevent the flow of undocumented migrants. One such measure has been
the convening of ministerial conferences to discuss the issue. In 2002, ministers from
more than thirty nations gathered at the Regional Ministerial Conference on People
Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime. The
conference, which was held in Bali, was co-chaired by the Ministers for Foreign
Affairs from Indonesia and Australia, Hassan Wirajuda and Alexander Downer,
respectively, and involved several States from which migrants commonly originate,
such as Iran and Afghanistan.
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Even though States in the region have tried to enhance cooperation in order to
deal with the issue, especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, people smuggling
remains one of the major threats to maritime security in the region. This threat also
forms a barrier to advancing bilateral ties between States in Southeast Asia. Indeed,
this can be seen in the strained relations between Malaysia and Thailand. Malaysia
has been critical of undocumented labourers entering its territory from Myanmar,
Bangladesh and Thailand. As a result, Malaysia has erected a fence along its Thai
border and instructed its military personnel and border control officials to remove
any illegal migrant entering the country.55
Another example of people smuggling militating against regional cooperation
is the political tension that recently existed between Indonesia and Malaysia. In
2002, Malaysia granted amnesty to people (mainly illegal workers) who had entered
its territory illegally. This policy, which was called the Voluntary Repatriation
Programme, freed around 300,000 people, most of who originated from Indonesia.56
5.3.2

Smuggling of Humans through Southeast Asia

The reason why people decide to ‘resettle’ in another country varies in different parts
of the world. In Southeast Asia, most of the people being smuggled are asylum
seekers or refugees.57 Indeed, this has domestic policy implications for prosecuting
those who have been smuggled. Most of the migrants who transit through Southeast
Asia intend on resettling in Australia or Canada. Hence, it is important for both these
countries to strengthen their border control and manage the flow of irregular
migrants. Even though Australia and Canada have become increasingly concerned
55
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over this issue, it is important that their governments recognise the rights of asylum
seekers and refugees and comply with prevailing international law on the issue.58

Figure 7: Asylum Claims Submitted in Industrialised Countries, 2010-201459

5.3.3

The Trends of People Smuggling in Southeast Asia

As previously mentioned, there are several reasons why people choose to be
smuggled. Most of the people who transit through Southeast Asia are from the
Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, and are fleeing internal conflicts and poor
economic conditions. On the other hand, destination countries are viewed as offering
employment opportunities with higher earnings, a better standard of education, as
well as peace and stability. In 2014, the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) noted that the countries with the highest number of citizen
seeking asylum in Asia included Afghanistan (68,719), Iraq (59,472), Pakistan
(26,332), Iran (20,241), and Sri Lanka (6,792).60
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Over the past few years, there has been a variation in the number of people
arriving in Australia and claiming asylum or refugee status.61 In order to reach their
destination, these people use either water transportation (and are thus classified as
Irregular Maritime Arrivals or IMAs), or aerial transportation (with the result being
that they are regarded as Non-Irregular Maritime Arrivals or non-IMAs). On average,
there were 6,551 non-IMA asylum seeker applications per year between 2008 and
2013.62 On the other hand, within the same period, there were approximately (7,186)
IMA applications each year.63 There is a greater likelihood of IMAs receiving
asylum seeker status than non-IMAs.64

Figure 8: Asylum claims lodged by Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi and Sri Lankan nationals
while in Australia after arrival by air65

61
62

UNODC, above n 57, 40.
Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Asylum Trends, 2012-2013 Annual Publication,

4.
63

Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Asylum Trends, 2012-2013 Annual Publication,

4.
64

UNODC above n 57, 40.
Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) or previously known as Department of
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) Systems.
65

170

4%	
  
7%	
  
11%	
  

31%	
  

17%	
  

Afghanistan	
  
Iran	
  
Stateless	
  
Iraq	
  
Sri	
  Lanka	
  
Other	
  

30%	
  

Figure 9: Refugee status determination requests by top countries of citizenship (20102011) in Australia by irregular maritime arrivals66

Afghanistan had the highest number of asylum seekers in Australia between
2010 and 2011 (31 per cent), followed by Iran 30 per cent, Iraq 11 per cent and Sri
Lanka 7 per cent.67 There was an increase in the number of Iranians seeking asylum
during this period compared to 2009-2010 (where the figure was only four per cent).
Most of these asylum seekers are single males under the age of 40.68
One of the problems facing Australian and Canadian authorities in dealing
with immigrants coming through Southeast Asia is how to differentiate between bona
fide refugees and migrants who are using the legal protection afforded to asylum
seekers and refugees in order to gain entry into their countries. Moreover, there are
bona fide asylum seekers who nonetheless ask people smugglers to help them enter
other States.69
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In responding to this problem, States have tried to strengthen their
immigration and border protection policies in order to prevent the flow of irregular
arrivals. However, people smugglers are often one step ahead of the authorities, and
are thus able to find ways to continue their operations. Indeed, this has led the
Australian Government to assert that people smugglers exploit “softer enforcement
practices through whatever means and routes [are] available to them.”70
Another reason why people are willing to undertake the often dangerous
journey to another State (besides the opportunity of being granted asylum), is that
diasporic communities exist in both Australia and Canada. There are more than
300,000 Tamils in Canada, making it the third largest country with a Tamil
population after Sri Lanka and India.
Irregular migrants are also aware of the social networks that provide trusted
information for the journey that would be encountered. Furthermore, social networks
in the destination State usually inform migrants how to obtain a loan and secure
accommodation in the initial stages after they reach the destination State. In addition,
such networks help with advocacy services if those smuggled are intercepted and
later detained by authorities. Indeed, these types of services were provided by
Canadian Tamils to migrants on board the MV Sun Sea.71
Australia and Canada have become the most attractive destinations for
migrants, as both countries are signatories to 1951 UN Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees72, and hence have an obligation to protect refugees. Moreover,
neither country was affected by the global financial crisis to a significant extent, and

70

Ibid, 41.
Ibid, 41.
72
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, open for signature 2 July 1950, (entered into force 2
April 1954). Hereinafter referred to as Refugee Convention.
71

172

as a result, both countries have relatively high pay rates for workers. In terms of
immigration regulations, Australia and Canada have relatively open immigration
policies compared to many other countries. It is for these reasons that people seeking
to flee their homeland (and especially those from the Middle East, as well as South
and West Asia) risk the dangerous journey by sea. In most cases, the person seeking
to enter the destination State has been directed to do so by their family.73 Indeed, the
head of the family or the eldest son will often depart before the others. Family
members will only follow if the first member of their family is given protection in
the destination State.74
In 2011, Australian authorities noted an increase in the number of families
arriving in the country. One of the reasons for this increase was that Australia had
adopted a new immigration policy whereby children and families would be housed in
community-based accommodation rather than detention centres. A similar policy
exists in Canada where children are accompanied by other family members.
5.3.4

The Smuggling Process from Southeast Asia to Australia and Canada

The smuggling of people to Australia and Canada is conducted along wellestablished routes in Southeast Asia and via different forms of transportation.75
5.3.4.1 Human Smuggling from Southeast Asia to Australia
In the 1970s most of the ships arriving in Australia were from Vietnam. However,
this has changed since the end of 1990s. Since that time people from Afghanistan,
Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka and Myanmar have used a new strategy to reach their country of
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destination.76 Southeast Asia has become an important region for people smugglers,
as Indonesia is the main transit State for those seeking to resettle in Australia. People
smugglers use several paths and methods to get their customers into Indonesia.
People from Afghanistan are transported by bus or on foot to Pakistan or Iran
through both official and unofficial land borders.77 From these countries, the people
are then transported to Malaysia by air. To get to Indonesia from Malaysia, smuggled
Afghans are transported by bus, train or ferry. Once they arrive in Indonesia, they are
placed on boats in order to continue their journey to Australia.78
Migrants from Iran and Sri Lanka tend to use a more streamlined approach to
reach Malaysia or Indonesia: air travel. From these transit States, they board boats in
order to reach Australia. The Iraqis follow a similar journey. They use an aerial route
to reach Malaysia or other transit States like Jordan or Iran, before arriving in
Indonesia.79 As for the Rohingyas, they take a land route from Myanmar through
Thailand and Malaysia to Indonesia. From Indonesia, they are transported to
Australia by sea.
The safest and quickest way to arrive in Southeast Asia is by air travel
through the Gulf States. Of course, people choosing this method of transportation
will have to provide genuine documents that will be checked by immigration
officers. For some States, there are visa conditions that are relatively easy to get from
Southeast Asian States. For nationals of Iran for instance, a visa on arrival is granted
by several Southeast Asian States. Migrants from States which do not enjoy the same
privileges, such as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Iraq, require the assistance of people
76

J. Phillips and H. Spinks, Boat Arrivals in Australia Since 1976 (Parliament of Australia 2012).
Indonesian National Police, ‘Improving Evidence-Based Knowledge on Migrant Smuggling from,
through, within to Southeast and East Asia’ (2nd Inter-Regional Workshop, 2011).
78
Ibid.
79
UNODC, above n 57, 42.
77

174

smugglers to get from their homeland to the destination State. The smugglers will
assist these migrants by giving them false documents such as:
a genuine passport that is physically altered by photo substitution or insertion of a
visa page; an entire passport that is fabricated; visa pages that are fabricated; a
genuine passport or visa fraudulently obtained through stolen or illegally-obtained
paperwork; or a genuine passport stolen or purchased from the black market.80

There have been cases where people smugglers have themselves
accompanied migrants to transit countries. For instance, numerous Afghan is have
been accompanied by air to Indonesia. From there, migrants are transported by land
to pooling locations. They must then wait in apartment style accommodation for at
least two weeks until they receive further notice about the time and location of their
departure. In some cases, the waiting period can be several months long.
Indonesia is often chosen as the departure point because of its close proximity
to Australia.81 Furthermore, the authorities are not able to effectively monitor the
smuggling activities conducted in some parts of Indonesia. There are several points
within Indonesia from which boats depart to different places in Australia. Two of the
most popular destinations in Australia are Ashmore Reef, which is located 150km
from Rote Island, and Christmas Island, which is located 340km from Java Island.82
The vast majority of boats arrive at either of these two destinations, as opposed to
travelling straight to mainland Australia.83
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Figure 10: Migrant Smuggling to Australia and Canada by Sea84

In response to the rising tide of illegal arrivals, the Australian and Indonesian
government signed a regional cooperation agreement which sought to prohibit and
intercept people smugglers and their human cargo on route to Australia.85 Although
the agreement did not entirely stop people smuggling operations from Indonesia,
smaller operators were unable to continue after the agreement came into effect.86
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Figure 11: Indonesian departure points and harbours for boats travelling to Australia87

In order to maximise profits, people smugglers tend to use unseaworthy
fishing vessels to transport migrants. Therefore, the journey becomes extremely
perilous, and in many cases passengers have died on the long and treacherous
journey. For example, in 2001 a fishing boat, Siev X, sank on her journey to
Christmas Islands as it was overloaded with people. The incident caused the death of
353 passengers from four countries.88
In 2012, it was reported that a boat containing almost 200 migrants from
Afghanistan was attempting to enter Australian territory. However, as the boat was in
distress, she was not able to complete the journey. Australian authorities thus had to
rescue the vessel and its passengers on the north-west coast of Australia.
Unfortunately, only 108 people survived the incident.89
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Figure 12: Irregular maritime arrivals to Australia by select nationalities (2011-2012)90

To undertake this journey, people smugglers recruit Indonesian captains who
steer the ship towards Australia. However, these captains do not usually take control
of the ship until it reaches Christmas Island or Ashmore Reef. While the ship is
sailing in international waters, junior crew members are directed to steer the ship on
the captain’s behalf. In addition to the vessel carrying the human cargo, there is
invariably a support vessel which is used to carry the crew back to Indonesia. The
support vessel also ensures that crew members avoid being apprehended by
Australian or Indonesian authorities. Australian authorities have claimed that
incidents of people smuggling show similar trends, and that no new strategies have
been implemented by people smugglers in terms of their operations.91

90
91

DIBP or previously known as DIAC Systems.
UNODC, above n 57, 44.

178

5.3.4.2 Human Smuggling from Southeast Asia to Canada
The smuggling of people into Canada has been dominated by Sri Lankans since
1985.92 It should be noted, however, that Canada is not the most popular destination
for Middle Eastern and Central Asia migrants, such as those from Afghanistan and
Iran. Following the reconciliation between the Sri Lankan Government and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, many Tamil asylum seekers
migrated to India, and then to Southeast Asia in order to board boats which would
take them to their final destination - either Canada or Australia. More than 50 male
Tamils were carried by the Ocean Lady in 2009, which sailed from Mumbai and then
through several Southeast Asian countries to pick up other Tamil groups. This
journey was supported by the Tamil diasporic community in Canada, which
encouraged Tamils to migrate.93
Noticing this movement by the Tamils, Canadian authorities successfully
intercepted another vessel which was carrying almost 500 Tamils in August 2010.
The vessel in issue, the MV Sun Sea, had sailed from Songkhla, Thailand, and was
intercepted off the coast of British Columbia. Migrants seeking to resettle in Canada
usually enter Thailand through legal means – mainly air travel from Jaffna to
Bangkok. After entering Thailand, they overstay their tourist visas, thus becoming
illegal migrants. In the case of the MV Sun Sea, it was reported that there were
approximately 45 people working as people smugglers from different countries (Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia). These people smugglers provided the
migrants with tickets and documents to facilitate their arrival in Bangkok. The
migrants were then asked to stay in apartment-style accommodation until their date
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of departure, at which point their Thai documents were confiscated by the people
smugglers.94
In 2011, Indonesian authorities intercepted a vessel which was carrying more
than 80 Sri Lankan asylum seekers to Canada. The vessel was presumably heading to
New Zealand, however, there was some evidence that the crew on board the ship
intended to sail to Canada.
5.3.5

Smuggling Networks

Smuggling networks originating from the Middle East, as well as those from South
and West Asia, are involved with numerous criminal syndicates, especially those in
Asia.95
Both males and females are involved in people smuggling.96 Indeed, female
people smugglers have a distinct advantage over their male counterparts, often
evading detection by immigration officers and other authorities. Female people
smugglers are also used to accompany migrants who do not wish to travel alone.97
The smuggling network in this region is characterised by a loose
organisational structure. Migrants tend to rely on people smugglers who share their
country of origin. However, people smugglers have also been known to hire local
people (such as Indonesians), to help them arrange their activities in Indonesia.
People smugglers also offer different kinds of services, such as providing travel
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documents and accommodation, to hiring a crew and vessel that will take the
migrants to their desired destination State.98
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Figure 13: Afghan smuggling network (Amanullah Rezai)99

People smugglers who relocate Tamils operate differently from those
smuggling syndicates that smuggle people from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and
Myanmar to either Australia or Canada. It has been suggested that the smuggling of
Tamils was closely linked to the LTTE. Indeed, Canadian law still lists the LTTE as
a terrorist organisation. Moreover, there are other networks which support the
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movement of Tamils, such as nationals of Southeast Asian states (through which
Tamils transit on their way to Canada), as well as Sri Lankan smuggling networks.100
5.3.6

The Costs of People Smuggling

The amount of money required by migrants to reach their destination varies
according to their departure point, the particular route that is being used, as well as
the length of time they are required to spend in the transit country. For a migrant to
be smuggled from the Middle East, South or West Asia to Australia, the approximate
cost is US$10,000. However, if the migrant breaks up their journey into several
stages and uses different smuggling networks, the cost could be as much as
US$18,000. In order for a migrant to travel to Australia from a departure point in
Indonesia, the approximate cost would be US$5,000.101
In terms of payment, a person seeking to be smuggled will usually pay the fee
in instalments, either to the smuggler’s syndicate in their country of origin, or
through a broker or third party (called a ‘hawala broker’). Migrants are required to
pay a deposit in advance and make periodic payments at different stages of their
journey. In order to raise the necessary funds, the migrant’s family will often borrow
money or sell their belongings.102
On the other hand, the amount of money required by a migrant to reach
Canada can exceed US$25,000. According to a Canadian Government report, some
of the Sri Lankans that boarded the MV Sun Sea paid almost US$45,000 for their
journey.103 Similar to the migrants seeking to enter Australia, those on board the MV
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Sun Sea had to pay deposits of between US$2,500 and US$8,000 before
commencing their journey.104 Their families also had to borrow money from banks
and, in some cases, sell their properties in order to raise the required funds.105

Smuggling Service
Organiser (in source country)

Amount
$ 4,000

Fraudulent documents

$ 400

Bribes – law enforcement & border officials
Logistic air

$ 2,500
$ 700

Facilitator (based in Malaysia)

$ 1,700

Facilitator (based in Indonesia)

$ 3,000

Sea voyage

$ 5,000

Total

$ 17,300

Table 21: Potential smuggling service fee from Afghanistan to Australia106

5.3.7

The Number of Migrants Transported

The flow of migrants to Australia by boat has increased in recent years. More than
5,500 people attempted to enter Australia between 2009 and 2010, with almost 120
boats intercepted. This figure is higher than the previous peak, which occurred
between 1999 and 2001, and represents the highest number of arrivals in the country
in the last 20 years. Tumultuous political and social situations in several parts of the
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world have contributed to this influx of migrants. It should be noted that in 2002, the
number of illegal arrivals in Australia declined in the wake of the Pacific Solution,
which commenced in August 2001.107 However, this trend has been reversed, with
almost 6000 asylum seekers having attempted to enter Australia between 2009 and
2012.108
As mentioned above, each migrant is required pay approximately US$14,000
for their journey. If this figure is multiplied by the number of asylum seekers that
sought to enter Australia between 2009 and 2012, the Australian people smuggling
market is worth approximately US$85 million each year. In the case of Canada, if the
average payment made by a migrant to a people smuggler is approximately
US$25,000, and this figure is multiplied by the 492 asylum seekers on board the MV
Sun Sea, then the annual value of the Canadian people smuggling market is US$12.3
million.

Figure 14: Boat arrivals since 1989 by calendar year to Australia109
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Figure 15: Boat arrivals since 2009 by calendar year to Australia110

5.4

International Legal Framework on People Smuggling

This section discusses the international legal framework governing people
smuggling. The Smuggling Protocol, the main global instrument in addressing
people smuggling, is discussed in this section. The definition of people smuggling as
stipulated in the protocol is also elaborated. Furthermore, the explanation on the
categorisation of people smuggling as a crime under the international law is also
elaborated in this section.
5.4.1

The Smuggling Protocol

As people smuggling has become a problem for many countries around the world,
the act has been criminalised at the international level by virtue of the Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.111 This protocol is attached
to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (popularly
110
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known as the Palermo Convention), and was adopted on the 15 December 2000.112
The protocol was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly by Resolution
55/22, and subsequently entered into force on the 28 January 2001. Indeed, the
instrument has a large following, with more than 120 states parties to the protocol.113
As stipulated in Article 2 of the Smuggling Protocol, its purpose is to “prevent and
combat the smuggling of migrants, as well as to promote cooperation among States
Parties to that end, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants.”114 In essence,
the protocol aims to protect smuggled migrants and to foster cooperation between
States so that smuggling networks can be disrupted.
The other protocols which supplement this convention include the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and
Children, as well as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. These instruments not only
address the issue of human rights, but also create a legal basis for prosecuting
persons engaged in transnational organised crimes. The Palermo Convention forms a
general framework, but requires greater specificity in order to be effective. However,
the convention could be enhanced if provisions were inserted dealing with the need
for cooperation between States on matters relating to organised crime, such as the
exchange of information, the building of common entrance policies, and the
registration of bio-data. Nevertheless, the question that should be asked is whether
States are willing to accept provisions which have the capacity to infringe State
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sovereignty. The risk is that, left in its current form, the convention may simply
amount to what Brolan has referred to as “a list of good intentions.”115
5.4.1.1 The Smuggling Protocol and the Palermo Convention
Formal UN discussions on the Smuggling Protocol commenced after Italy urged the
international community to produce a legal instrument which would criminalise
people smuggling (and especially those operations conducted by sea).116 This appeal
was made in response to the unexpected number of people arriving in Italy by boat
from Turkey.117 By this stage, the problem of people smuggling had certainly caught
the attention of the international community, with other members of the United
Nations supporting the course of action proposed by the Italian government. Indeed,
there was widespread suspicion that highly developed people smuggling syndicates
were facilitating the illegal transfer of migrants abroad. Hence, other States (and
especially developed States), were becoming increasingly aware that the same
problem might present itself in their own jurisdiction, and that an immediate
international response was required.
Italy took the initial step of drafting the instrument on people smuggling.
However, in early 1990s, prior to the drafting, there were approaches adopted to
address the issues of organised crimes. The formal drafting of the instrument
occurred in 1992, when the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council.118
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The work of the Italian government and the commission reached its peak in
1998, when the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution which
“established an Ad Hoc Committee open to all states for the purpose of elaborating a
new international convention against transnational organized crime and additional
instruments.”119 These provisions were adopted by Resolution 53/111, which was
passed on 9 December 1998. The growing importance of the Palermo Convention
was evidenced by the fact that, by the year 2000, almost one hundred foreign
ministers had flown to Palermo in order to sign the convention.

State

Brunei
Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Vietnam

United Nations
Convention
against
Transnational
Organized
Crime

The Protocol to
Prevent,
Suppress and
Punish
Trafficking in
Persons,
especially
Women and
Children

The Protocol against
the Illicit
Manufacturing and
Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts
and Components and
Ammunition

25 Mar 2008 a

x

x

12 Dec 2005
20 April 2009
26 Sep 2003 a
24 Sep 2004
30 Mar 2004 a
28 May 2002
28 August 2007
17 Oct 2013
9 Nov 2009 a
8 Jun 2012

2 Jul 2007
28 sep 2009
26 Sep 2003 a
26 Feb 2009 a
30 Mar 2004 a
28 May 2002
28 Sep 2015 a
17 Oct 2013
x
8 Jun 2012 a

12 Dec 2005 a
x
26 Sep 2003 a
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Legend: Ratification, Accession (a), not ratified (x)
Table 22: Ratification Status of International Instruments
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5.4.1.2 People Smuggling according to the Smuggling Protocol
As stated earlier in this chapter, the Smuggling Protocol defines “people smuggling”
in Article 3(a), while Article 3(b) of the protocol defines “illegal entry” as “[the]
crossing of borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal
entry into the receiving State.”120 Hence, it could be inferred from this definition that
any person who enters a State without bringing essential documents (as required by
the immigration laws of that State), is an illegal migrant. Those people who enter a
State undocumented or who present false documents would also fall within the scope
of the article.121 Furthermore, Article 3(c) specifies the different kinds of fraudulent
documents which may be produced by an illegal migrant, including the unlawful use
of another person’s immigration documents, as well as documents which have been
obtained through corruption or duress.122
The regulation of people smuggling under the Smuggling Protocol should
also be read in conjunction with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea123
(LOSC). Under the protocol, a State party is authorised to board and search a vessel
allegedly involved in people smuggling where the vessel is without a nationality or is
assimilated to a vessel without a nationality.124 In addition, a State may take such
measures deemed necessary in accordance with its national law as well as
international law if evidence confirming the act of people smuggling is found.
Likewise, the LOSC authorises States to conduct investigations in respect of
vessels suspected of engaging in people smuggling. Indeed, in both the territorial sea
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and the contiguous zone, LOSC grants States the right to take necessary steps against
the vessel.125 By virtue of Article 33, LOSC also gives States the right to prevent and
punish violations of their immigration laws within their territory.126
Furthermore, as stipulated in Article 111 of LOSC, States are able to engage
in hot pursuit of foreign vessels in respect of such acts. However, this right can only
be exercised if the State committing the seizure has adequate grounds to believe that
the vessel is violating its national laws or regulations.127
5.4.2

People Smuggling as a Crime under International Law

People smuggling is considered a crime under international law. A fundamental
principle of criminal law is that two elements must be present in order for an offence
to be established.128 The first element, ‘mens rea’, requires the offender to have a
‘psychological or guilty mind’.

The second element, ‘actus reus’, calls for a

‘physical or guilty act’ to have been conducted. Therefore, in order for people
smuggling to be considered a criminal act under the Smuggling Protocol, the offence
should be composed of both a mental and physical element.
In Article 6(1) of the Smuggling Protocol, a person commits the offence of
people smuggling if the act is conducted in order to obtain a direct or indirect
financial or other material benefit.129 This act, which must be conducted
intentionally, forms the mental element of the offence.
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The physical element of the offence is presented in Article 6(1) and Article 4.
According to Article 6,130 a person conducting migrant smuggling must be involved
in the actual physical act of smuggling itself, or otherwise be engaged in producing
false or fraudulent travel or identity documents as elaborated in Article 3(c).
Furthermore, Article 4 elucidates the nature of the act described in Article 6, stating
that the act must be transnational in nature and involve an organised criminal
group.131 The protocol has elaborated the term “organized criminal groups” as
encompassing:
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or
offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.132
It is difficult to establish a link between transnational organised crime and
migrant smuggling activities, as the empirical research on this issue is lacking.
However, there are several scholars who have argued that people smuggling is not
committed by structured organisations, but by networks of individuals and groups
who cooperate with one another in order to reap financial rewards from the activity.
According to this conception, people smuggling has its own business model, with
each network performing a particular role within the broader smuggling process.
Depending upon the particular task, each ‘network’ may involve an individual or a
group of people. The definition of “organised criminal group” in the Smuggling
Protocol is wide enough to include such networks.133
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5.5

Regional Legal Framework on People Smuggling

This section elaborates on several regional legal frameworks which are used to
address the issue of people smuggling in Southeast Asia. The Bali Process and
ASEAN are the two prominent forums in the region that deal with the problem.
5.5.1

The Bali Process

As previously discussed, in 2002, Indonesia and Australia co-chaired a regional
ministerial conference in Bali to address the issue of irregular migration.134 This
meeting formed the foundation of the Bali Process.135 During this first meeting,
conference

participants

(which

included

several

States

and

international

organisations), stated three major points:136 (i) the problem of irregular migration in
the Asia Pacific region (and especially where sea transportation is used to enter the
destination State), creates political, economic, social and security challenges in the
region;137 (ii) migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons are activities which
endanger the lives of people. Indeed, such acts are reprehensible as they infringe
human rights as well as civil liberties;138 and (iii) states are committed to fighting
people smuggling and trafficking in persons in terms of their international
obligations and at the domestic level.139
In addition to these points, the Ministers acknowledged the commitments to
combat these illegal acts as it has been the region’s common purpose and concern.
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However, the Ministers also highlighted that regional cooperation must take into
account the right of each State to create and implement their own domestic laws to
address the issue.140
The Bali Process also endorsed the formation of an ad hoc expert group to
follow up the recommendations of the conference.141 Indeed, following the first Bali
Process two ad hoc expert groups were established. One was led by New Zealand,
and was responsible for coordinating regional and international cooperation, while
the other was chaired by Thailand and sought to support States to strengthen policy
making, legislative arrangements and law enforcement practices.142
5.5.1.1 The Aim of the Bali Process
The overarching objective of the Bali Process is to “raise awareness of, encourage
cooperative action and develop practical regional measures to prevent, intercept and
disrupt people smuggling, human trafficking and transnational crime.”143
There were five goals of the Bali Process which were agreed upon in the first
meeting. They include:
a.

b.
c.
d.

Developing more effective information and intelligence sharing
arrangements within the region to obtain a more complete picture of
smuggling and trafficking activities and other forms of illegal
migration;
Improving the cooperation of law enforcement agencies to enhance
deterrence and to fight against illegal immigration networks;
Enhancing cooperation on border and visa systems to improve the
detection and prevention of illegal movement;
Increasing public awareness of the facts of smuggling and trafficking
operations to discourage those considering illegal movement and to
warn those susceptible to trafficking, including women and children -
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e.

enhancing the effectiveness of return as a strategy to deter illegal
migration through the conclusion of appropriate arrangements; and
Cooperating in verifying the identity and nationality of illegal migrants,
in a timely manner.144

In order to accommodate developments in migrant smuggling and trafficking
in persons, these goals were amended in 2009 during the Third Bali Process Regional
Ministerial Conference.145 The new goals are:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

The development of more effective information and intelligence
sharing;
Improved cooperation among regional law enforcement agencies to
deter and combat people smuggling and trafficking networks;
Enhanced cooperation on border and visa systems to detect and prevent
illegal movements;
Increased public awareness in order to discourage these activities and
warn those susceptible;
Enhanced effectiveness of return as a strategy to deter people
smuggling and trafficking through conclusion of appropriate
arrangements;
Cooperation in verifying the identity and nationality of illegal migrants
and trafficking victims;
The enactment of national legislation to criminalise people smuggling
and trafficking in persons;
Provision of appropriate protection and assistance to the victims of
trafficking, particularly women and children;
Enhanced focus on tackling the root causes of illegal migration,
including by increasing opportunities for legal migration between
states; and
Assisting countries to adopt best practices in asylum management, in
accordance with the principles of the Refugee Convention. 146

These goals are used as a benchmark to monitor the development of the conference,
as well as to measure the fulfilment of the Bali Process mandate.147

144

Australia and Indonesia, ‘Co-Chairs’ Statement: Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling,
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime’ (26-28 February 2002).
145
Douglas and Schloenhardt, above n 134, 9.
146
Australia and Indonesia, ‘Co-Chairs’ Statement: Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling,
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime’ (26-28 February 2002).
147
Douglas and Schloenhardt, above n 134, 9.

194

5.5.1.2 Bali Process as a Regional Response
People smuggling has been the main issue discussed at the Bali Process meetings.
And although there have been discussions regarding trafficking in persons, people
smuggling seems to have dominated this particular forum. However, to date, there
have been no major evaluations of the work conducted by the Bali Process, and
hence, it is arguable whether the meetings can reasonably be expected to solve the
problem of people smuggling in the Asia Pacific region. According to Douglas and
Schloenhardt, the reasoning behind this is that people smuggling is a complex
problem – one that demands more than a narrow investigation of the issues discussed
during the meetings. The infrequent nature of the meetings has also caused problems
in this regard. Furthermore, the Bali Process does not have a secretariat to oversee
administrative work and to conduct coordination among the committed states.
Meanwhile, the lack of a fixed schedule to conduct its meetings means that
evaluating the achievements of the Bali Process mandate is a difficult task.148
5.5.1.3 The Bali Process as a Forum of Consultation
The Bali Process serves as one of the largest consultative processes in the world,
with over 45 members, including States and international organisations such as the
UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as well as numerous observers.
The majority of State members of the Bali Process are from the Asia Pacific
region. At present, there is no formal qualification process in order for a State to
become a member of the forum and it is relatively easy for developing States to join

148

Ibid, 10.

195

the Bali Process. To date, there have been five ministerial meetings organised by the
Bali Process (2002, 2003, 2009, 2011 and 2013).
Information sharing among member States of the Bali Process is still lacking.
Indeed, even though information sharing forms one of the fundamental goals of the
forum, it remains one of the major hurdles in improving coordination among the
participating parties. This problem was pointed out during a technical experts
meeting in Sri Lanka in May 2011.149 The meeting viewed the lack of technical
information and intelligence sharing as a barrier to fighting people smuggling
operations.
5.5.1.4 Results of the Bali Process
It is difficult to assess whether the Bali Process has been successful in its outcomes
because the forum is both informal and non-binding,150 with member States
conducting ‘soft diplomacy’ as a way of approaching other participants in the
process. Thus, although the Bali Process is neither a forum for international treaty
negotiation nor a dispute settlement body, it nonetheless serves as a valuable
platform for dialogue, building and enhancing trust among the parties. And this
certainly seems to be the case. Since the Bali Process was initiated, States have
openly discussed concerns surrounding transnational crimes (and particularly
migrant smuggling) at the international level, whereas previously such matters were
only discussed domestically, as they involved issues of national sovereignty.151
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The Bali Process has also succeeded in getting States to look at the issue of
people smuggling from different angles, such as from the perspective of source
States, destination States and transit States.152 Furthermore, it has united States in the
Asia Pacific which have a diversity of legal systems, social structures, cultural norms
and economic imperatives. However, these achievements should not supersede the
fact that the forum produces few practical outcomes.153
5.5.1.5 Model laws
The Bali Process has also successfully developed a Model Law to Combat People
Smuggling, which has been heavily influenced by the Smuggling Protocol
In its first year, the Ad Hoc Expert Group compiled a list of the national laws
of member States regulating people smuggling. Subsequently, Australia and China
drafted a Model Law which was intended to harmonise these laws. The document
was produced in 2003 and was later promoted in a series of meetings, particularly to
States lacking legislation on the issue. More than a quarter of Bali Process member
States have since incorporated the Model Law into their domestic legislation.
The adoption of the Model Law has harmonised legislation relating to people
smuggling, especially in the Asia Pacific region. Furthermore, it has the potential to
enhance cooperation in several areas, including in the legal sector, which may form
the foundation for greater State cooperation at the bilateral and international levels.
Moreover, the Model Law is extremely beneficial for countries that have not ratified
the Smuggling Protocol. Indeed, less than half of Bali Process member States have
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ratified the Smuggling Protocol, and hence the Model Law is particularly significant
for the Asia Pacific region.
Because of its voluntary nature, the Bali Process does not have the power to
compel member States to ratify and implement international instruments, such as
those related to people smuggling. Thus, the creation of the Model Law facilitates the
adoption of consistent national legislation across States in the region. Furthermore, as
the Model Law is based on the Smuggling Protocol, States which do adopt it will
most likely be acting in a manner which is consistent with international law.154
In order to improve law enforcement cooperation between relevant authorities
in the region Bali Process has also developed best practice guidelines on various
topics. Most of these guidelines mainly focus on capacity building and result from
numerous workshops conducted between 2002 and 2011155. Model laws serve as
tools to assist legislative drafters to develop domestic laws, however, greater
awareness and training should be organized or made available regarding these tools.
As people smuggling is transnational in nature, regional States require understanding
and a common legal basis to address the issue. The presence of the Model Law
would enhance such challenges particularly among States engaged in the Bali
Process where only less than half of the member States have ratified the Smuggling
Protocol.
5.5.1.6 Guidelines for Cooperation
The Bali Process has formulated a set of guidelines which, in principle, are designed
to enhance cooperation among government agencies, especially law enforcement
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agencies.156 The guidelines were the result of several workshops which were held
since the forum’s inception in 2002 until 2011. Even though the guidelines do not
have much practical significance, they serve to unite related agencies in the region,
as their main focus is on capacity building.157 Furthermore, one of the outcomes of
the guidelines has been to streamline verification and document examination
procedure in the region. Hence, visas and passports are now examined with greater
uniformity across member States. Another benefit of the guidelines is that
information about people smuggling in the region is now readily available, especially
in countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.158
5.5.1.7 Regional Framework Agreement
The Regional Framework Agreement (RFA) is another important document that has
been produced by the Bali Process. The rationale for the agreement was first
canvassed in a paper presented by UNHCR in Manila five months prior to its
inception, where the UNHCR noted the need to formulate a document which would
help member States, organisations as well as other stakeholders cooperate with one
another in order to address the issue of illegal migrants. In early 2011, member States
attended the Fourth Regional Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process and agreed
on the RFA. In principle, the aim of the agreement is to enhance State cooperation on
people smuggling at the regional and bilateral levels.159 Furthermore, during the
Senior Official Ministers meeting, the Steering Committee formulated a set of
principles to govern the non-binding agreement. These principles are:
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a. Irregular movement facilitated by people smuggling syndicates should be
eliminated and States should promote and support opportunities for
orderly migration;
b. Where appropriate and possible, asylum seekers should have access to
consistent assessment processes, whether through a set of harmonised
arrangements or through the possible establishment of regional
assessment arrangements, which might include a centre or centres, taking
into account any existing sub-regional arrangements;
c. Persons found to be refugees under those assessment processes should be
provided with a durable solution, including voluntary repatriation,
resettlement within and outside the region and, where appropriate,
possible “in country” solutions;
d. Persons found not to be in need of protection should be returned,
preferably on a voluntary basis, to their countries of origin, in safety and
dignity. Returns should be sustainable and States should look to
maximize opportunities for greater cooperation; and
e. People smuggling enterprises should be targeted through border security
arrangements, law enforcement activities and disincentives for human
trafficking and smuggling.160
In implementing the agreement, it was agreed that States should take into
account several considerations such as:
a. Arrangements should promote human life and dignity;
b. Arrangements should seek to build capacity in the region to process
mixed flows and where appropriate utilise available resources, such as
those provided by international organisations;
c. Arrangements should reflect the principles of burden-sharing and
collective responsibility, while respecting sovereignty and the national
security of concerned States;
d. Arrangements should seek to address root causes of irregular movement
and promote population stabilisation wherever possible;
e. Arrangements should promote orderly, legal migration and provide
appropriate opportunities for regular migration;
f. Any arrangements that should avoid creating pull factors to, or within,
the region;
g. Arrangements should seek to undermine the people smuggling model and
create disincentives for irregular movement and may include, in
appropriate circumstances, transfer and readmission; and
h. Arrangements should support and promote increased information
exchange, while respecting confidentiality and upholding the privacy of
affected persons.161
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Both the principles and considerations of the RFA are of great significance,
with both being agreed upon by States during the Fourth Regional Ministerial
Conference.162 Indeed, the RFA represents a big step forward in combating people
smuggling. Even though the document is non-binding, it serves to assimilate
sensitive issues on border security into one document. The fact that many States in
the Asia Pacific region have not yet ratified the Palermo Convention or the
Smuggling Protocol undeniably forms a barrier to cooperation on the issue of people
smuggling. Indeed, this is compounded by the lack of domestic regulation on people
smuggling. Therefore, the RFA is significant as it provides the impetus for
cooperative discussions on the issue. In light of the number of culturally and legally
diverse states that have signed up to the RFA, according to Douglas and
Schloenhardt, its significance as an instrument cannot be questioned.163
5.5.2

ASEAN Measures

People smuggling has also been a concern for members of ASEAN.164 The member
states of ASEAN have recognised the need for cooperation at both the international
and regional levels in order to successfully combat people smuggling. Due to the
transboundary nature of the activity, the ten states of ASEAN have acknowledged
that the successful prosecution of offenders at the national level is absolutely vital if
smuggling networks are to be disrupted.165
However, people smuggling is not a new issue for ASEAN. In 1997, during
the Second Informal ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN member countries
162
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expressed their concern over the issue.166 Since then, people smuggling has received
greater attention within the organisation. In keeping with this commitment, the
ASEAN regime has produced several instruments to facilitate cooperation among its
members on the issue.
ASEAN has made a formal declaration in combating transnational crime
which would also include people smuggling, the ASEAN Declaration against
Transnational Crime, signed in Manila, on 20 December 1997.167 The declaration
urges member States to strengthen their commitment to combating transnational
crime through regional measures. Furthermore, it also encouraged member States to
conduct discussions and meetings in order to discuss issues related to transnational
crime. The declaration also stated that member States would consider the
establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime which would be a
coordinating body to foster regional efforts in combating transnational crime through
“intelligence sharing, harmonisation of policies and coordination of operations.”168
Another instrument that facilitates regional ties in combating people
smuggling is the 2006 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) in Criminal
Matters which sets out the basic requirements for cooperation in order to combat
transnational crimes. The MLA Treaty aims to enhance cooperation and mutual legal
assistance in prevention, conducting investigations as well as prosecution of criminal
offences. The treaty urges legal assistance in criminal matters between the
contracting States as stipulated in Article 1. In order to make the arrangement
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feasible, every State is asked to provide a focal point or central authority which
would make and receive requests. Furthermore, Article 7 explains the execution
process which would be conducted in conformity with the national law of the
requested State.169
The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime is the other
instrument used by ASEAN countries to conduct regional cooperation in addressing
transnational crime matters, including people smuggling.170 The Plan of Action is
focussed on several programs of action such as information exchange, legal matters,
law enforcement matters, training, institutional capacity building and extra regional
cooperation.171 These programs are conducted in order to achieve both the general
and specific objectives of the Plan of Action. The general objective of the framework
is to enhance cooperation in combating transnational crime at different levels such as
the national, bilateral and regional levels. Furthermore, it also stated that member
States shall focus on strengthening regional commitments and capacity to combat
such transnational crimes as terrorism, arms smuggling, trafficking in person and
piracy. The specific objectives of the Plan of Action are to:
a. Develop a more cohesive, regional strategy aimed at preventing,
controlling and neutralizing transnational crime;
b. Foster regional cooperation at the investigative, prosecutorial, and
judicial level as well as the rehabilitation of perpetrators;
c. Enhance coordination among ASEAN bodies dealing with transnational
crime;
d. Strengthen regional capacities and capabilities to deal with sophisticated
nature of transnational crime; and
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e. Develop sub-regional and regional treaties on cooperation in criminal
justice, including mutual legal assistance and extradition172.
The plan of action also included a section on Institutional Framework for
ASEAN Cooperation on Combating Transnational Crime, where member States
commit themselves to establish several institutional frameworks in order implement
the Plan of Action as well as to combat transnational crime. These institutions
include the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, the Senior
Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, and the ASEAN Secretariat.173
However, as various States within ASEAN are affected by people smuggling
in different ways, for example, either as States of origin, transit or destination,
divergent approaches have been taken by States to address the issue. Such
complexity has also affected the formulation of a regional legal instrument to tackle
people smuggling. However, the legal framework provides help in prosecuting the
offenders as well as establishing uniformity of people smuggling laws among
ASEAN member States. A convention on transnational crime has been one of
ASEAN’s main priorities. However, the conflicting perspectives of the member
States on the issue of people smuggling has affected its progress, and thus more time
is needed to forge a common understanding before the instrument can be enacted.174
5.6

Analysis of the Prevailing International and Regional Framework

Even though many States have ratified the Smuggling Protocol at the international
level, implementation of the protocol at the national level within the Southeast Asian
region has not always been forthcoming. There are several reasons for this, including
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lack of domestic legislation, inadequate policies and planning, as well as limited
international cooperation.175
The Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, which was held in 2008, encouraged States to ratify
the Palermo Convention as well as its protocols.176 The conference highlighted the
lack of capacity of numerous States to formulate legislation against people
smuggling. Nonetheless, the same conference noted that many States had
successfully criminalised smuggling activities at the national level. Those States that
had not drafted domestic legislation incorporating the relevant international
instruments cited limited capability and a lack of expertise as the main factors for the
legislative gap. Hence, it is important to develop capacity building in the form of
training sessions and other measures so that this problem can be overcome. Indeed, it
is critical to have legislation at the national level that accords with international
instruments in order to suppress people smuggling syndicates, and more importantly,
to support the political will of States that have ratified the Palermo Convention and
its protocols.
Another problem militating against the implementation of the convention and
its associated protocols is the inadequacy of State policies and planning. Only a few
States have a specific policy addressing the issue of people smuggling, and as a
result, it is difficult to establish inter-agency cooperation to respond to smuggling
activities. Furthermore, law enforcement efforts at the State level are often limited to
border control, but this is inadequate to deal with the problem. In order to be
responsive to developments in people smuggling activities, States must engage in
175
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advanced planning and have a range of different policies in place. As encouraged by
the UNODC, this planning should produce “collaborative, multi-agency, long-term
and coordinated strategies.”177 Such planning, however, must take into account
several factors, such as the assessment of the smuggling activities and the capability
of States to respond to the problem. In addition, authorities must develop cooperative
and collaborative approaches at the regional and international levels in order to
implement the required strategies.
In conducting their activities, people smugglers take advantage of States with
inadequate legal frameworks and weak law enforcement capabilities. Indeed,
developing States are often used as transit areas, providing people smugglers and
their customers with a ‘safe haven’ until such time as formal arrangements are in
place for their departure to the destination State. Moreover, smuggling operations
conducted by sea threaten the lives of legitimate users of the ocean. In responding to
this concern, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 64/71, which in principle
urges States and relevant stakeholders to cooperate and combat people smuggling.
Furthermore, the resolution encourages States to cooperate at the international level,
particularly with respect to the Palermo Convention and the Smuggling Protocol.
The framework for cooperation is outlined in Articles 7 to 9 of the Smuggling
Protocol.178 In combating people smuggling by sea, States are encouraged to
cooperate in accordance with international law to the fullest extent possible, as
stipulated in Article 7.179 In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 8, where a
State party has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel may be engaged in people
smuggling, it may request assistance from other State parties to prevent the
177
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smuggling process. Moreover, the second paragraph of Article 8 allows a State party
to give permission to other state parties to board, search and take other appropriate
measures in respect of a vessel flying its flag where the vessel is allegedly being used
for migrant smuggling purposes.180
Limited international cooperation is another factor that has hampered the
implementation of the Smuggling Protocol. It is almost impossible to combat people
smuggling by unilateral initiatives which ignore the importance of cooperative ties
with other States. Indeed, in order to track the movement of people smugglers and
their human cargo, and to create coordinated operational activities between States,
bilateral as well as international cooperation is needed. People smuggling is a highly
organised operation, involving numerous criminal networks across multiple regions
and States. Therefore, a collaborative and transnational approach between States is
required to comprehensively address the problem. However, such an approach is not
without its difficulties. Given the disparate social and cultural sensitivities of States
in the region, it is important to overcome “geographical, political, ideological and
linguistic” barriers in order to address people smuggling activities.181
At the regional level, the Bali Process has not been able to produce a binding
framework for its members to accept and implement.182 Indeed, the forum has only
produced a few tangible outcomes, and unfortunately has not proved successful in
eradicating people smuggling activities in Southeast Asia. However, the Bali Process
does have validity as a forum where States can come together to discuss issues
related to illegal migrants – something they did not do prior to its inception
(especially in Southeast Asia). In this regard, it is important to note that the forum is
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a process, not an organisation, and thus the results which the forum can reasonably
be expected to achieve must be viewed in perspective. The success of the Bali
Process lies in creating a common ground amongst States in the region on people
smuggling issues, but it is unlikely to be able to compel States to ratify and
implement legal frameworks (if it decides to proceed down that path in the future).
In 2009, Indonesia and Australia (in their capacity as co-chairs of the forum)
stated that the Bali Process has reached its “point of maturity”. However, the facts
indicate that this is not the case.183 The Bali Process has been growing steadily over
the years and its importance is being recognised by States. One of the prominent
outcomes of the forum has been the 2011 Regional Framework Agreement.184
Indeed, it would be counterproductive for States to withdraw from the Bali Process,
as the forum may have a greater and more enduring impact on transnational crimes
(such as people smuggling) the longer it operates.
Undeniably, the Bali Process is one of the most prominent forums for
addressing people smuggling in the region. Although some stakeholders view the
work of the forum as moving at a slow rate, the progress made by the Bali Process is
promising, and with concerted effort by States, it should continue to develop.
Ultimately, however, it is dependent upon State parties to decide the extent to which
the Bali Process should address people smuggling. As the problem becomes more
complex and generates worldwide attention, the action taken by State parties in
prosecuting offenders and protecting smuggled migrants will become increasingly
important.185
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As for the ASEAN regime, the dialogue on people smuggling has not yet
crystallised into a formal legal framework. Although the organisation has discussed
the issue since its Second Informal Summit in 1997, people smuggling still
dominates its talks. However, the different approaches and perspectives of member
States toward people smuggling activities (depending upon their involvement as
States of origin, transit or destination), have always been a barrier to creating a
transnational crime convention within ASEAN.
5.7

Conclusion

People smuggling is a serious maritime security threat in Southeast Asia. The gravity
of the issue has been recognised by States, and solutions to address the problem have
been proposed and implemented albeit with limited success. There are existing
international and regional measures in place which aim to address the problem. At
the international level, the Smuggling Protocol is the main legal instrument whereas
at the regional level, the Bali Process and measures within the ASEAN framework
are most relevant in addressing the issue.
This chapter explained that the problem of people smuggling is particularly complex
and challenging for a variety of reasons, as discussed extensively above. Moreover, it
is undeniable that people smuggling still occurs in Southeast Asia. Hence, it could be
concluded that the prevailing frameworks are inadequate to comprehensively and
fully address the problem. The nature of people smuggling as a transnational
organised crime renders it difficult for a single State to unilaterally address the issue
as the offenders routinely cross state boundaries to escape prosecution.186 Thus,
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regional cooperation involving related agencies is regarded as the best way to disrupt
smuggling networks and to eradicate the practice of people smuggling.
.
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CHAPTER VI
6 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in Southeast Asia

6.1

Introduction

The exploitation of fisheries resources has become a significant concern in the
international community.1 Fish constitutes one of the main sources of animal protein
in people’s diet.2 The growth of the world’s population has undeniably led to the
increased exploitation of fisheries resources. Moreover, technological advancements
have made the harvesting of fish easier, paving the way for the fishing industry to
better meet the protein requirements of the world’s population.
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a practice where fishing
vessels neglect the regulation of fisheries in coastal waters, on the high seas, or in
those areas which are under the control of Regional Fisheries Management
Organisations (RFMO).3 Such conduct is almost always premeditated, with offenders
having reflagged to States which are non-members of RFMOs, changing the vessel
name and call sign, as well as sharing intelligence information with other
perpetrators.4 Operators and owners of the IUU fishing vessels have benefited from
the limitations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).5

1

W Riddle, K., ‘Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: Is International Cooperation
Contagious?’ (2007) 37 Ocean Development & International Law , 265
2
Mary Ann E Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William R Edeson, Promoting sustainable fisheries: The
international legal and policy framework to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (Brill,
2010), 1.
3
Rachel Baird, ‘Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing: an analysis of the legal, economic and
historical factors relevant to its development and persistence’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal
International Law 299, 2.
4
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5
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC.
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The development of modern marine fisheries has been shaped by historical
and developmental factors.6 Some of the reasons for this are economic and political
self-interests. However, it is useful to canvass the factors which have led to this
change in order to find legal solutions which address the problem of IUU fishing.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concept of IUU fishing, and
discuss and analyse issues relating to IUU fishing in Southeast Asia. This chapter
explains the nature and practice of IUU fishing in Southeast Asia, the regional and
international legal frameworks that are used to combat IUU fishing, as well as their
legal gaps. The Chapter also focuses on regional cooperation that addresses IUU
fishing conducted in the EEZ and on the high seas.
The chapter concludes that States have taken numerous steps at the
international and regional level to address the problem, but IUU fishing remains a
significant concern in the region and unilateral action by States is unlikely to solve
the problem. However, the chapter also affirms that collective measures taken by
States through regional organisations as well as the implementation of cooperative
strategies between organisations, may act as a way forward in providing
recommendations to address IUU fishing based on the experiences of States.
Moreover, adherence to the international legal framework at the regional level will
help in uniting existing policies worldwide, thus forging a common understanding of
the issue and allowing for the more effective enforcement of prevailing laws.7
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6.2

Concept and Challenges in Combating IUU Fishing

This section will examine the concept of IUU fishing as a maritime security threat.
Furthermore, it will analyse the challenges that are being faced by States in
combating the problem of IUU fishing.
6.2.1

IUU Fishing as a Maritime Security Threat

IUU fishing generally refers to any illegitimate fishing act, including
“noncompliance with fishing seasons, fishing without proper permits, catching
prohibited species, using illegal fishing gear, catching more than the allowable quota,
and not reporting or underreporting the amount of fish caught”.8 The UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO)9 has stated that IUU fishing is the main factor in the
collapse of a number of valuable fish stocks around the world.10 The FAO has further
affirmed that this act is responsible for the decline in fisheries and threatens the
rebuilding of damaged fish stocks.11
The International Plan of Action-IUU (IPOA-IUU)12 has defined IUU fishing
into three parts as follows:
Illegal fishing refers to activities: a. conducted by national or foreign vessels
in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that
State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations; b. conducted by vessels
flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries
management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation
and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the
States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or
c. in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those
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undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management
organization.13
Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities: a. which have not been
reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in
contravention of national laws and regulations; or b. undertaken in the area of
competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization which
have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the
reporting procedures of that organization.14
Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities: a.in the area of application of
a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are conducted by
vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to
that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with
or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that
organization; or b. in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no
applicable conservation or management measures and where such fishing
activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities
for the conservation of living marine resources under international law; and c.
certain unregulated fishing may take place in a manner which is not in
violation of applicable international law, and may not require the application
of measures envisaged under the International Plan of Action.15

IUU fishing is a maritime security threat because of its potential to
compromise and threaten food security worldwide. The exact number of IUU fishing
incidents worldwide is difficult to obtain, as most of the acts are unreported or
constitute illegal fishing.16 According to the FAO, IUU fishing has “escalated in the
past 20 years, especially in high seas fisheries”.17 The FAO estimates that IUU
fishing constitutes approximately 11–26 million tonnes of fish annually, with a value
of US$10–23 billion.18 Hence, it is not surprising that IUU fishing threatens the
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sustainable management of fisheries around the world.19 Furthermore, IUU fishing
crosses State boundaries, and hence, perpetrators can escape the national jurisdiction
of States. It is estimated that IUU fishing in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of
States is worth $US10-23.5 billion, resulting in the loss of approximately 18 per cent
of total fisheries.20 The FAO predicts that the incidence of IUU fishing will increase
in the future, threatening the remaining healthy fish stocks.
The practice of IUU fishing contravenes several instruments are applicable at
both the regional and international levels.21 Furthermore, such conduct threatens the
conservation and management of fish stocks. However, unregulated fishing may in
some circumstances be legal in the absence of relevant regulations in place. Whilst
all States have the right to fish on the high seas, they must comply with prevailing
regulations. An unregulated catch becomes illegal when a State which is not a party
to an RFMO conducts fishing in an RFMO conservation area and contravenes the
conservation measures which have been put in place. In terms of unreported fishing,
it is illegal if a State engages in fishing without reporting to the conservators in areas
where reporting is an obligation.22
IUU fishing has become a global security concern, especially after it was
discovered that illegal fishing activities are often connected to other transnational
organised crimes such as piracy, people smuggling and illicit weapons smuggling.
One prominent example of this overlap is the terrorist act that occurred in Mumbai in
19
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2008. The incident involved several transnational crime actors including terrorists,
people smugglers, pirates, as well as illegal fishers.
IUU fishing is not a new maritime threat. Indeed, the phenomenon has
resulted in numerous conservation and management efforts being taken by RFMOs.23
States have been discussing the issue for some time, with the objective of forging a
common understanding of the problem and devising concrete measures to combat
IUU fishing activities. One such output has been the IPOA IUU, which was
formulated by the FAO. A number of specific measures have been implemented to
address the problem, including maintaining the number of legitimate fishing
activities by the FAO, as well as the development of an international treaty which, in
principle, provides measures that should be adopted by port States to prevent IUU
fish from entering the seafood market.24
Likewise, RFMOs have affirmed several policies that need to be followed by
its members in order to prevent IUU fishing. These measures include registering
vessels which are going to be used for fishing, as well as the use of monitoring,
control and surveillance (MSC) systems. Furthermore, legislative and administrative
steps have been taken to prevent IUU fish from entering the consumer market. Just
like other commodities, offenders can only benefit from their activities if IUU fish
are able to be sold commercially.25
Ideally, all fishing vessels that operate on the high seas should be registered
and possess an identification number, thus making them recognisable. Indeed, the act
of registration assists with identifying the beneficial owner of the vessel. It is also
important that all States become parties to international instruments such as the
23
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LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement26 (UNFSA). According to the Global
Ocean Commission, not only should States comply with these international
instruments, but they should also discharge their obligations at the regional level
(such as within RFMOs). In this regard, States are expected to monitor the fishing
activities conducted by their citizens and vessels flying their flag. RFMOs should
also help coordinate action that needs to be taken by its members and other RFMOs
in relation to IUU fishing and other illegal activities on the high seas. The exact
location of vessels, as well as their activities on the high seas, should be monitored
by RFMOs and, if deemed necessary, this information should be shared with other
stakeholders such as law enforcement officials and fisheries management agencies.
At the national level, port States should coordinate and cooperate with RFMOs in
relation to monitoring fishing vessels which enter their ports. This would enable port
States to deny entry to vessels involved in IUU fishing activities and vessels
allegedly carrying IUU fish. To eradicate this problem at its financial roots, retailers
should also play their part by refusing to purchase fish which is suspected of having
been caught illegally.27
However, to get to this ideal position championed by the Global Ocean
Commission, there are several loopholes that have to be addressed. These loopholes
create opportunities for offenders to conduct their activities and enter new markets.
IUU fishing on the high seas is an extremely lucrative business. Moreover, due to the
transnational nature of the crime, multilateral and regional cooperation is needed to
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apprehend offenders – many of whom take advantage of weaknesses in law
enforcement regimes to continue their illegal activities. Therefore, enforcement
measures on the high seas are unlikely to be effective unless they are supported by
prevention measures by retailers and the wholesale fish market.
The bottom line is that IUU fishing can only be combated if States are willing
to cooperate at the international and regional levels by implementing agreed
measures and providing the required resources to ensure such implementation.
6.2.2

Challenges in Combating IUU Fishing
IUU fishing continues to take place due to shortcomings in the prevailing

system that is managed by fisheries authorities.28 These shortcomings include
irresponsible flag States, inadequate port State measures, inadequate regulation by
RFMOs, individual States and commercial markets, as well as a lack of capacity and
weak enforcement.
6.2.2.1 Lack of Responses from Flag States
According to the LOSC, all States have the right to conduct fishing on the high
seas.29 Nonetheless, States must exercise responsibility over fishing vessels flying
their flag. In addition, States need to be aware of the prevailing international and
regional instruments governing high seas fishing. States which are members of
RFMOs have a particular obligation to comply with the conservation and
management measures which have been agreed upon by the organisation. Indeed,
even States which are not members of RFMOs need to be aware of such measures,
and refrain from engaging in conduct which would hamper RFMO conservation and

28
29

Ibid, 3.
Article 87, LOSC.

218

management plans. Therefore, although these States do not have to abide by the
obligations set out in treaties agreed upon under the RFMO framework, according to
Global Ocean Commission, they should be reminded of their duty to cooperate, as set
out in the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
If the above responsibilities were to be adhered seriously by all States, then
the problem of IUU fishing will be minimized.30 However, the facts reveal that
several flag States are either unable or unwilling to fulfil their obligations in this
regard. Indeed, some States are unable to control and monitor their vessels due to a
lack of capacity. Furthermore, there are States which offer cheap and fast registration
of fishing vessels. Therefore, there are vessels which are registered under different
flag States within a short span of time.31 More problematic, however, is the lack of
transparency in the registration process – a shortcoming which allows the beneficial
owners of vessels to hide behind nominees.32 As a result, IUU fishing is able to
flourish, thereby threatening the sustainability of fisheries worldwide.
6.2.2.2 Weak Port State Measures
Port States play a significant role in the effort to eradicate IUU fishing.33 Indeed,
both States and RFMOs have recognised the importance of port State measures in
disrupting IUU fishing activities, especially with regard to the offloading of fish in
ports. These measures are intended to make it more difficult for IUU fishers to
conduct their operations, as they must expend considerable time and money on ports
which are less regulated. Conversely, such measures have proved extremely cost
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effective for States, as port State control is cheaper to implement than inspections at
sea.
In order to be effective, however, port State control has to be practiced at all
existing ports. If this does not occur, the result may be ‘ports of convenience’, where
IUU fishers can offload their catch without fear of prosecution. To implement such
control, port States need to have domestic legislation prohibiting the act, as well as
legal instruments enabling them to coordinate action with flag States, market States,
as well as other port States. Indeed, harmonised port State control at both the global
and regional levels would benefit States with limited enforcement capabilities. Other
States with similar control programs would be able to assist in cases where IUU fish
is transported from one port to another within a particular region.34
Port State control has been successful in resolving issues surrounding
substandard merchant ships. Currently, there are nine port State control
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) around the world which implement
international treaties related to shipping. Furthermore, port States participating under
these MOUs are bound by a set of rules produced by the IMO and the International
Labour Organization (ILO)35, with such States conducting inspections when vessels
enter their ports and detaining vessels suspected of violating the terms of the
prevailing MOU. Similar control measures are being trialled with respect to fishing
vessels. There are, however, additional enforcement measures that could be
implemented by port States, such as denying port entry to a vessel that has been
blacklisted, as well as preventing the offloading of harvested IUU fish.
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In 2009, after a series of negotiations, the Agreement on Port State Measures
to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
(PSMA), was approved by the FAO and opened for signature.36 This agreement was
heavily influenced by the 2004 Port State Model Scheme, which in principle
recommended the basic port State measures needed to be applied when adopting the
Regional MOU. The PSMA will enter into force after it is ratified by at least 25
countries. The agreement has not received wide support and has not yet entered into
force, which highlights the need for greater effort to convince and encourage States
to ratify the instrument.37
6.2.2.3 Black Listing of Vessels
Each RFMO has devised its own set of measures to address the problem of IUU
fishing. One such measure is the blacklisting of vessels reasonably suspected of
having engaged in IUU fishing, as well as those proven to have engaged in such
activity. The names of these vessels could be released and widely circulated so they
can easily be identified. The aim of this measure is to prevent detected vessels from
offloading IUU fish at ports. Currently, there are nine RFMOs including the Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)38, the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO)39 and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
(NEAFC)40, which have officially blacklisted vessels.41
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There are more than 70 vessels which have been blacklisted to date.42
Considering the vast number of RFMOs, this figure may appear small. Indeed, there
are large numbers of undetected vessels engaging in IUU fishing activities. These
vessels go undetected for a variety of reasons, including the lack of a mandatory
numbering scheme, the failure of States to update vessel details, as well as the
absence of IMO numbers. Furthermore, the problem is compounded by the fact that
individual blacklists are not shared globally.43

6.2.2.4 Markets
Retailers are positioned to play an important role in preventing IUU fish from
reaching the consumer market. If retailers were only allowed to accept seafood
harvested legitimately (and in circumstances where the origin of the catch has been
disclosed), then preventing the entry of the IUU fish into the consumer market would
be facilitated. Furthermore, such a scheme would enable customers, who are unlikely
to be privy to the dealings between the supplier and retailer, to be confident that the
seafood they purchase has been procured through legal means.
The seafood trade is a multi-billion dollar business. Therefore, if seafood
retailers were to become engaged with the issue of IUU fishing, and their assistance
sought, they could potentially have a significant impact on reducing the number of
illegal catch. Indeed, this measure could go some way towards developing and
maintaining the traceability of fishery products. Traceability is required in order to
determine the source of all fish destined for the consumer market. It would also be
beneficial if governments, retailers and consumers were made aware of marine
42
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fishing practices, with reliable information about the origin of seafood entering the
local market being made available.44

6.2.2.5 Inadequacy States Compliance with the Agreements
The PSMA has been acknowledged as one of the most significant measures in
combating IUU fishing. However, several developing States, and especially those in
Africa, have asserted that they lack capacity in this area, and are therefore not able to
meet the requirements of the agreement.45 Indeed, States have differing capacity,
ranging from human resources to the availability of accessible technology. However,
Article 21 of the PSMA46 has anticipated this problem, and if implemented
accordingly, should help the agreement to be effectively discharged following its
entry into force. For instance, African States have joined the New Partnership for
Africa's Development (NEPAD)47 through its Stop Illegal Fishing Working Group.
The main aim of this group is to meet the requirements of the PSMA by listing the
capacity needs of States and the toolkits required. However, according to the Global
Ocean Commission, corruption remains the main barrier to its implementation. For
this reason, accountability and transparency are essential elements to ensure the
efficacy of the measures taken in combating IUU fishing.
There has also been growing momentum to categorise IUU fishing as a
transnational organised crime. It was the Norwegian government who led this
initiative, seeking the involvement of the International Criminal Police Organization
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(INTERPOL)48 to combat the problem. IUU fishing has also been categorised as a
fisheries management problem, and therefore the involvement of INTERPOL
provides an alternative pathway to address the issue. In response, INTERPOL has
launched a special initiative to deal with IUU fishing called the Fisheries Crime
Programme (Project SCALE).
In September 2013, INTERPOL issued a ‘Purple Notice’ when investigating
a blacklisted vessel named “Snake”.49 A ‘Purple Notice’ is an international alert used
to request information and coordinate action. In order to avoid the detection of
prohibited fishing activities Snake changed its name, national registration (“flag”)
and other identifying characteristics several times. These actions showed the
willingness of the owners and operators to avoid “blacklisting” and associated
sanctions. Thus Snake is suspected of violating numerous laws both at international
and domestic levels.50
This was the first time that INTERPOL had used its network for information
gathering in the context of an IUU fishing case. The Fisheries Crime Programme
would benefit from information gathering and enforcement measures.
6.2.2.6 Weak Enforcement Measures
It is not an easy task to conduct monitoring, surveillance and enforcement activities
on the high seas, particularly if one considers the vast expanse of ocean and the long
distances vessels must travel from their coasts in order to carry out the work. A
survey conducted in the mid-2000s by the FAO reported that over half of the 64 selfreporting States stated that ‘their ability to control activities of their flagged vessels
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on the high seas was ineffective or inefficient’51. Indeed, most of the enforcement
activities carried out by these States focused on areas close to their coastlines (and
thus within their national jurisdiction). This practice was not only conducted by
developing countries, but also developed countries, which have the resources to
conduct patrols on the high seas in addition to areas within their national jurisdiction.
Monitoring and enforcement measures need to be taken in order to decrease
or eliminate these linked transnational crimes. Therefore, the tracking of large fishing
vessels through the use of vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and automatic
identification systems (AIS) is important. Today, the use of VMS is mandatory in
several countries. RFMOs are also using VMS in their effort to conserve and manage
their accredited areas.52 Even though vessel tracking systems do not entirely
eliminate IUU fishing practice, it still plays a vital role for helping to pinpoint noncompliant vessels that may be engaged in IUU fishing activities.
There are also other means to track the activities of vessels. Indeed, satellite
monitoring systems such as optical imaging satellites, radar satellites, advanced
ground-based radar and remotely piloted air/sea vehicles have been used to conduct
surveillance. Even so, there are inherent problems with this approach. Due to the
high costs involved in procuring satellite monitoring systems, few countries have
been able to utilise them, and hence the technology is yet to be used as part of a
coordinated fisheries enforcement program.53
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6.3

Nature of IUU Fishing in Southeast Asia

Since 2006, the Asia Pacific region has accounted for more than 50 per cent of the
world’s fish production54. In Southeast Asia, the top five fish producing countries are
Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand.55 Together these countries
account for 31 per cent of the fish production in the Asia Pacific region.56 Indonesia
is the largest producer in Southeast Asia, producing around 5.4 million tons of fish
products each year, representing 11 per cent of the total production in the Asia
Pacific region.57 Fish exports have certainly benefited Southeast Asian nations, with
States in the region receiving significant foreign currency earnings.58 Therefore, it is
clear that fisheries make a significant contribution to the livelihood and food security
of many people in Southeast Asia. However, the increasing demand on fisheries also
leads to overfishing and the exploitation of aquatic resources.
Fisheries make a significant contribution to the livelihood and food security
of many people in Southeast Asia. Indeed, approximately 10 million of people in
ASEAN countries are employed as fishers. Furthermore around 10 million people are
engaged in fisheries industries. Families of these workers are indirectly supported by
the fish stocks in Southeast Asia. Therefore, according to Williams, there are almost
100 million people who are dependent on fisheries sector in the region.59
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Table 23: The amount and relative proportion of capture fishery production
in Asia Pacific States60

IUU fishing is considered a serious maritime security threat in Southeast
Asia. Since fish is a primary source of food protein across the region, any act that
potentially disrupts, undermines, or threatens the supply and sustainability of
fisheries resources constitutes a threat to the region. Furthermore, trade in fisheries is
an important component of the economies of many States in Southeast Asia.
Therefore, States are under pressure to take the necessary measures to protect and
conserve their respective living resources.
Illegal fishing in Southeast Asia is reportedly associated with other forms of
maritime crime, such as piracy.61 As a threat, IUU fishing is difficult for Southeast
Asian States to address for several reasons. Firstly, government agencies which are
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tasked to solve the problem often lack adequate resources.62 Secondly, the
unresolved maritime boundary issues especially in the South China Sea, remain a
sensitive issue amongst claimant States which often lead to protectionist policies
over fishing areas as well as acting as a constant source of tension in the region.
Instead of taking multilateral action to address the problem, States prefer the
traditional route of bilateral cooperation. However, the growing importance of
addressing IUU fishing cannot be denied, and hence States have agreed to develop a
multilateral framework to tackle the problem. Initiatives such as the Regional Plan of
Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing
(RPOA-IUU),63 the ASEAN–Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
Strategic Partnership (ASSP),64 as well as the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI),65 have
been finalised and implemented to address IUU fishing operations.66
6.4

International Legal Framework to Combat IUU Fishing

This section discusses the current international legal framework in place to combat
IUU fishing. It also elaborates the limitations faced by States in addressing the
problem. Furthermore, the section explains the different measures that could be
taken to reduce IUU fishing.
6.4.1

Law of the Sea Convention

The LOSC provides for principles embedded in several provisions which are
applicable in the economic exclusive zone (EEZ) and high seas, which are of
relevance to IUU fishing underscoring the equitable, efficient utilisation and the
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conservation of living resources in these maritime zones. In the other maritime
zones where coastal States have exclusive sovereignty, i.e., internal waters,
archipelagic waters and territorial sea, the LOSC does not provide specific guidelines
in respect to the management and conservation of fisheries resources.67
The coastal State exercises jurisdiction over approximately 90 per cent of
marine resources.68 This change in the management of fisheries resources is due to
the development of the legal regime of EEZ under the LOSC. Coastal States are
given the right to manage the living resources within their EEZ along with basic duty
of ensuring that the living resources are not over-exploited whilst ensuring their
optimum utilisation. The LOSC urged coastal States to provide conservation
measures69as provided in Article 62 (4)70, including:
a) licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment;
b) determining the species which may be caught, and fixing quotas of
catch;
c) regulating seasons and areas of fishing;
d) fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may be caught;
e) specifying information required of fishing vessels;
f) requiring, under the authorization and control of the coastal State, the
conduct of specified fisheries research programmes and regulating the
conduct of such research;
g) the placing of observers or trainees on board such vessels by the coastal
State;
h) the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in the ports of
the coastal State;
i) terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or other cooperative
arrangements;
j) requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of fisheries
technology; and
k) enforcement procedures.
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While the LOSC has given the right to the coastal state to conduct
conservation measures on the EEZ, the effectiveness of such laws still depends
largely upon the willingness and the capacity of the coastal State to implement
them.71
On the high seas, the LOSC requires States to comply with several general
obligations which include to: ‘a. adopt conservation measures of the living resources
of the high seas; b. ensure that nationals of states adhere to those measures; and c.
cooperate with other states to achieve the same objective’.72 The LOSC also contains
management provisions which apply both to the EEZ and on the high seas, relating to
cooperation over the management of trans-boundary stocks and the obligation of
States to cooperate on the conservation and management of living resources on the
high seas.73 In addition, the LOSC also urged States to cooperate on the management
of highly migratory special and straddling stocks. These obligations to cooperate
stipulated in the LOSC served as the underlying driving force in the development of
other agreements including the UN Fish Stocks Agreement as well the establishment
of the RFMOs.74
6.4.2

UN Fish Stocks Agreement

The UN Fish Stocks Agreement was designed in such a way that is in accordance
with LOSC but also addresses other issues which arose due to developments in
international law since the LOSC was negotiated.75 The agreement was opened for
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signature in 1995. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement aimed to regulate ecosystembased approach to fisheries management, and put forward innovative ocean
management concepts, which include:
a. unity of stocks and the need for management of stocks over their entire
range;
b. the imperative for compatibility of EEZ and high-seas fisheries
regimes;
c. a concern with the catch of non-targeted species and the
interdependence of stocks;
d. the need for a precautionary approach to fisheries management; and
e. transparency in the decision making and activities of regional fisheries
management organizations and arrangements.76
The protection of fish stocks which do not fall under the jurisdiction of any
coastal State is also provided for in this agreement. It urges the relevant regional
fisheries bodies to conduct fisheries management and protection in their respective
areas over these fish stocks. The agreement also provides enforcement measures on
the high seas. It requires the regional fisheries organisation to conduct necessary
actions against a vessel which does not abide with relevant fisheries conservation and
management measures in place. Furthermore, States that ratified the agreement are
also subject to enforcement measures enacted by the regional organisation.
In circumstances of breach where there is a violation of the agreement, the
authorities have the obligation to notify the flag State concerned and to collect
evidence of the offense committed. After such notification, the flag State is given
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three days to decide whether it would conduct enforcement measures on its own and
to inform the inspecting State authorities or otherwise authorise the inspecting State
to take the necessary enforcement measures. Port States are given the right to inspect
documents, gear, and catches on entering vessels. Other than these enforcement
rights, the agreement also allows port States to adopt legislation that prohibits transshipment in situations where the catch conducted on the high seas violates the
regional management measures. A dispute settlement mechanism is also provided for
in the agreement, which follows the provisions in the LOSC, and applicable only to
parties to the agreement.77 Given the importance and the benefit of the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement, only Indonesia and Philippines have acceded to the agreement in
Southeast Asia region as shown in Table 24.

UN Fish Stocks
Agreement
x
x
ü
x
x
x
ü
x
x
x
x

Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Timor Leste

Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded

Table 24: Accession Status of UN Fish Stock Agreement78
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6.4.3

FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries

In responding to the decline of global fish stocks, States established a code of
conduct which would be able to address the problem of the uncontrolled exploitation
of global fisheries. The issue of the rapid expansion of fishing industries and the
alarming practice of unregulated fishing on the high seas that threaten global fish
stocks attracted global attention which led to the adoption of the FAO Code of
Conduct79 in an effort to address these problems.80
The FAO Code of Conduct, adopted on 31 October 1995, establishes
principles and standards of conservation, management and development of
fisheries.81 In order to address the issue of IUU fishing, the code is designed to be
global in scope82 and applicable in maritime zones where coastal States exercise
jurisdiction as well as on the high seas.83 Furthermore, even though the code is not
legally binding, it is intended to be applicable and implemented by all stakeholders
including: members and non-members of FAO, fishing entities, and global and
regional organisations.84 The Code of Conduct is derived from binding international
frameworks such as the LOSC, and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Thus, it addresses
the IUU fishing problem and it is in accordance with prevailing international
arrangements on the matter.
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The FAO Code of Conduct imposes the obligation to fish in a responsible
manner85 in order to support conservation and management measures.86 It also
requires States to implement management measures to avoid overfishing,87 and to
control fishing activities in order to create balance with the productive capacity of
fisheries resources. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct88 elaborated the development
of environmentally safe fishing gears and practices. These provisions are in line with
international measures to combat IUU fishing. It further provides that scientific
evidence should be the basis of any conservation and management decisions.89
Moreover, traditional knowledge, economic and social factors should also be taken
into account before carrying out a decision.90

6.4.4

IPOA-IUU

As mentioned earlier, IUU fishing is not a new issue. Indeed, the problem caught the
attention of the international community as early as 1990.91 Since then, various
organisations (including the United Nations), have attempted to address the issue and
find a suitable solution. A concrete measure to combat IUU fishing at the
international level was proposed by the Australian delegation at the Twenty-Third
Session of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI). This measure was the development of
a governance framework to address IUU fishing in the form of an IPOA.92 This
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proposal, which was presented in 1999 by the Australian delegation, marked the
beginning of a new regime in COFI. Since this time, IUU fishing has become a major
concern and focus of FAO programs. Two years after the meeting, the IPOA-IUU
was adopted during the One Hundred and Twentieth Session of the FAO Council.93
The original purpose of the IPOA-IUU was to address fishing in the EEZ and
on the high seas. In principle, the goal of the IPOA-IUU is to prevent, deter and
eliminate IUU fishing.94 This goal is to be achieved by providing States with
concrete measures which are comprehensive, transparent and effective. Furthermore,
these same measures are directed at international organisations that deal with
fisheries management. It is also hoped that the IPOA-IUU will be able to address the
situation described by Lawrence Juda as a “tragedy of the commons”.95 This
describes a phenomenon where fishers are motivated to harvest fish stocks quickly.
The idea behind this is that if fishers opt to conserve the fish stocks rather than
harvest them, other fishers will simply intervene and exploit the remaining fish
stocks. As a result of this behaviour, fish stocks decline more rapidly.96
The IPOA-IUU, which was adopted on 2 March 2001 by COFI, strengthens
the provisions of the LOSC,97 the FAO Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement. In fact, the IPOA-IUU contains frameworks which are more
comprehensive compared to the FAO Code of Conduct. State parties are able to use
the provisions stipulated in the framework to conduct enforcement measures against
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perpetrators conducting IUU fishing.98 The framework also elaborates the
responsibilities of the stakeholders including coastal States, flag States and market
States to combat IUU fishing. Furthermore, the IPOA-IUU also contains provisions
that stipulate the responsibilities of both member and non-member States of regional
fisheries organisations which should be in accordance with international law.99 Even
though the development of NPOA or other measures equivalent is significant in
addressing IUU fishing, none of the Southeast Asian States has the said measure in
place except for Brunei (Table 25).

Southeast Asian States

Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Timor Leste
Vietnam

IPOA-IUU Fishing
(Development of NPOA or
other measures equivalent)
Yes (2011)
Draft
Yes (2014)
Draft
Draft

Table 25: Southeast Asian states that have started the process of implementing the
FAO IPOA-IUU Fishing100
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6.4.5

The Compliance Agreement

The Compliance Agreement is a binding instrument upon which the most important
of the IPOA-IUU responses are based. As explained in Article 2 of the Compliance
Agreement, the application of the Agreement ‘is aimed at all vessels that are used or
intended for fishing on the high seas except that a party may exempt fishing vessels
of less than 24 metres in length, unless the exemption would undermine the object
and purpose of the Agreement’101.
The Compliance Agreement was able to define several key terms such as
"vessels" which also includes "mother ships and any other vessels directly engaged
in such fishing operations". Furthermore it successfully defined ‘record of fishing
vessels’ instead of ‘register’. The latter only allows control through the register itself,
whereas in the former, control is primarily conducted through fishing authorization.
Article 4 states that ‘each party is required to maintain a record of fishing
vessels entitled to fly its flag and authorized for use on the high seas, and to take
such measures as are necessary to ensure that all such vessels are entered on that
record’. Furthermore, Article 5 of the Agreement regulates international cooperation
‘referring to the exchange of information (such as evidentiary material) relating to
activities of vessels in order to assist the flag State in identifying those vessels flying
its flag which have reportedly engaged in activities undermining international
conservation and management measures’102.
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6.4.6

Limitations in Combating IUU Fishing

6.4.6.1 Flag State Control
Increased competition among legitimate fishers has led to illegal fishing in areas
within the jurisdiction of littoral States and on the high seas.103 Such competition has
been prompted by an increase in the number of fishers, as well as dwindling of
resources. The sustainability of fisheries is further threatened by unreported and
unregulated fishing. The reflagging of vessels has become a common practice among
perpetrators of IUU fishing, allowing offenders to avoid the regulatory controls
established by RFMOs. Reflagging occurs when a vessel flying the flag of an RFMO
member State intentionally reflags by re-registering the vessel to a non-member
State, thus avoiding the regulations imposed by the RFMO. In this situation,
reflagging allows IUU fishing to persist, as the control exerted by the new State over
the vessel is weak. As argued by Baird, this loophole could be addressed if coastal
States were to develop a set of requirements allowing them to exercise greater
control over their vessels.104
6.4.6.1.1 Reflagging
In order to conduct fishing, a vessel needs to be registered in the vessel owner’s
preferred State. This system of registration has become more popular as the fishing
industry has expanded. Registering a vessel, however, does not appear to be an
adequate way of controlling the activities of the vessel. This is because vessel owners
tend to reflag and register their vessels in States which lack high seas fisheries
regulations.
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Owners intentionally deregister their vessels (which were once registered in
an RFMO member states) to other States (which are non-members) in order to avoid
having to comply with RFMO conservation and management measures.105 These
States, which are also known as “flags of convenience”, allow vessel owners to fish
irresponsibly and neglect the regulatory provisions of international instruments such
as the LOSC and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.106
Furthermore, on numerous occasions, flag of convenience vessels have been found
without their name and number printed, and without their flag being flown.107 The
reflagging of ships has thus been a prime concern to the international community,
one that has been addressed in international meetings including the third LOSC
Conference, the 1992 Conference on Responsible Fishing, as well as the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development.108 The LOSC provides for flag State
responsibility in Articles 91 and 94.109 Article 91(1) provides that “every State shall
fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships
in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag”,110 while Article 94 emphasises that
each State has the obligation to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag”.111
6.4.6.1.2 Determining the Ownership of the Vessel
Baird has argued that the obligation of flag States to assume responsibility for their
vessels (as mandated by the international community), seems to have gone unnoticed
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by some States.112 Indeed, provisions in the LOSC, the FAO Compliance Agreement
and the FAO Code of Conduct regulate the obligation of flag States in respect of their
flagged vessels. As mentioned earlier, these obligations find their most lucid
expression in Articles 91 and 94 of LOSC.113 Article 91 specifically requires a
genuine link to exist between the flag State and the registered ship.114 However, a
universally agreed definition of what constitutes a ‘genuine link’ remains elusive.
Furthermore, as both Articles 91 and 94 are general in nature, it is difficult to
evaluate whether or not a State has discharged its responsibility with respect to its
vessels. Likewise, to identify flag State control over a flagged vessel or a ‘genuine
link’ is challenging. Another instrument which requires a State to have a genuine link
to its vessels is the FAO Compliance Agreement.115 Article 3(2)116 of the agreement
requires States to exercise responsibility over their fishing vessels, provided there is a
genuine link between the State and the vessel. Although it was hoped that this
agreement would increase the responsibility of flag States towards their vessels, it
did not enjoy much popularity, and thus not all State parties to the LOSC have
ratified it. Moreover, the agreement does not elaborate on the definition of ‘genuine
link’.117
The difficulty in proving a link between a State and a vessel has been
exacerbated by the increasing number of flags of convenience. This limitation of
international law has been used to the advantage of the IUU fishing industry to
corporatise their illegitimate business. Indeed, the trend towards vessel owners
112
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reflagging their vessels is regarded as a ‘tactical commercial decision’.118 In this
way, the IUU fishing industry has been exploiting ineffective LOSC provisions on
flag State responsibility for its own self-interest.
6.4.6.2 Hot Pursuit
The right of hot pursuit is given to coastal States in cases where rights over their
maritime zones have been violated or infringed by a foreign vessel. Thus, coastal
States are permitted to enforce their national laws over the foreign vessel in areas
outside their jurisdiction - that is, on the high seas. However, the State conducting the
arrest or seizure must abide by the regulations stipulated in Article 111 of the
LOSC.119 If the hot pursuit is not conducted in conformity with the LOSC, then the
state conducting the arrest or seizure may be required to pay compensation for any
loss or damage caused to the foreign vessel or its crew.120
6.4.6.3 Complying with Article 111 of LOSC
The requirements that need to be satisfied by coastal States under Article 111 are
relatively clear.121 Nonetheless, determining whether a foreign ship is in a coastal
State’s EEZ can be problematic, as States tend to have different interpretations on
this issue. For instance, in the Volga Case,122 the Australian Government argued that
there is no requirement for the State engaging in hot pursuit to prove that the foreign
vessel (a Russian ship in this instance) was within its (Australia’s) EEZ.
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Furthermore, it was argued that if the coastal State considers that a foreign vessel is
within its EEZ, then that is a sufficient basis for conducting an arrest or seizure.123
Although the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) had the
opportunity to provide some much needed clarification in this area, its judgment in
the Volga Case did not consider the debate on the issue. Therefore, in the absence of
further extrapolation by the LOSC or ITLOS, it is best to take the literal meaning of
Article 111(4)124 of the LOSC - that is, that a coastal State has to have reasonable
evidence that the foreign ship was within one of the maritime zones stipulated in the
Article.125 The Tribunal did, however, find that ‘the Australian government has
violated the Convention by requiring excessive payments and ruled that the
government of Australia did not have the right to impose measures beyond the
paying of a bond’126.
Another problem arising from the LOSC provisions on hot pursuit is the
absence of an agreed definition of the term “interrupted”. This term is found in
Article 111 of LOSC and its precise meaning is significant, particularly for fisheries
enforcement.127 IUU fishing vessels have developed in speed and hence to justify a
seizure to be uninterrupted is a concern. Indeed, there have been cases where
authorities have engaged in lengthy pursuits, some exceeding 3000 nautical miles,
such as those involving the South Tomi and the Viarsa. In these circumstances, there
may be debate as to whether or not the pursuit was ‘interrupted’.
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The need for a visual or auditory signal to be given to a foreign ship before a
State engages in hot pursuit is another requirement of Article 111(4).128 However, it
is yet to be decided whether a radio message broadcast, email or even facsimile
constitutes a visual or auditory signal. In the Volga Case, Australian authorities used
a radio broadcast, whereas in the South Tomi Case, the crew of the foreign ship was
contacted via radio and phone by the relevant authorities. However, in the M/V Saiga
(No.2) Case, Judge Anderson affirmed that if even the Tribunal had been willing to
consider the fact that authorities had sent messages via radio broadcast over 40
nautical miles, the evidence to prove that the messages were sent and received was
absent.
As demonstrated by the pursuits of the South Tomi and the Viarsa, a radio
broadcast represents the current practice by which a signal is given to a foreign
vessel to stop. Indeed, this measure is considered to be a “visual or auditory signal”
within the context of Article 111(4).129 Furthermore, the International Law
Commission, in explaining Article 23 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
has stated that the significant point when engaging in a hot pursuit is to give an order
to stop and seize the vessel, “not the means by which the right [is] exercised”. 130
6.4.7

Measures to Decrease IUU Fishing

As the eradication of IUU fishing requires a robust and comprehensive strategy, it is
important to examine the measures that have been taken by the international
community to combat this problem.
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International law has paved the way for coastal States to implement measures
to tackle IUU fishing. However, international law also has limitations which may
affect the measures taken by States.131 Nonetheless, international law still provides
prominent strategies to address the issue.
6.4.7.1 Port State Controls
International treaties such as the LOSC, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the IPOAIUU, the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR)132 and Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), as
examples, have acknowledged the power that a State has over vessels flying its
flag.133 Indeed, there are jurisdictional rights that exist under international law which
allow port States to control their vessels on the high seas as well as in ports.134
One such right is to ask the Master of a vessel to produce documents before
the vessel enters its port. Regulations concerning vessel safety, pollution and
working conditions of the crew are also regulated under an IMO MOU. The
establishment of port State control is also supported by the FAO and the IMO
through an IUU Fishing and Related Matters Working Group which seeks to, among
other things, implement a uniform system of port state control so that measures to
combat IUU fishing can be better coordinated.135 Further support for port State
control can be found in the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme,136 which
include regulations in trading toothfish such as the process of landing especially by
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State parties. Even though toothfish are not caught within the area designated in the
convention, State parties and non-State parties are encouraged to control such
activities. Indeed, surveys have shown that both member States and several nonmember States comply with the arrangements of the scheme.
Even though port State control could be executed by RFMOs on a regional
basis, non-member States could still bypass RMFO control by entering the port of
another State in the region not party to the particular RFMO.137 This may lead to the
control measures implemented by RFMOs being rendered ineffective. Nevertheless,
CCAMLR can, in certain circumstances, compel non-member States to comply with
the scheme, and therefore could implement its control measures more effectively. On
another note, CCAMLR also faced the same problem in ports in Jakarta and
Mozambique but have been advocated to apply the CCAMLR Catch Documentation
Scheme.138
In regards to the WCPFC, it tries to address numerous problems such as
‘management of high seas fisheries resulting from unregulated fishing, overcapitalization, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-flagging to escape controls,
insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient multilateral
cooperation in respect to conservation and management of highly migratory fish
stocks’139. The provisions stipulated in the WCPFC mostly are drawn from the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement. Furthermore, it also reflects the special political, socioeconomic, geographical and environmental characteristics of the western and central
Pacific Ocean (WCPO) region.
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6.4.7.2 Market State Controls
Market States could also exercise control over fish trade by tracing the origin of all
fish exported or imported. This would allow a State to prevent incoming IUU fish
from being sold in their markets. In areas where port State control is well
implemented, it is likely that any fish caught originated from a legitimate source.
However, this does not mean that market State control is any less important. Rather,
it could ensure that measures aimed at preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU
fishing are conducted in a proper way.140
6.4.7.3 Database of Vessels Committing IUU
Establishing an IUU vessel database is another way to minimise IUU fishing.141
Indeed, IUU Vessel databases consisting of vessels that have been involved in IUU
fishing activities have been established. In one example, nine RFMOs and
INTERPOL contributed data to it.142 Furthermore, individual RFMOs such as the
WCPFC and The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT)

143

also publicize such lists.144 The database separates blacklisted vessels

belonging to member States from those which belong to non-member States.
However, the database has caused some controversy among States, as listed vessels
are perceived in a negative light, suffer restrictions on their trading activities, and are
often denied entry into port States.145
At the international level, the FAO could work on creating and updating a
similar database. This list would enable RFMOs to better detect blacklisted vessels,
and hence take appropriate measures where such vessels attempt to enter the ports of
member States. Furthermore, the list would enable RFMOs around the world to be
140
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informed of new IUU fishing vessels on a consistent basis, as well as those vessels
which have been rehabilitated.
Even so, the establishment of a universally agreed list is difficult to achieve.
The main problem with such a list is that its compilation requires State consent.
Moreover, if the list was established, but only recognised by a small group of States,
then its implementation would be hampered. One prominent example of this is the
protest mounted by Russia and Spain towards the CCAMLR IUU Vessel List in
2003. Russia argued that the list violated the rights and duties of flag States.
Therefore, if States could agree on establishing the list of vessels that are involved in
IUU fishing operating on an international basis, then RFMOs would benefit from it
and uniformity in terms of information might be achieved.146
6.4.7.4 Enforcement and Surveillance on IUU Fishing
Cooperative surveillance could act as a way to decrease the number of IUU fishing
incidents. Indeed, if one considers that IUU fishing is a global activity, cooperative
surveillance between States (as well as between RFMOs), could go some way to
addressing the problem. Several States have adopted this idea, with France and
Australia having signed a treaty in 2003 for cooperative surveillance in the Southern
Ocean.147
The treaty not only allows the two countries to conduct surveillance in each
other’s EEZ, but also provides assistance in relation to the hot pursuit of foreign
vessels. Furthermore, it facilitates the exchange of information between the two
countries in relation to the location and movement of vessels (including fishing
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vessels). In a similar way, cooperative surveillance and enforcement could assist
other States and RFMOs to detect fishing vessels engaging in IUU fishing activities,
as well provide assistance to states in enforcing their national laws.148
6.5

Regional Framework Addressing IUU Fishing

This section aims to explain the different regional frameworks that are used as a tool
in combating IUU fishing in Southeast Asia. The frameworks that are explained in
this section include the Regional Plan of Action (RPOA), ASEAN-SEAFDEC
Strategic Partnership (ASSP) and the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI).
6.5.1

Regional Plan of Action-IUU

The idea for an RPOA was born out of a series of measures taken by Australia in the
late 1980s towards illegal fishing operations conducted by Indonesian fishermen in
Australian waters. Since then, the measures have intensified, resulting in Australia’s
decision to establish ‘Operation Clearwater’ in 2005.149 This operation, which took
place in the northern part of Australia, led to the detention of many Indonesian
fishermen (as well as their boats), thus souring relations between the two nations. In
an attempt to rebuild their relationship, Australia and Indonesia subsequently agreed
to conduct a series of talks on the issue, and eventually agreed to conduct a bilateral
maritime patrol in the region in 2006. A further development occurred in 2007, when
both States invited other countries in the region to discuss the problem of IUU
fishing. The meeting also launched the Regional Plan of Action to Promote
Responsible Fishing Practices Including to Combat Illegal, Unreported and
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Unregulated fishing (RPOA-IUU), which was signed by eleven ministers of the
participating States.150

Signed RPOA-IUU
Brunei Darussalam

ü

Cambodia

ü

Indonesia

ü

Laos

x

Malaysia

ü

Myanmar

x

Philippines

ü

Singapore

ü

Thailand

ü

Vietnam

ü

Timor Leste

ü

Legend: ü = signed, x = not signed

Table 26: Status of RPOA-IUU in Southeast Asia151

Even though the initial aim of the regional framework was to settle tensions
between Indonesia and Australia, other States in the region acknowledged the
importance of the framework, as they too were facing similar issues - internationally
as well as domestically.152 The Ministers representing the participating countries
stated that the aim of the RPOA was to combat IUU fishing through a common and
150
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collaborative approach, and to promote responsible fishing practices in the region.
The RPOA also affirmed that the main areas of concerns were the South China Sea,
the Sulu–Sulawesi Seas, and the Arafura–Timor Seas.153
Although member States make financial contributions to the RPOA, the main
contributors are Australian fisheries and development assistance as well the
Indonesian fisheries.154 The RPOA also receives support from regional organisations
such as the Fisheries Working Group of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum,155 the World Fish Center, the Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission
(APFIC),156 the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC),157 as
well as Info Fish.
The RPOA also seeks to help countries use monitoring, control and
surveillance (MCS) systems in a fisheries context so that financial intelligence units
can “follow the money trail” of illegal activities. However, the low profile of the
RPOA renders it difficult to find topics of substance to address fisheries issues at the
technical level.
The goal of the multilateral framework is to sustain fisheries resources and
the marine environment by strengthening fisheries management in the region.158 The
RPOA Coordinating Committee holds annual meetings to discuss plans for the
following year, with such plans being reported to member States and the FAO
Committee on Fisheries.
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The secretariat of the RPOA is located in Jakarta at the Ministry of Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries. Member States are also active in hosting meetings and events
of the RPOA, such as workshops to help States implement the 2009 FAO Port State
Measures Agreement.
6.5.2

ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership (ASSP)
The objective of the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center is to

promote “sustainable fisheries development in the Southeast Asian region through
research, training and information services”.159 The center, which was established in
1967, consists of Southeast Asian States as well as Japan. Initially, SEAFDEC was
heavily funded by Japan, but since the 1990s Southeast Asian States have provided
most of the financial support required to sustain the center. In addition, the center
receives funding from Australia and Sweden, in their capacity as partner agencies.
SEAFDEC, through its Training Department (TD), conducts the project
on Promotion of Countermeasures to Reduce IUU Fishing. The project is one of
the measures taken to combating IUU fishing and aims to develop Regional
Fishing Vessels Records (RFVR) for fishing vessels 24 metres in length and
over. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand,
and Vietnam Southeast Asian States that have vessels that fall under this
category.160 In 2013, The SEAFDEC Council at its 45th Meeting and Special
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SOM-34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF)161
endorsed the RFVR162.
ASEAN has worked closely with SEAFDEC, not only in terms of funding,
but also with regard to facilitating regional control. In return, SEAFDEC has
supported ASEAN in a fisheries technical capacity. As a result, both organisations
agreed to launch a fisheries partnership - the ASEAN–SEAFDEC Fisheries
Consultative Group. The group, which was established in 1998 but rose to status in
2007, led to the establishment of the more formal ASEAN–SEAFDEC Strategic
Partnership (ASSP).
This strategic partnership has helped regional fisheries in several ways. For
instance, it has supported ASEAN to establish the ASEAN Regional Fisheries
Management Mechanism (ARFMM). Unsurprisingly, ASEAN has regarded
SEAFDEC as its fisheries technical advisor. Furthermore, the establishment in 2009
of the ASEAN Fisheries Consultative Forum received significant support from
SEAFDEC. This forum has discussed and reached agreement on themes requiring
fisheries cooperation in the region, such as combating IUU fishing, limiting fishing
capacity, as well as the need to promote responsible fishing practices. Not only does
ASSP enhance regional cooperation, it also supports certain sub regional areas which
are prone to IUU fishing, such as the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea.163
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6.5.3

The Coral Triangle Initiative

This initiative was spearheaded by conservationists in the scientific community, as
well as international NGOs. One of the aims of CTI is ‘to establish a fully
functioning and effectively managed region-wide Coral Triangle Marine
Protected

Area

System

(CTMPAS)’.

Furthermore,

it

seeks

common

understanding about CTMPAS, particularly on how to improve management
effectiveness and how to design and establish successful MPA networks. This
was done under the mechanism of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) Working
Group. 164 Since the 1980s, when Australia, Canada and the United States began to
offer financial support to three ASEAN marine science projects, the conservation
measures employed in Southeast Asian ecosystems have grown significantly. These
projects have focused primarily on coastal resource management, living coastal
resources and environmental quality. Furthermore, the projects have helped forge
international scientific networks and enhanced the region’s marine resource
assessment and management programs.165
The projects in the Coral Triangle were initiated by international conservation
NGOs in late 1990s.166 However, as Southeast Asian states became aware of the
significance of regional marine conservation, they too began to make contributions to
the various projects.167
Indonesia led the way in this regard, with the Indonesian President
introducing and publicising the CTI during the Conference of the Parties of the
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Convention on Biological Diversity in Brazil in 2006.168 Indeed, even before the
initiative was launched at the Manado World Ocean Conference in 2009, it was
announced during the APEC Summit in Australia in 2007.169 NGOs played a
significant role in establishing the initiative, with the World Wildlife Fund, the
Nature Conservancy, Conservation International and the Wildlife Conservation
Society all heavily involved. The CTI also has an RPOA which focuses on issues
such as marine protected areas and fisheries management. The initiative has also
established secretariats, such as the CTI Secretariat in Jakarta, state CTI coordinating
committees, the CTI Regional Business Forum, as well as the Secretariat for the US
CTI Support Partnership.170 Indonesia’s Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
hosts the CTI Secretariat in Jakarta.
6.6

Analysis of the Prevailing Framework on IUU Fishing

One of the most pressing challenges facing governments in Southeast Asia is
fisheries governance, including enforcing fisheries regulations. Indeed, in many
cases, governments in the region have been unable to take effective fisheries
management measures. Moreover, this problem has been compounded by a lack of
capacity and funds.
If present conditions persist for the next two decades, it is almost inevitable
that significant fisheries problems will arise in Southeast Asia. These problems may
include demand for fish outstripping supply (resulting in a worrisome picture for
food security in the region), as well as a substantial increase in the price of fishery
products (with its concomitant social implications). In order to address these
168
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problems, Southeast Asian states have to be committed to cooperate with one another
and strengthen their regional institutions. Furthermore, States need to implement a
raft of international instruments in order to sustain regional as well as international
fisheries.
Over time, the practice of IUU fishing has intensified and become more
sophisticated.171 The economic gain obtained by IUU fishers, as well as their ability
to exploit political situations for their own ends, has shaped IUU fishing into the
extremely elusive and multi-faceted activity that it is today. In fact, the problem has
emerged as one of the main threats to the management of high seas fisheries. As
mentioned earlier, there are limitations in the application of LOSC provisions relating
to fisheries, particularly with regard to Articles 73 and 111.172 However, as noted by
Baird proposing amendments to these articles may not be advisable, as coastal States
may interpret such action as an attempt to curtail their jurisdiction over these waters,
rather than as a solution to the loopholes in IUU fishing regulations.173
This chapter has discussed numerous international as well as regional
frameworks which have been designed to address the problem of IUU fishing. The
IPOA-IUU is one of the main international frameworks which seeks to prevent, deter
and eliminate this irresponsible activity.174 Other international frameworks discussed
are the provisions in LOSC, the FAO Code of Conduct as well as the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement. At the regional level, the chapter looked at measures employed by States
and organisations which include the RPOA, ASSP and the CTI. These frameworks
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have made a positive impact in combating IUU fishing in the region.175 Their
establishment has helped Southeast Asian States address the problem collectively
through numerous cooperative and coordinated schemes. This has resulted in States
being able to address IUU fishing nationally as well as regionally. These
arrangements have also acted as a starting point for multilateral management action
in the region, such as the collaborative measures which have taken place between the
RPOA and the ASSP, as well as between the ASSP and the ASEAN regime. As for
the CTI, it has been designed to include public and political actors, and therefore it is
hoped that the initiative will encourage marine management action by both state and
non-state actors in the future.176
With its large maritime area, Southeast Asia is undeniably vulnerable to
maritime security and fisheries issues. However, the establishment of a regional
fisheries management organisation might not be a feasible solution in the short term.
Indeed, there are many barriers to the establishment of such an institution, including
unresolved maritime boundary disputes and complex fisheries problems.177
Therefore, sub-regional forums focusing on specific hot spots178 (such as the Gulf of
Tonkin fisheries shared by China and Vietnam), are probably the best way to address
the aforementioned problems.179 Furthermore, it has been proposed by Williams that
these forums represent the first step towards long-term cooperation among States in
the region.180
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Undeniably, the regional and multilateral arrangements discussed above are
insufficient to address the broad problem of IUU fishing in Southeast Asia.181 The
inability or unwillingness of States to exert control over their fisheries resources
poses a formidable challenge to both the conservation of the marine environment and
the sustainability of fisheries resources in the region. Also, some Southeast Asian
States are perpetrators of illegal fishing in the region. Although States in Southeast
Asia continue to exploit fisheries resources to meet an ever increasing demand, there
are only several fisheries management areas in the region where fishing is properly
regulated and enforcement measures are taken against offenders. Furthermore,
maritime border issues continue to persist, hampering the management of fisheries in
those areas where states have not clarified the ownership of fisheries resources. In
such circumstances, IUU fishing is likely to continue, as any unilateral action would
create tensions between the States involved, particularly given the importance of fish
as a food source for communities in the region.182
6.7

Conclusion

IUU fishing is one of the main maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. The chief
motive of IUU fishers is the economic windfall they receive from their activities.183
IUU Fishing occurs in different maritime zones, but particularly in EEZs, and in high
seas areas controlled by an RFMO. It is clear that, by definition illegitimate fishers
do not follow the regulations that have been put in place for licensed fishing, and
thus IUU fishers tend to exploit fisheries resources without any regard for
conservation or management measures. Several States have tried to implement the
181
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existing frameworks at both international and regional levels. Nonetheless, in the
broader picture, proper implementation is still lacking and hence the illegal act is still
taking place. There are States which are yet to ratify international conventions related
to IUU fishing. In the case of Southeast Asia, even though there are several legal
frameworks available, comprehensive regional effort is still not in place.
Furthermore, there are several States which do not have comprehensive domestic
frameworks on IUU fishing. Therefore, it could be concluded that the existing legal
framework, at both international and regional levels, is inadequate to address IUU
fishing.
IUU fishing is a transnational issue that needs to be addressed regionally. The
problem cannot be solved by unilateral measures of a single state. Thus, cooperation
between the regional States is needed in order to address the problem
comprehensively.
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CHAPTER VII
7 Marine Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil and Gas Activities in Southeast Asia

7.1

Introduction

The number of offshore oil and gas platforms has increased significantly in the last
ten years, due mainly to the economic growth of numerous countries around the
world, particularly those in Asia.1 In the larger context, spending on offshore oil and
gas development in the Asia Pacific region between 2011 and 2015 has been
predicted to exceed US$90 billion.2 This represents a 55 per cent increase in capital
expenditure from the previous five years.3 The number of projects currently
operating in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Australia is quite
significant in comparison to other parts of the world. Combined, these regions have
441 projected shallow (less than 300 metres) and deep water (greater than 300
metres) oil and gas fields.4 While offshore oil and gas development may have
benefited the economy of contracting States, it has also become a potential maritime
security threat. Indeed, offshore oil and gas activities have the potential to create
pollution, resulting in long-term damage to the marine environment.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the international and regional legal
frameworks governing maritime pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. It
highlights the fact that offshore oil and gas activities are prone to create marine
pollution which may affect more than one State. To this end, the chapter focuses on
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two specific marine pollution problems generated by offshore oil and gas activities oil pollution and the dumping of offshore installations at sea. This threat is chosen
because petroleum exploration has been rapid through out the region, and the number of
offshore platforms keeps on increasing. These activities create added pollution dangers that
could result in damage to the environment in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, as stated earlier
in Chapter I, marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activity also forms a

significant challenge to maritime security in the region, as indicated by Brunei
Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand in MSDE 2013.
To obtain a comprehensive picture of the problem, this chapter will examine:
(i) the international legal framework governing offshore oil and gas activities; (ii) the
regional legal framework regulating offshore oil and gas activities; (iii) the nature of
the problem in Southeast Asia; and (iv) whether the current legal frameworks are
sufficiently capable of addressing the problem.
This chapter concludes that the existing legal framework - both at the
international and regional level - is inadequate to address the problem. This is
because even though some aspects of the problem may be specific to a single State,
other aspects are transnational in nature, and thus cannot be addressed by unilateral
action. What is required to address marine pollution caused by the offshore oil and
gas activities in Southeast Asia is cooperation at the regional level.
7.2

Marine Pollution from Offshore Oil and Gas Activities as a Maritime
Security Threat

More than seventy percent of the earth’s surface is covered by the ocean.5 For this
reason, the presence of offshore oil and gas installations carries inherent risks.6 The
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end of the 20th century marked the starting point for the development of offshore oil
and gas activities in the Southeast Asia region, and particularly off the Brunei coast.7
There are numerous offshore oil and gas platforms across several littoral States in
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia.

Figure 16: Location and profile of the Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia8
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Figure 17: Shipping traffic in the seas of Southeast Asia9

The presence of international straits in some Southeast Asian States poses a
different set of challenges. Safety of navigation is affected because vessels frequently
pass through the Southeast Asia region. The safety of navigation is not only affected
by the large number of aging oil and gas installations which are not removed but also
by the increasing number of new installations in the region built to meet the
economic and petroleum needs of regional States. As a result, sea lanes used for
navigation are narrowed down requiring the crews to be more cautions in order to
avoid the risk of hitting the installations. Moreover, since some of these straits are
located between two or more countries, the need for international cooperation is
paramount. The high intensity of shipping traffic as shown in Figure 17 may also at
some point impact the upon the high number of offshore installation in Southeast
Asia as illustrated in Figure 16.
Even so, the total number of offshore oil and gas platforms in the region is
not comparable with regions which had already established such facilities before the
9
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end of the 20th century, such as in the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Persian
Gulf. However, Southeast Asia still has a significant number of platforms approximately 1350 - and like all facilities of this nature, these platforms produce
volatile organic compounds which contribute to global hydrocarbon pollution levels.
Indeed, more than half of these platforms have been in operation for more than 20
years and close to 400 are over 30 years old. The life cycle of a platform is around
20-30 years, and therefore the old and aging platforms in Southeast Asia are certainly
in need of high-level maintenance.10 Unfortunately, most Southeast Asian States are
reluctant to invest in these platforms beyond the bare minimum with regard to
decommissioning, thus creating a maritime security problem for the area. While
functioning platforms may create oil pollution, disused ones may be a source of
hydrocarbon pollution occasioned by their (often illegal) dumping.

Age (years)
0-10
10-20
20-30
30+

Percentage of offshore installations
27.9
24.1
36.1
11.9

Table 27: Age of the Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia11
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the opportunity for Rig-to-Reef, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore,
Halifax 21-22 June 2012.
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Coastal
States
Maritime
zone
Indonesia
Malaysia
Brunei
Thailand
Philippines
Vietnam
China
Sub-total
Grand Total

Installations > 30 years
Territorial sea/
Archipelagic
Waters
169
63 (15)
78 (48)
0
0
0
1
306
389

Installations 20-30 years

EEZ

Territorial sea/
Archipelagic
Waters
170
45 (8)
55 (19)
0
0
0
23
270
444

0
47
13
16
6
0
83

Total per
country

EEZ
17
54
4
64
0
12

356
209
146
80
6
12
24

174
833

Table 28: Age of the Offshore Installations more than 20 years in Southeast Asia12

Country

Total

Fixed Mobile

Indonesia

482

463

13

Thailand

265

260

5

Malaysia

249

237

Brunei

160

160

Vietnam

46

40

6

China

120

98

22

Malaysia- Thailand
Joint Development Agreement
Philippines

15

14

1

8

6

1

Cambodia

2

Total

1350

2
1278

27

Table 29: Location of the Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia13
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derived from presentation by Youna Lyons, Offshore Decommissioning in Southeast Asia and the
opportunity for Rig-to-Reef, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, Halifax
21-22 June 2012. (Compiled from OPL World Offshore Field Development Guide Database, Vol 2:
Asia, India Australasia & Far East, 2010).
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The location of these platforms demonstrates that coastal States prefer to
conduct offshore oil and gas activities in shallower areas close to their coasts (see
table 30), most likely because they are more accessible. However, if these areas have
already been explored and exploited, then coastal States tend to move further out to
explore other, potentially oil-and-gas-rich sites. Many Southeast Asian States
including Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia have expressed concern over
their ageing platforms. Indeed, the domestic incorporation of relevant international
law provisions is particularly important in these countries, as most of the offshore oil
and gas operators are controlled by national oil companies. Therefore, it is likely that
domestic legislation incorporating international obligations on offshore oil and gas
activities would be adhered to by operators and enforced by the government.14
Conversely, however, if States in the region oppose the incorporation of relevant
international law provisions, then operators will also seek to avoid the duties and
responsibilities that such provisions impose upon them.15

Water depth (m)

Percentage offshore installations

0-50
50-75
75+

51.5
33.3
15.2

Table 30: Depth of the Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia16
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the opportunity for Rig-to-Reef, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore,
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Figure 18: Offshore installations in territorial and archipelagic waters17

Oil spills can have disastrous consequences on the marine environment. In
addition to the loss of human life, the blowout of an oil rig can damage fragile
marine ecosystems, affecting both their viability and diversity and their economic
value. Furthermore, an oil spill can cause significant financial losses and enduring
reputational damage for the companies involved. A prominent example of such an
incident is the Montara case, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Marine
pollution can also be caused by the dumping of abandoned offshore oil and gas
platforms. The dumping of these structures produces volatile organic compounds
which contribute to global hydrocarbon pollution levels. as a result, offshore oil and
gas activities can be considered as creating maritime security risks in Southeast Asia,
as the activities taking place on these platforms during their operational lifetime (as
well as their decommissioning, if not correctly managed), creates the potential for
marine pollution.
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7.3

Nature of the Problem in Southeast Asia

This section discusses the nature of the problem caused by offshore oil and gas
activities in Southeast Asia. The main risks include oil pollution and the dumping of
disused offshore installations in the region. Furthermore, this section discusses the
numerous safety and security challenges being faced by States in Southeast Asia.
7.3.1

Safety and Security Challenges in the Southeast Asia Region

7.3.1.1 Risks Created by Humans and Inadequate Regulator Regimes
The large number of offshore oil and gas platforms in Southeast Asia poses
numerous security challenges to the region. Indeed, human-induced risks and
regulatory failures are some of the reasons behind offshore oil and gas safety
incidents.18 The international demand for oil and gas has pushed energy companies to
greatly increase production. However, some of the activities of these companies take
place in remote areas, and are conducted by inexperienced crews using outdated
technology. Furthermore, the political and financial pressures faced by these
companies, combined with inadequate regulatory regimes, have created additional
challenges from a risk management perspective. As a result of these risks, according
to Cordner one can reasonably expect that security incidents on busy platforms are
likely to occur. Well blowouts from human errors and regulatory failures are one alltoo-common example. Indeed, it has been predicted that this type of security incident
is set to increase in the future, and with an ever-increasing number of offshore oil
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and gas facilities being established in strategic areas, such as the South China Sea,
the potential for large-scale environmental damage is high.19
7.3.1.2 Unresolved Tensions between States
Unresolved territorial and jurisdictional disputes pose yet another challenge to
offshore oil and gas security and safety.20 As previously stated, worldwide demand
for oil and gas has increased in recent years, and this has led to States exploring and
exploiting their own energy resources. However, unresolved maritime boundary
claims have created tensions among States, with most wanting to explore potential
energy resources beneath the water surface. One prominent example of this scenario
are the cases of the South China Sea and East China Seas. Furthermore, as tensions
mount among States over contested sovereignty and sovereign rights to resources, so
too does the threat of armed conflict in the region. In the case of the South China
Sea, claimant States (including China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia) have
occupied and unilaterally named contested features in order to buttress their claims to
ownership of the maritime area.21 For example, the Philippines has called the
disputed water area the ‘West Philippine Sea’, whereas Vietnam has labelled the area
as the ‘East Sea’.22
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One major barrier to States entering into multilateral arrangements in the
region is the lack of clarity on the delimitation of several maritime boundaries.23
Indeed, this is why the vast majority of oil and gas exploration in the region has
taken place in areas where States have undisputed national jurisdiction - that is, in
their territorial waters.24 However, the growing importance of oil and gas exploration
has encouraged States to expand their exploratory activities into ‘grey areas’ – that
is, where there are no clear-cut maritime boundaries, often in areas under dispute.
This is best illustrated by the offshore oil and gas activities that are occurring in the
South China Sea, where several countries have competing claims.25
Maritime boundary delimitation is a sensitive public international law issue
which cannot be resolved in a short span of time.26 Not only are heads of State
reluctant to discuss the matter during intergovernmental talks (unless of course the
issue has been flagged ahead of time), but it also raises difficulties for second-track
diplomacy, with State delegations preferring to avoid discussions relating to
sovereignty and maritime delimitation. Indeed, as related by Cordner, it is hardly
surprising that States, when faced with such complex sovereignty issues, eschew
cooperative engagement with their neighbours regarding oil and gas activities. This
is because it is important to have a clear picture of the jurisdictional limits of certain
maritime areas in order to determine the rights and responsibilities of States insofar
as oil and gas activities are concerned.27
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Several parties in the region remain hopeful that the disputing States will take
necessary measures (such as arbitration or adjudication), in an effort to resolve the
problem. These parties have also suggested that a cooperative management regime
be established – one which directly involves claimant States in the South China Sea
area.28 The question that arises is whether the increasing importance of oil and gas
exploration will at some future point act as a trigger for the resolution of maritime
delimitation disputes in the area or lead to deeper conflict.
7.3.1.3 Inadequate Law and Order
A law and order incident or accident such as Montara oil spill has the capacity to
jeopardise offshore oil and gas security and safety. The consequences of such an
incident could affect not only the State in which the incident takes place, but also
neighbouring States in the region.
7.3.1.4 The Problem of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Piracy in Southeast Asia, as extensively discussed in Chapter 3 above, has decreased
gradually since 2011.29 Indeed, this trend has been highlighted in a 2015 Report by
the Information Sharing Centre (ISC)30 of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)31.
The number of piracy and armed robbery cases in the Malacca and Singapore
Straits in particular (as well as in the South China Sea) has declined.32 Piracy and
armed robbery attacks have usually been directed at vessels anchored in ports. Also
28
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vulnerable to these types of attacks are small oil tankers that travel at relatively slow
speeds. Piracy incidents against large oil and gas installations have also been
reported, but outside Southeast Asia itself. Although attacks against these
installations are difficult to mount, there have been reports of attacks by local
militants against oil and gas installations, for example in Nigeria.33
7.3.1.5 Terrorism
The incidence of maritime terrorism against offshore oil and gas platforms is
relatively low in the region.34 Similar to piracy offences, maritime terrorism is
relatively difficult to perpetrate against large oil and gas installations. However, the
capability of terrorists to attack such installations should not be underestimated.35
The terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, for instance, has compelled the government to
protect its offshore installations.
Indeed, such preventive action should make regional actors consider the
possibility of terrorist attacks being directed at their own installations. Furthermore,
the increase in the exploration of oil and gas, and the accompanying increase in
offshore platforms, has made the energy and resources sector more vulnerable to
terrorist attacks.36
7.3.1.6 Increasing Intensity of Maritime Users
The increase in intensity of maritime exploration and exploitation has also led to a
greater number of maritime incidents, such as shipping operation incidents. This, in
turn, has created risks for offshore oil and gas operations. In the year following the
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2009 Global Financial Crisis, there was a seven per cent increase in the number of
shipping operation incidents. The most severe incidents were reported in Asia,
particularly in the South China Sea area. Furthermore, it has been reported that the
number of vessels traversing the Malacca Strait each year has reached almost
70,000.37 Therefore, the likelihood of human-induced incidents as a result of busy
maritime operations is high.
Loss of life has been reported in maritime incidents between South China Sea
claimant States,38 with the majority of such incidents involving fishing vessels and
maritime security forces.39 Evidently, there is a need to develop risk management
approaches among States in the region so that maritime incidents can be prevented,
and also to ensure that any damage resulting from incidents which do occur can be
minimised. Indeed, as maritime exploration and exploitation continues to grow, one
can reasonably expect a commensurate increase in the number of maritime incidents
unless redressive action is taken.40
7.3.1.7 Safety zones
Unauthorised activities around the area of oil and gas installations, such as fishing
and tourism, also pose a safety risk to the facilities. The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea41 (LOSC) allows for a safety zone of 500 metres to be
maintained around installations in order to avoid such risks.42 However, this zone is
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not considered wide enough to ensure that the surrounding activities do not affect
offshore installations. States including Southeast Asian States that claim a safety
zone of more than 500 metres may be breaching LOSC Article 60 (5). Over time, if
based on State practice, States might claim larger safety zones on the basis of ‘new
generally accepted international standards’, which is permissible in accordance with
Article 60 (5).43 A follow-up discussion on this issue took place during the 56th
Session of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)44 Sub-Committee on
Safety of Navigation in July 2010 where contracting States expressed concern over
the risks posed by activities taking place around installation areas. The meeting was
fruitful and produced guidelines to address the matter. In principle “the guidelines
are intended to increase awareness of the availability and best use of existing
routeing measures to protect personnel and to prevent serious damage to such
structures or to the marine environment in the event of a collision”. 45 However, the
provisions formulated at the meeting did not increase the width of the safety zone,
but instead seek to increase awareness and routing around the zones, thus leaving the
problem essentially unchanged.46
7.3.1.8 Obligation to Comply with the Prevailing International Law
The tendency of governments to explore and exploit their offshore oil and gas
resources in response to increased national demand for energy is understandable.
However, the right to conduct such activities also generates a set of obligations
which States should abide by. One such obligation is the need for States to comply
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with applicable international provisions, such as those governing responsible
management measures. Yet another is the responsibility of States to ratify and
implement international treaties that govern the exploration, extraction, production
and storage of these resources (and well as the safety of those who carry out such
processes).
If one considers that offshore oil and gas incidents have the potential to cause
national, regional as well as international consequences, the need for cooperative
security arrangements between neighbouring and regional States, and also between
extra regional actors, cannot be ignored. Indeed, such cooperation is vital for
preventing, or at the very least minimising, the escalating risks that accompany
offshore oil and gas operations.
The number of States that have ratified relevant international treaties on oil
and gas is relatively low.47 This has the potential to affect the safety of life at sea, as
international provisions set a benchmark for understanding and resolving problems
relating to offshore oil and gas activities. Another implication of the low rate of
ratification in Southeast Asia is the damage that might be caused to the marine
environment if an offshore oil and gas incident were to occur.
7.3.2

Oil Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil and Gas Incidents

Several offshore oil and gas incidents have occurred in Southeast Asia. Moreover,
those incidents that have taken place outside the region have nonetheless impacted
Southeast Asian States. Although the likelihood of a major offshore oil and gas
incident occurring is low, the consequences of such an incident (should it eventuate)
could be extremely serious for the States concerned. Indeed, these incidents may
47
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result in the loss of human life and create a large-scale environmental disaster.
Furthermore, they have the capacity to cripple the economy of not only contracting
States, but also neighbouring States. As the potential ramifications of an oil spill are
significant and transnational in nature, joint cooperation and coordination between
relevant stakeholders, including government and industry, is required.
Oil spills also threaten the safety of international navigation, particularly if the
incident were to occur in or near one of the significant straits in the region.48 There
are numerous straits which are used for international navigation in Southeast Asia,
such as the Malacca and the Singapore Straits. If an oil spill were to occur in any one
of these straits, not only would it create marine pollution, but the flow of trade in
certain areas would be disrupted, with concomitant economic consequences. An oil
spill in the Malacca Strait, for instance, would have a direct financial impact on
littoral States such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as flow-on effects
for other countries which depend on seaborne trade traversing the strait.49 Marine
pollution caused by an oil spill from a platform and which could be operational as
well as accidental, would also negatively impact marine resources. As Southeast
Asian states are located in close physical proximity to each other, a large oil spill
would undoubtedly have a transboundary effect, such that more than one country
would suffer economic loss and environmental damage from the incident.50
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7.3.2.1 The Impact of Oil Pollution
Oil spills from offshore installations represent one of the main causes of oil
pollution, with their effects being many and varied. Indeed, oil is widely regarded as
one of the most destructive pollutants to the marine environment. A number of
studies have been conducted to determine the effects of an oil spill incident. One
such study was conducted by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, which
found that a single oil spill would result in the death of plants and animals of
intertidal marsh and subtidal soft-bottom communities. The study also found that
these communities would take years to recover. Perhaps the most worrying finding
from the study, however, was that oil spilled at sea causes persistent damage,
especially in marsh areas which serve as a source of recontamination by continuously
oozing oil.51 The clean-up and recovery from an oil spill can be so difficult and
dangerous that oil residues are often detected in marine resources (such as animals
and plants) years after the spill took place.52
Indeed, the sub-lethal effect of oil pollution caused by an oil spill can last for
more than six years, with marsh grass being particularly vulnerable to the oil’s toxic
components. Marsh grass, which is beneficial as a land stabilisation mechanism, also
acts as a nursery area for marine life and as a purification system for runoff water.
However, once exposed to oil pollution, marsh grass cannot perform these roles
effectively.53 Oil pollution also causes oil slicks at sea which, at times, can drift onto
beaches.54 Animals such as water fowl have high mortality rates when exposed to oil
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pollution in their environment. Tar residues, which can be found in beaches around
the world in different forms - such as globs, pellets and balls - are also the result of
oil pollution.55
The harmful effects of oil pollution are not limited to the specific flora and
fauna mentioned above, with “salt marshes, rocky shore ecosystems, sandy and
muddy shore ecosystems, sediments in general, littoral animals, fisheries, and the
high seas” all being susceptible to the negative effects of oil exposure.56
Furthermore, oil pollution poses a hazard to human health. Some studies have noted
that oil spills cause the spread of carcinogenic hydrocarbons, with these compounds
having been found in coastal bottom deposits, marine animals and plankton
following oil spill incidents.57 It is clear that oil pollution affects the marine
environment, including animals and fragile ecosystems, and therefore States should
be required to take significant steps to prevent and reduce the occurrence of oil being
spilled into the ocean.
7.3.2.2 Offshore Oil and Gas Incidents
Several offshore oil and gas incidents have occurred in or impacted Southeast
Asian States, including:
i.

the sinking of the Petormar (a drillship) in the South China Sea. The
incident occurred on 27 August 1981 following a blowout of shallow gas
in the area;

ii.

the capsizing and subsequent sinking of a US drillship named Glomar
Java Sea on the 25 October 1983, resulting in the loss of 81 lives. The
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incident was due to Typhoon Lex in the South China Sea, approximately
80 nautical miles east of Vietnam;
iii.

the explosion of an oil rig owned by French company Total Petroleum,
which killed four people. The incident occurred on the south eastern
coast of Borneo; and

iv.

the leaking of oil and gas into the Timor Sea from the West Atlas mobile
drilling rig in the Montara oil field, located off the northwest coast of
Australia. The incident occurred on 21 August 2009 and caused an oil
slick covering 50,000 square miles of coastline. Although there were no
human fatalities, the incident resulted in the death of marine life in the
area.58

The following section will focus on the Montara oil spill as the incident is
relatively recent and has been well documented. This incident has also been selected
because it attracted international attention and numerous lessons can be drawn from
it.
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Figure 19: Montara Oil Spill Incident
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7.3.2.3 Montara Oil Field Incident
The Montara case involved a blowout from the Montara Wellhead Platform which
caused oil and gas to escape from the well, contaminating the sea area around the
platform. The spill occurred in shallow water (less than 300 metres deep), and 135
nautical miles away from Australia (located half way between main coast of
Australia and the coast of Pulau Roti)60 and 50 nautical miles from the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) boundary with Indonesia, covering an area of 90,000 square
kilometres.61 This incident is a prominent example illustrating transboundary
pollution caused by offshore activities. Furthermore, the problem is still unresolved
and debates on the issue between Australia and Indonesia continue. The incident is
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the third largest oil spill in Australia and was caused by PTT Exploration and
Production Public Company Limited Australasia (PTTEP-AA),62 an Australian
subsidiary of PTTEP, itself a subsidiary of Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT).
Fortunately, the incident did not result in the loss of life, with all the crew on the rig
evacuated to safety. Even so, the incident resulted in the equivalent of 400 to 1,500
barrels of oil expelled from the well every day, with the spill continuing for more
than ten weeks.63 This incident polluted the environment and had a direct impact on
the marine ecosystem in the area. Economic consequences also affected the
surrounding littoral States.
The oil field was located in the Indian Ocean on the north western part of
Australia.64 Following the blowout, another drilling rig called the West Triton was
brought in to plug the well by drilling under the seabed. These drilling operations,
which were conducted on 1 November 2009, triggered a fire which broke both the
platform and another drilling rig located in close proximity - the West Atlas. The fire
ceased two days later and the well was able to be plugged as planned.
Some of the findings from the investigation into the oil spill were that “the
primary operator did not observe sensible oilfield practices”, that “the primary
regulator was not a sufficiently diligent regulator”, and that “senior company
personnel had limited experience and did not fully comprehend the implications of
such operations.”65
The report produced by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority indicated
that the operational response to the oil spill took more than 100 days and involved in
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excess of 240 people and 120 surveillance flights. The oil spill polluted the marine
environment within a 35 kilometre range from the platform.66 The report also stated
that none of the marine parks around the platform were damaged as a result of the
incident.
An investigation into the incident was carried out by the Commonwealth
government, led by David Borthwick, a former senior Commonwealth public
official. The investigation was completed in mid-2010 and was publicly available in
late 2010. The report identified more than 100 recommendations for the
government.67
The Australian government released its response to the incident in the
following year.68 The content of the response, which was made available in May
2011, mirrored the recommendations of the investigative team. Importantly, the
report revealed that the company did not place enough barriers to stop the spill, and
that a second barrier, which the company should have installed, was not in place at
the time of the spill.
Several recommendations were made to the Northern Territory government in
the report. Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of the weaknesses and strengths of the
Commonwealth departments which responded to the incident was lacking in the
report. The report also recommended that petroleum companies be held liable for all
the costs incurred as a result of the spill, including operational costs, scientific
monitoring, as well as clean-up costs. To ensure that this measure is followed
66

Australian Maritime Safety Authority, ‘National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and
Other Noxious and Hazardous Substances’ ((2003) Annual Report 2002/2003, 17.
67
Australian Government, ‘Draft Government Response to the Report on the Montara Commission of
Inquiry ‘, 28 Oct 2010 <www.ret.gov.au/Department/Documents/MIR/response-to-montara-inquiryreport.pdf> at 4 May 2015.
68
Australian Government, ‘Final Government Response to the Report of the Montara Commission of
Inquiry’, 25 May 2011 <http://www.ret.gov.au/montarainquiryresponse> at 4 May 2015.

281

through, the Commonwealth government would need to establish effective legal
arrangements for the relevant companies to abide by.
Furthermore, it should be noted from the Montara incident that in managing the
risks posed by oil spills, international engagement is an important consideration.69 In
this case, the oil spill extended beyond the Australian EEZ into Indonesian and
Timor-Leste waters. Indeed, the oil present in Indonesia’s EEZ was almost 94
kilometres off the coast of Palau Roti Island. The oil was also observed around the
Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), which Timor Leste and Australia
established in 2002. Therefore, Australia needed to cooperate with other States which
were affected by the incident, in addition to ensuring that the measures taken
accorded with international law.70
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 was
also criticised by the report noting that the provision could be well implemented by
the Commonwealth government. Furthermore, the report recommended the
establishment of an independent regulatory body to oversee the safety of the
platforms.71
In late 2010, an Australian Minister proclaimed that the Montara incident
would not have occurred if PTTEP-AA and the relevant authorities in the Northern
Territory had done their jobs correctly.72 The Minister also added that the
Commonwealth government should have accepted the recommendations produced
by the Commissioner, which included the establishment of a National Offshore
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Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) 73, as well
as the granting of additional powers to the National Oil Pollution and Safety
Authority (NOPSA). Under the Commissioner’s recommendations, NOPSEMA
would play a role in regulating the health and safety of personnel, oversee operations
in Commonwealth offshore areas, manage environment plans and attend to
administrative matters on a daily basis. These measures would help both the State
and Federal government regulates issues related to offshore installations.
In Australia the Commonwealth government is responsible for regulating
offshore installations beyond the three mile limit. This has been agreed between the
Commonwealth and the States, and is regulated under the 1979 Offshore
Constitutional Settlement. Thus, in the Montara field, the Northern Territory
government had the obligation to ensure that the installation complied with the
prevailing regulations.
In responding to the incident which caused damaged to the marine
environment, the Indonesian government has claimed US$2.4 billion in
compensation.74

Furthermore, one of the provincial legislative speakers of

Indonesia, Ibrahim Medah, stated that there are three districts (Rote Ndao, Sabu
Raijua and Kupang) which have been impacted by the oil spill.75 Fishing
communities, seaweed farms and pearl farms are some of the sectors which suffer the
direct impacts of the incident. Furthermore, reports were also produced by the West
Timor Care Foundation which, in principle, stated that Indonesia has conducted
research and would provide evidence to prove that seaweed farmers are affected and
73
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waters around the West Timor Sea region are contaminated as a result of the Montara
oil spill.76
PTTEP-AA responded to the claim by stating that there is no verifiable, valid,
scientific evidence that has been presented to them in supporting the claim made by
Indonesia and West Timor Care Foundation.77 Furthermore, under Australian law,
in order to receive compensation, the victim (in this case Indonesia) has the
responsibility to prove and justify losses caused by the incident. Australia’s position
in responding the Indonesia claim is similar with the view of PTTEP-AA.
7.3.3

Dumping of Disused Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia

The abandonment of platforms at sea causes the release of potentially toxic
hydrocarbons. That being so, it is imperative that appropriate action be taken towards
such platforms following their operational phase.78 In some circumstances, operators
partially dispose of the platforms, removing some parts but leaving other parts on the
surface of the ocean. It is questionable whether the abandonment or partial removal
of offshore installations constitutes dumping under international law. Prominent
instruments governing this issue include the LOSC, the 1972 London Convention on
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter79
(London Convention) and its Protocol, as well as the 1989 IMO Guidelines and
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Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the
Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone.80
The LOSC and the London Convention contain identical definitions of
‘dumping’. The London Convention, which was produced prior to the LOSC,
includes within its definition the disposal of waste or any structure at sea. This
expansive definition was settled upon to address all aspects related to ocean
dumping. The LOSC attempts to be all-encompassing by embracing the participation
of the international community, and hence its relevant provisions attempt to
incorporate dumping regulations from the London Convention. The LOSC and the
London Convention respectively define dumping as “any deliberate disposal of
wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures
at sea”, and “any deliberate disposal of platforms or other man-made structures at
sea”.81
However, there are exceptions to the general prohibition against dumping
under the London Convention.82 For example, the convention does not regulate
disposals which are derived from incidental circumstances or the regular operation of
sea bed activities, man-made structures or vessels. This is because such activities
should be regulated by other international instruments. The convention clearly states
that all disposals at sea fall within its ambit unless stated otherwise.
Moreover, the London Convention makes it clear that the disposal of offshore
platforms falls within its scope. However, as the convention uses the phrase
“deliberate disposal”, some stakeholders have argued that the abandonment of
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platforms falls outside the convention. According to these proponents, the
convention only applies where there has been deliberate action with respect to the
disposal of a structure, and thus abandoning the object by leaving it in situ is not
contrary to the convention.83
These differing views on the scope of the convention were expressed by the
Informal Group of Legal Experts on Dumping.84 Some of the participants agreed that
abandonment does not qualify as dumping under the convention, but is instead
regulated by the IMO Guidelines and Standards. Other participants saw no difficulty
in construing the abandonment of structures as dumping in accordance with the
convention. Thus the legal expert group concluded that the act of abandoning or
leaving in situ an offshore installation with the intent of disposing of the object
should be classified as dumping.
Installations are usually placed at sea for industrial purposes.85 However,
when the object is no longer being used for its initial purpose and is left in the ocean,
it could be argued that the installation has been disposed of at sea and should thus be
categorised as dumping. This act of abandonment accords with the LOSC,86 which
stipulates that the placement of a man-made object at sea with the purpose of
disposing of the object constitutes dumping. In other words, if the purpose of the
placement is for a reason other than disposal, then no dumping has occurred.
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The LOSC, in Article 60(3), deals with disused or abandoned installations.87
It stipulates that in order to ensure the safety of navigation, such installations should
be removed. However, this should be done in accordance with international standards
produced by the competent international organisation. Furthermore, to help coastal
States implement Article 60(3), the IMO produced the 1989 IMO Guidelines and
Standards. This instrument requires parties to remove installations which are not
being used, but in some cases non-removal is permitted – for example, where the
removal would cause damage to the marine environment or affect the safety of
navigation. Furthermore, the definition of dumping in the London Protocol states that
dumping includes “any abandonment or toppling at site of platforms or other manmade structures at sea, for the sole purpose of deliberate disposal”.88
7.3.3.1 Southeast Asia’s Response to Disused Offshore Installations
As noted above, Southeast Asia is increasingly becoming an important region in
terms of offshore oil and gas activities. Nonetheless, the establishment and regulation
of these activities trail behind other parts of the world, such as the Gulf of Mexico,
the Persian Gulf and the North Sea. Unfortunately, Southeast Asia is yet to establish
a robust and comprehensive legal framework for the decommissioning of offshore oil
and gas installations. However, as similar problems have been faced by States in the
aforementioned areas, unique opportunities exist for Southeast Asian states to learn
from past struggles and challenges.89
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A decommissioning incident which took place in the North Sea is instructive
in this regard.90 Full removal was the measure taken for decommissioning of the
disused installations. By taking this measure, States in Southeast Asia could comply
with the provisions of the LOSC, particularly with regard to the protection of the
marine environment. One of the steps that could be taken in implementing this idea is
the establishment of a regional framework to formulate guidelines on the
decommissioning of disused installations.
As there is no clear agreement on decommissioning, the State practice in the
region varies according to the operator’s internal standards and any applicable
domestic laws. Decommissioning itself involves a set of operations, the precise
details of which depend upon the decommissioning plan being undertaken. These
operations may include well capping and the abandonment of pipelines, as well as
the removal of cuttings, the topside, and the jacket of the platform (among other
processes). There are sets of rules governing the decommissioning of disused
installations at the international level. These rules include the 1989 IMO Guidelines
and Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures, as well as
the London Convention.
A large number of offshore installations have been constructed in Southeast
Asia’s maritime areas. Almost 1400 offshore facilities are located across the water of
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand alone.91 However, these platforms have
reached a state of maturity and need to be decommissioned. Indeed, more than half
of the platforms in the region are over 20 years old and need to be withdrawn. Even
so, the majority of Southeast Asian States appear unwilling to follow through with
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this course of action. Disused offshore oil and gas installations have the potential to
create safety of navigation problems. This is because in addition to aging
installations being left in situ, States are continuously building new installations in
their respective maritime areas, the effect of which is a narrowing of navigational
lanes. Considering the number of ships that traverse Southeast Asian waterways, this
situation is increasingly hazardous.
Following the termination of an oil operator’s contract, offshore installations
tend to remain under the control of coastal States. Therefore, as argued by Lyons, it
is incumbent upon coastal States to take responsibility for these aged installations.
The most appropriate use for the platforms has been the subject of much debate.
Indeed, the plethora of views that have been expressed appear to stem from a
misinterpretation of the applicable international law, as well as loopholes in
prevailing international instruments.92
7.3.3.2 Different Treatments of Disused Installations
There are different opinions on the treatment of disused offshore installations. One
popular view is that disused installations should be removed completely and brought
ashore. Proponents of this view have been influenced by the European interpretation
of relevant LOSC provisions. Another instrument which lends credence to this
conclusion is the 1989 Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of Offshore
Installations adopted by the IMO. The case study that best illustrates this view is the
1995 Brent Spar incident.93
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This incident was sparked by Greenpeace activists occupying the Brent Spar
platform in an effort to compel Shell (the oil operator) to remove its oil platform.
Shell, on the other hand, had planned for the deep-water disposal of the installation.
However, Greenpeace opposed this course of action on environmental grounds, and
was urging Shell to completely remove the platform from the sea bed. Following
intense international pressure, Shell dispensed with its original plan and brought the
platform ashore.
Another alternative to the full removal of disused platforms is to turn them
into artificial reefs.94 However, this suggestion has come under opposition by the
intergovernmental organisation charged with the protection of the marine
environment in the Northeast Atlantic95 (OSPAR), due to the requirement that
artificial reefs be composed of virgin materials. Furthermore, OSPAR has adopted
regulations on the prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore sources96 –
regulations which sit uneasily with such facilities being abandoned at sea.
7.3.3.3 International Regime on Disused Offshore Installations in the Region
The LOSC has been ratified by all States in Southeast Asia which engage in
significant offshore oil and gas activities. The convention clearly states that in order
to ensure safety of navigation, contracting parties must remove disused installations
from their exclusive economic zone. Furthermore, following the removal of the
installation, the LOSC requires coastal States to publicise the new location of the
installation. In this context, the LOSC makes reference to generally accepted
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international standards governing disused facilities97, namely, IMO Guidelines. In
principle, these guidelines recommend that States conduct an evaluation on the
treatment of disused offshore oil platforms. Indeed, it is for this reason that the
approach favours a case-by-case evaluation; one which considers a number of factors
including freedom of navigation, risks to the marine environment, the costs involved
in removing the facility, as well as the technical feasibility of the removal.98
The situation in Southeast Asia is quite different from other parts of the
world. From a regional perspective, Southeast Asia does not have uniform
regulations governing the treatment of disused offshore oil platforms. As mentioned
earlier, most of the installations in the region are quite old and will cease to operate
in the near future. However, the fact that these platforms weigh in the vicinity of
4,000 tons in air, and are located in water less than 75 meters deep, has influenced
recommendations regarding their treatment post-decommissioning.99 As complete
removal of the platforms would be costly and technically infeasible, it has been
suggested that they remain in situ. Furthermore, as most of the platforms in Southeast
Asia are located within the territorial sea of littoral States, the relevant LOSC
provisions cannot be invoked to regulate their removal. This is because States
possess a maximum level of jurisdiction over their territorial sea and archipelagic
waters. Leaving the aged installations in their current positions to serve as artificial
reefs is permitted under IMO Guidelines, provided such action “do[es] not cause
unjustifiable interference with other uses of the sea”.100
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However, disused platforms which are left in the sea without any provision
being made for the subsequent treatment may be considered ocean dumping. Indeed,
the 1989 IMO Guidelines contain a provision to this effect - one which is applicable
both in the territorial sea the exclusive economic zone. Both the LOSC and the
London Convention, support this view.101 According to the LOSC, approval from the
competent authorities of the coastal State is required prior to any such disposal.
Moreover, if there are national laws in place, they should also be taken into
consideration and abided by.102
Although all States in Southeast Asia have ratified the LOSC, most of them
have not yet ratified the London Convention. However, this convention should also
be taken into consideration, as it is widely accepted as an international regulation or
‘global rule and standard’ on dumping, as well as having been established before the
LOSC.
In light of the above discussion, states need to exercise caution when granting
permission for the disposal of offshore facilities. Indeed, they should evaluate and
consider several important factors including other uses of the sea, the location of the
dumping, as well as the potential impact of pollution from the facility. It is illadvised for foreign operators to seek dumping approval from littoral states which
have minimal law enforcement measures in place.103 Conversely, an operator’s
corporate image would likely be enhanced if it were to create new uses for disused
platforms. As neither LOSC nor the London Convention on Dumping prohibits new
uses for disused platforms, operators have a unique opportunity to act in a way that is
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economically, environmentally and socially responsible. There are several novel uses
for disused offshore oil and gas platforms, including artificial reefs, fisheries
management infrastructure, aquaculture and marine tourism. The process by which a
disused platform serves as an artificial reef for fisheries is known as ‘rigs-to-reefs’104.
Even so, the rigs-to-reefs idea has not received a positive response from nongovernmental organisations such as Greenpeace105. These organisations have insisted
that once a platform is not in use, it is the responsibility of the operator or the coastal
state to remove it from the sea. The socio-economic advantages of the rigs-to-reefs
concept has also been denied by these organisations, with the complete removal of
the installation being touted as the most sensible approach. In contrast, the United
States government has responded positively to the program, and has established a
rigs-to-reefs regime in the Gulf of Mexico and in California106.
7.3.3.4 Rigs-to-Reefs
There are two main theories on the rigs-to-reefs regime. The first has been
called the ‘aggregation’ theory and propounds that artificial reefs attract fish,
allowing them to converge on a common site. This view argues that aggregation
facilitates the protection of fish species and allows for improved fisheries
management. The downside to this theory, however, is that fish are displaced from
other sea areas to the location of the artificial reef.107
The second theory is known as the ‘production’ theory which “refers to the
creation of new life on [the] artificial reef”.108 This view argues that the existence of
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the reef inhibits the existence of marine life at the location of the reef. If the reef is
removed, then there is a chance for new marine life to inhabit the area. Both theories
have been scientifically validated, with researches asserting that, depending upon the
location of the reef, ‘aggregation’ as well as the prevention of ‘production’ may
occur.
International law does not object to rigs-to-reefs, as long as the goal is to
enhance fisheries management109 Furthermore, it is a settled principle of international
law that coastal States have the right to reuse oil and gas installations in their
respective territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. In circumstances where an
artificial reef does not have a direct link to fisheries, but nonetheless aims to protect
an endangered marine habitat, a coastal State will still be acting in accordance with
the LOSC. Moreover, this view is supported by the Convention on Biological
Diversity and the Ramsar Convention on the Protection of Wetlands of International
Importance, both of which have been ratified by most oil-producing countries in
Southeast Asia.110
It is important to note, however, that a rigs-to-reefs regime must have a
genuine purpose - that is, a coastal State has to be able to create a new use for the
disposed installation. In order to prove this intention, and thus demonstrate that the
measures taken in respect of the facility are genuine, a coastal state has to have
supporting scientific documents. A monitoring and evaluation process should also be
put in place to safeguard against environmental risks. If the above requirements are
not satisfied, the status of ‘artificial reef’ may not be granted to the facility, and as
such the disposal may be considered illegal dumping.
109
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Efforts have been made to formulate a set of rules governing oil and gas
activities at the international level. However, the initiative is yet to come up with a
framework that has global appeal. The reason for this is that every region has its own
approach to offshore oil and gas activities, and thus there are legal gaps in the
existing provisions which regulate such activities.111
For instance, with respect to well-plugging and the abandonment of offshore
oil installations, any action taken by a well operator would be informed by best
industry practice, which in turn has to accord with the domestic law of the state
concerned.112 External States would certainly play a role if the well-plugging or
abandonment were to cause pollution which spreads to neighbouring States (and thus
any action taken would fall within the affected States’ respective jurisdiction).
Furthermore, the State which owns the well would be responsible to pay or otherwise
provide suitable compensation to states affected by the pollution. Indeed, as pollution
from disused installations has the capacity to harm the marine environment,
compensation would need to be provided to repair any damage caused.
Another issue which has not been addressed under the existing framework is
the decommissioning of pipelines.113 The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention
does not contain any provisions on the abandonment of pipelines, and therefore
regulation of this issue falls to the domestic law of coastal States. Although the
LOSC contains a provision dealing with the jurisdiction of pipelines (the substance of
which is mirrored in the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention), the provision
does not regulate the issue of abandonment of such pipelines.
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Interestingly, the IMO Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL),114 has regulated drill cuttings and other solid waste from offshore oil
and gas activities since its entry into force. The downside to this instrument is that it
does not regulate the decommissioning of disused platforms. However, once offshore
oil and gas activities cause trans-boundary pollution, then irrespective of whether the
facility is in its production stage or is disused, the state conducting the activity is
responsible to pay compensation for any damage caused.115
7.4

International Legal framework on Offshore Oil and Gas

For the establishment of a unified standard on offshore oil and gas activities, States
in Southeast Asia would need to adopt or accede to relevant international
instruments. A unified standard would benefit industries in the region in that a clear,
common and consistent approach would facilitate cooperation and lead to an
enhanced understanding of the issues involved. Therefore, the adoption of key
conventions should be a priority for States in the region.116
This section will discuss the various international legal instruments governing
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities including the LOSC,
MARPOL, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response
and Cooperation117 (OPRC Convention), the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards,
the SUA Convention and Protocols, ISPS Code, as well as the London Convention
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and its Protocol. Furthermore, this section evaluates the risk management approach
to offshore oil and gas security and safety.
7.4.1

Law of the Sea Convention

The location and nationality of an offshore platform determines the legal framework
which applies to it.118 Jurisdictional control over the platform also depends upon the
maritime zone in which the platform resides. According to the LOSC, coastal States
have jurisdiction over different zones of the ocean. For example, coastal States have
exclusive and absolute rights within their internal waters. These rights persist in the
territorial sea, except for the right of innocent passage which is given to foreign
vessels.119
Therefore, the domestic laws of a State apply to those offshore platforms
located in the internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea of the state. This
regulatory power also extends to offshore platforms in the EEZ and continental
shelf.120 Indeed, the jurisdictional control of a State over artificial islands and other
installations is similar in both of these maritime zones. Under the LOSC, States are
given the authority to conduct several activities within the EEZ, including “(a) the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (b) marine
scientific research; [and] (c). the protection and preservation of the marine
environment.”121 Furthermore, Article 60 of the LOSC allows States to construct and
to authorise and regulate the construction, operation and use of “(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other
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economic purposes; [and] (c) installations and structures which may interfere with
the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.”122
The practical effect of Article 60 of the LOSC is that States are given control
over artificial islands and installations in the EEZ.123 Thus, States are able to exercise
their economic rights in this particular maritime zone. Nonetheless, before
establishing an offshore platform, coastal States are required to provide notice of
their construction plans in order to avoid navigational problems.124 In addition, those
platforms which are disused or abandoned should be decommissioned.125
The establishment of offshore platforms is prohibited in sea lanes which are
used for international navigation.126 Moreover, the establishment of the platform
needs to accord with international provisions on the marine environment. In
particular, the construction of such platforms should preserve and protect the marine
environment from being polluted. States are obliged to comply with the provisions in
Part XII Section I of the LOSC, which makes it incumbent upon States to: (a) protect
and preserve the marine environment.127 Furthermore, Article 194 LOSC stated that
States shall:
(a) take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with
this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of
the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best
practical means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities;
[and] (b) take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution
to other States and their environment.128
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Furthermore, when implementing anti-pollution measures, States need to
ensure that their activities do not transfer pollution from one place to another or from
one form to another. Article 194(3)(c)129 and (d)130 regulates the obligation of States
to prevent pollution that may arise from offshore platforms, particularly with regard
to the exploitation of resources.
The marine environment can also be affected by intentional pollution caused
by activities related to offshore platforms.131 Such activities are regulated in LOSC
provisions on dumping in Article 210(1) and (2).132 These provisions require States
to conduct measures and adopt rules relating to the reduction, control and prevention
of pollution by dumping. Furthermore, States are obliged to monitor their industries
to ensure they comply with prevailing legal frameworks and fulfil the obligations
stipulated in the Article. Enforcement measures in relation to dumping activities are
covered in Article 216 of the LOSC.133 Under this provision, both the LOSC and
international standards produced by competent international organisations should be
ratified by States so that laws and regulations on the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution of the marine environment can be enforced:
(a) by the coastal State with regard to dumping within its territorial sea or its
exclusive economic zone or onto its continental shelf; (b) by the flag State with
regard to vessels flying its flag or vessels or aircraft of its registry; [and] (c) by any
State with regard to acts of loading of wastes or other matter occurring within its
territory or at its off-shore terminal.134
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Provisions governing offshore installations at the regional level are also
important.135 Thus, legally binding frameworks in the forms of agreements or treaties
are necessary in order to comprehensively address the issue of marine pollution,
particularly when it originates from offshore oil or gas exploration. What makes
regional institutions significant is that they have an international character (in the
sense that they consist of more than one State), while retaining a strong national
outlook in terms of enforcement action.

While regional provisions would be

applicable for States when governing offshore installations in their EEZ, the national
legislation of the particular State would still apply in maritime zones such as internal
waters and the territorial sea.
The Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations is one example of a regional
arrangement on offshore activities. This conference, which was held in London
between 1975 and 1976, produced the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral
Resources, which deals with issues related to oil pollution damage from offshore
activities.136 Although the content of the convention is limited, it could be used as a
positive example for states in Southeast Asia to establish a regional framework
governing offshore activities.137
7.4.2

MARPOL

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL)
identifies floating crafts and fixed or floating platforms as ships. Thus, this
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framework is relevant in addressing pollution arising from offshore platforms.138
There are other potentially relevant IMO instruments such as the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC Convention)139, and
the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND Convention)140, but are not
discussed in this thesis. There are limitations to the implementation of MARPOL. For
example, the definition of ‘discharge’ in Article 2(3)(b) of the convention excludes
dumping (within the meaning of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter), as well as the spread or release
of poisonous substances from the exploration and exploitation of offshore platforms,
particularly in connection with the processing of seabed mineral resources.141
However, MARPOL also contains provisions on the prevention of oil
pollution which would apply to ‘ships’ (including offshore platforms). One such
provision can be found in Annex I and states that “the discharge into the sea of oil or
oily mixture [is] prohibited except when the oil content of the discharge without
dilution does not exceed 15 ppm”.142 However, in Southeast Asia not every State has
adopted MARPOL, and thus the practical application of the provision is limited Table
31 shows that only Laos, Malaysia and Timor Leste have not yet acceded to
MARPOL.
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MARPOL 73/78
(Annex I/II)
Brunei
Darussalam
Cambodia

ü

Indonesia

ü

Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar

x
x
ü

Philippines

ü

Singapore

ü

Thailand

ü

Vietnam

ü

Timor Leste

x

ü

Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded
Table 31: Accession Status of MARPOL in Southeast Asia143

7.4.3

OPRC Convention

Those states which are highly dependent on resources found in the marine
environment should be able to mount an adequate response if an oil spill were to take
place. To this end, the international community (within the framework of the IMO)
drafted the OPRC Convention between 1989 and 1990. Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand are the only Southeast Asian countries that have
acceded to OPRC 1990, as illustrated in Table 32.
The 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster was the impetus for the OPRC Convention.
In the Exxon incident, ten million gallons of oil spilled into Prince William Sound,
Alaska, damaging the area’s marine environment.144 Thus, the preamble to the
convention expressly recognises the threat posed to the marine environment by oil
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pollution incidents (such as those involving offshore platforms, oil handling
facilities, ships, sea ports etc.). Composed of numerous provisions from the LOSC, as
well as those from the IMO framework, the convention was adopted in late 1990 and
entered into force in 1995.
Under the convention, member States are obliged to take necessary steps to
prepare for, and respond to, oil pollution incidents that damage the marine
environment.145 Furthermore, the convention requires States to ensure that operators
of offshore units within their jurisdiction have emergency plans in place for oil
pollution, and that these plans have been approved by the relevant State authority.146
Facilitating international cooperation and mutual legal assistance to prevent
major oil pollution incidents forms the main objective of the convention. To promote
both the ratification and implementation of the convention among developing States,
the OPRC Working Group was created in 1991 by the IMO’s Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC). The working group is composed of experts from the
IMO, intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations. The
working group seeks to enhance cooperation between relevant institutions, encourage
states to combat marine pollution, as well as promote regional action in order to
prevent and control oil pollution incidents.
The OPRC Convention in Article 6 recognises the importance for States to
cooperate at the regional level so that a national system capable of responding to oil
pollution incidents is established.147 Regional arrangements that deal with marine
pollution incidents have been supported by several international institutions, such as
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the IMO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).148 Capacity
building, emergency responses and collective planning are among the issues being
discussed and actioned by participating regional and international institutions.149
Article 6 of the OPRC Convention further requires member States to nominate a
focal point and establish a national contingency plan for responding promptly and
effectively to oil pollution incidents. Through regional arrangements, the convention
is confident that States will be able to comply with its requirements, which include
the “a minimum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment; a programme
of exercises for oil pollution response organizations; training programmes for
relevant personnel; a mechanism or arrangement to co-ordinate the response to an oil
pollution incident, and capabilities to mobilise the necessary resources.” 150
For developing States, financial and technical resources from other States (as
well as institutional support) are needed to facilitate their ability to implement the
convention. Indeed, the capabilities of a State will certainly affect its level of
involvement in the convention. Certain regions are not able to implement the
convention effectively because they do not have adequate support from external
actors. Nonetheless, there are other regions where regional and bilateral
arrangements govern marine pollution, particularly with regard to preparing and
responding to oil pollution incidents. A prominent example of this is the Barcelona
Convention, which operates in the Mediterranean and has in excess of 15 members.
Regional activities involving developed and developing states (as well as the
European Commission), are being funded under this arrangement. Furthermore, as a
148
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result of the Mediterranean Action Plan, both the financial and institutional
framework of the institution is being supported.151 Indeed, the trust fund of the
institution is funded by States including Italy, France and Spain, as well as the
European Commission.
A legal framework for the implementation of the Regional Marine Pollution
Emergency Response Centre152 (REMPEC) is present in the Mediterranean. This
framework consists of the Barcelona Convention and the Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency. The institution is active in
implementing the convention and protocol in numerous ways, such as providing
focal points, informing regional simulation models, providing expert lists and data
banks, as well as assisting States prepare and improve their contingency plans
(among other things).153
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OPRC 1990
x

Brunei
Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia

x
ü

Laos
Malaysia

ü

x

Myanmar
Philippines

ü

Singapore

ü

Thailand

ü

Vietnam
Timor Leste

x
x

x

Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded
Table 32: Accession Status of OPRC 1990 in Southeast Asia154

7.4.4

The 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards Regulating treatments of light
platforms in shallow waters

The LOSC in Article 60(3) provides that a “competent international organization”
may create “generally accepted international standards” regarding artificial islands,
installations and structures.155 The competent organisation in this case is the IMO,
and the relevant international standards comprise the 1989 IMO Guidelines and
Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the
Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone. These guidelines and
standards show a keen awareness by the IMO that the growing number of aging oil
platforms has the capacity to create serious environmental problems if not hastily
addressed.156 With regard to Southeast Asia, these guidelines and standards are
applicable to those platforms which are found in shallow water close to the shore.
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The provisions contained in the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards differ
somewhat from other international law provisions, such as those in the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf, as well as Article 60 of the LOSC.157 The latter
provisions clearly state that the full removal of offshore oil and gas installations is
the best treatment for disused facilities. On the other hand, the IMO provisions allow
coastal States (as well as oil and gas operators), to decide the most appropriate
treatment for aging offshore oil and gas installations on a case-by-case basis. These
guidelines and standards thus provide for the partial removal of the installations,
enabling some parts of the facility to be left in situ on the sea surface. It is important
to note, however, that in certain circumstances full removal is an option supported by
this set of provisions. In accordance with section 3.1 of the IMO Guidelines,158 small
installations weighing 4,000 tons or less and located in shallow water 75 meters deep
or less should be fully removed. There are, however, several qualifications to this
general rule. Small offshore installations located in shallow water may only be
partially removed if they meet one of the following criteria: (i) the entire removal of
the installation is not technically possible; (ii) the removal would involve extreme
cost, or (iii) the removal would involve unacceptable risks to personnel or to the
marine environment.159
These exceptions are derived from decommissioning cases of offshore
installations in the North Sea.160 Indeed, there have been debates on the matter
which, in principle, can be divided into two main arguments. The first argument is
that partial removal should be allowed due to the fact that some installations are too
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large and heavy, making full removal very costly. This particular view enjoys the
support of some coastal States, particularly those eager to bolster the development of
industries, and in particular offshore oil and gas industries. The second argument,
which calls for the full removal of oil and gas facilities, has the support of
environmentalists and coastal States with a stake in commercial fisheries.
However, the arguments canvassed above are not particularly relevant in
Southeast Asia, where the vast majority of platforms are located in shallow waters
and are relatively small and light.161 Thus, the full removal of these platforms is
feasible and should be encouraged. Nonetheless, the high costs associated with such
removal means that, in some circumstances, the financial outlay overshadows the
benefits. It should be noted, however, that where an aging installation is unstable and
may impact the safety of navigation, full removal is the only option.
According to the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards, the risk to personnel
also needs to be borne in mind when considering whether to fully remove a platform.
If the risk is too high, then full removal of the installation is not permitted. Therefore,
looking at the conditions in Southeast Asia, one could argue that the 1989 IMO
Guidelines and Standards do not fully suit the unique characteristics of disused
installations in the region.162
7.4.4.1 Application of the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards in the Region
Application of the IMO Guidelines and Standards on offshore oil and gas activities
in Southeast Asia can be assessed from different perspectives. Furthermore, its
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relationship with other international binding instruments needs to be considered
when assessing the effectiveness of its implementation in the region.
7.4.4.1.1 LOSC and the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards
The 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards have generally been viewed as an
extension of LOSC Article 60(3).163 Indeed, LOSC provisions regulating pollution
derived from seabed activities are considered to be the basis for these guidelines and
standards. The relevant provisions in the LOSC provide that a coastal State has an
obligation to implement any international framework regulating pollution from oil
and gas activities, particularly around the seabed area. Moreover, the LOSC
encourages States to establish common platforms for the treatment of such pollution
through diplomatic ties and engagement in relevant international networks and
organisations.164
Articles 210 and 214 of the LOSC are enlivened when dumping activities
occur. For coastal States to implement these provisions, they first have to adopt the
international framework on dumping, as well as establish national laws specifying
measures to prevent and reduce marine pollution.165 Therefore, both regional and
national frameworks governing pollution from seabed activities are important in
keeping the marine environment healthy and thriving.
7.4.4.1.2 Limitations of the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards
As previously mentioned, LOSC Article 60(3), which seeks to regulate the treatment
of disused offshore oil and gas platforms, provided the impetus for the 1989 IMO
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Guidelines and Standards.166 According to Article 60(3), such platforms should be
removed in accordance with international standards established by relevant
international organisations to ensure safety of navigation.167 The IMO Guidelines and
Standards expand on this point, stating that before a platform is removed, coastal
States should consider other factors such as the protection of the marine
environment, fisheries, as well as the sustainability of other marine life.
As these guidelines and standards are derived from Article 60(3) of the
LOSC, they should be construed in light of the main aim of the Article. In this regard,
the phrase “safety of navigation” takes on special significance, as it represents the
main goal of removing platforms and installations. Therefore, when debates arise on
the correct interpretation of the guidelines and standards, it is important to refer to
the overarching objective of Article 60(3) of LOSC in order to properly construe the
provision(s) in issue.168

7.4.4.1.3 Accepted International Standards
The 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards are considered as generally accepted
international standards.169 Another point to consider is that LOSC Article 60 enables
coastal States to take into account prevailing international standards.170 Thus, the
article allows for flexibility in its implementation, allowing States to adopt relevant
provisions produced by competent international organisations. Indeed, the
166
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application of Article 60 can be seen in the guidelines and standards produced by the
IMO. In the third part of these guidelines and standards, the IMO has included more
stringent provisions for the removal of disused installations located in shallow water
which are lightweight.171 Furthermore, the guidelines and standards contain strict
provisions on pollution caused by dumping and seabed activities.
7.4.5

London Convention and its Protocol

The London Convention and its Protocol aim to control pollution of the marine
environment by dumping. Furthermore, the provisions of the convention require
States to take necessary measures to prevent marine pollution caused by the dumping
of water and other materials.172 Even so, the convention has its limitations, such as
the exclusion of dumping “derived from the normal operation of vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their equipment”.173 The
convention also excludes the disposal of materials as a result of the exploitation of
sea-bed mineral resources (and the associated offshore processing of such resources).
Thus, only the disposal of disused offshore oil platforms and unwanted materials
arising from operations on these offshore platforms are covered by the convention.174
Even though the London Convention and its Protocol are significant in preventing
marine pollution caused by dumping, nonetheless, among the Southeast Asian States
only the Philippines has acceded to them as shown in Table 33.
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Brunei
Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Timor Leste

London
Convention 1972
x

London
Protocol 1996
x

x
x
x
x
x
ü

x
x
x
x
x
ü

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Legend: ü = Contracting States, x = Non- Contracting States.

Table 33: Status of London Convention and Protocol in Southeast Asia175

7.4.5.1 London Convention
The London Convention regulates dumping, including the disposal of disused oil and
gas platforms. According to the convention, the act of disposing of offshore oil and
gas installations at sea constitutes dumping.176 Specifically, Annex II (which is also
known as the ‘grey list’), deals with the disposal of platforms and other man-made
structures. Importantly, disposal at sea is not always prohibited, with the convention
allowing for disposals which have been permitted by authorised bodies. For a State
to receive a dumping permit from the relevant authority, it must progress through
several stages, including a pre-screening assessment of the disused waste, an impact
study of the waste on the environment, as well as an evaluation of the unique features
of the dumping site.177
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There have been debates over the term “deliberate disposal at sea”, which
forms the main focus of this convention.178 One view is that the convention does not
cover the on-site abandonment of disused offshore platforms by States. The
argument raised is that since there has been no movement of the platform from its
original location to the disposal site, the convention’s requirement of a “deliberate
disposal” has not been satisfied, and therefore the convention cannot be enforced.179
However, another approach, which has drawn wide support, is that the act of leaving
the disused installation in situ is a conscious decision to dump. Indeed, this view was
agreed upon at the thirteenth consultative meeting of the Contracting Parties to the
London Convention, and informs the application of the convention, especially with
respect to abandoned or disused offshore oil and gas platforms.180
7.4.5.2 1996 Protocol to the London Convention and Guidelines
The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention and Guidelines was adopted as a result
of a series of discussion and debates, particularly after the introduction of the 1989
IMO Guidelines and Standards. The protocol and guidelines specifically regulate the
following:
a. The deliberate abandonment or toppling of platforms and other man-made
structures at their original location for the purpose of deliberate disposal. This
provision is contained in the 1996 Protocol. Furthermore, other provisions
such as the ‘polluter pays principle’ and the precautionary approach have
been adopted in this protocol;181
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b. Before a disposal is approved, the document provides guidelines for waste
assessment. These guidelines cover dumping site selection, an approach for
carrying out waste prevention audits, as well as waste management
options;182 and
c. Man-made structures at sea, including offshore oil and gas platforms, are
assessed under a specific guideline.183
Even though the introduction of 1996 Protocol has heralded a different
approach towards dumping, the main principle of the London Convention still
prevails – that is, that dumping is only permitted if a State has received prior
authorisation from a body appointed under the convention. Importantly, the 1996
Protocol has brought a substantial change in the way waste assessments are carried
out – a change which is being implemented at the national level.
Other than the precautionary approach and the polluter pays principle, the
guidelines regulate other practices such as waste management options, the
description and characterisation of waste, as well as waste prevention audits. There
is also a guideline related to the placement of artificial reefs, which was produced by
United Nations Environment Programme and the IMO in 2009.184 This guideline
seeks to legitimise certain acts of dumping which are prohibited under the London
Convention and Protocol. However, the guideline has not been adopted by members
of the United Nations Environment Programme or Contracting Parties to the London
Convention due to a lack of support.
182
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7.4.5.3 Enforcement of the London Convention, Protocol and Guidelines
The provisions of the London Convention are broader than the 1989 IMO Guidelines
and Standards. While the application of the latter is limited to dumping that takes
place in the EEZ of States, the scope of the former instrument extends to other
maritime zones, such as the territorial sea and archipelagic waters. Even so, the
London Convention does not apply to the internal waters of a State. In Southeast
Asia, name of the major countries involved in offshore oil and gas activities, such as
Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand, have adopted the convention as
demonstrated in Table 33, the Philippines is the only Southeast Asian State party to
the London Convention and Protocol . As these States play a significant role in the
oil and gas sector, the adoption of the convention should be a priority.185
7.4.5.3.1 Obligation to Adopt International Rules produced by Competent
Organisations
States are obliged to prevent, control and reduce pollution derived from their seabed
activities. This obligation is made clear in the LOSC by virtue of Articles 208, 210,
214 and 216.186 The LOSC also acknowledges the applicability of global rules and
standards which regulate the aforementioned obligation. However, the debate that
arises is whether these global rules and standards are applicable to States which have
not yet ratified the LOSC. The provisions of the LOSC referred to above indicate that
international rules and standards produced by competent organisations shall be
adopted by states conducting offshore oil and gas activities. Even so, it should first
be made clear whether the London Convention and its Protocol are to be categorised
as global rules and standards. Moreover, another view that has been expressed is that
185
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even if a state has not yet ratified the convention and its protocol, it should at least
have relevant domestic legislation in place to address the problem.187
7.4.5.3.2 London Convention as a Global Rule
Whether a rule or standard has gained global acceptance is a matter of varying
viewpoints. Oxman has stated that there are three criteria that should be satisfied in
order for a rule to have gained ‘global acceptance’.188 First, it should be adopted by
several States. Secondly, it should be implemented by States, and lastly, it should
respect the parties which are conducting the activities as mentioned in the said rule.
If these criteria are applied to the London Convention, it would appear that the first
two requirements have been met. Even though the London Convention has not gained
popularity in Southeast Asia, it has been ratified by more than 85 countries around
the world. Moreover, the convention came into existence in 1972, during the
negotiation period of the LOSC but before it was formally agreed. However, the third
requirement postulated by Oxman cannot reasonably be said to apply to the London
Convention. Although the willingness of State parties to implement the London
Convention is high, some reports have shown that the level of compliance with the
convention is low.189 Furthermore, in the case of the 1996 Protocol, the number of
States ratifying the instrument is relatively low. Indeed, only 40 States have ratified
the instrument, thus indicating it is still some way off from being globally
accepted.190
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7.4.5.3.3 Domestic Rules
The application of domestic rules by States is a separate consideration to the
implementation of global rules and standards.191 In these circumstances, States have
the authority to set their own rules related to the activities that they are involved in.
Indeed, when states are given the flexibility to formulate their own rules, the question
that arises is whether they are required to follow certain international provisions as a
benchmark. In the context of offshore oil and gas activities, the London Convention
is clearly one of the relevant frameworks regulating disposal of disused platforms. It
adopts a case-by-case approach when deciding whether to permit a State to conduct a
dumping operation. The convention takes into account several factors when making
this inquiry, such as the location of the dumping site, the type of waste involved, the
cost to remove the installation, as well as the risks posed to the environment. It has
been proposed by Lyons that if States are unable to implement the London
Convention into their national legal framework, they should at least ensure that their
domestic legislation has an equivalent standard in place.192
7.5

Regional Framework on Offshore Oil and Gas in Southeast Asia

Therefore, in order to mitigate risks, Southeast Asian States should consider entering
into regional cooperative arrangements for preventing marine pollution caused by oil
and gas incidents.193 Such incidents have the capacity to affect not only the
immediate area surrounding the facility, but also neighbouring countries. If one
considers that States in Southeast Asia are located in close proximity to each another,
the likelihood of a security incident in one State affecting neighbouring States is
191
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high. In the event of a multi-state incident, the immediate country affected would
need to seek assistance from other littoral states, and this is where regional
cooperative arrangements would play an important role.194 Although there are few
regional frameworks currently in place, this section will discuss those which have
been established and which are relevant to offshore oil and gas security and safety in
Southeast Asia.
7.5.1

The Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on
Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore

The Cooperative Mechanism195 was established in order to implement Article 43 of
the LOSC which states that user States and coastal States bordering a strait should
cooperate in establishing and maintaining necessary navigational and safety aids for
international navigation.196 Furthermore, the article also stated that the contracting
States should cooperate in order to prevent, reduce and also control pollution from
ships.197
The main aim of the cooperative mechanism as stipulated in point 7 is
facilitating cooperation among the littoral states and forms as a platform for
dialogues.198 The establishment of the mechanism are based on several primary
principles such as
1. Re-affirming the sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and territorial integrity
of the littoral States over the Straits; 2. It is consistent with international law and in
194
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particular article 43 of UNCLOS; 3. It is established within the framework of the
Tripartite Technical Experts Group on the Safety of Navigation in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore (TTEG) and that the primary responsibility over the safety of
navigation and environmental protection in the Straits lies with the littoral States;
and 4. Recognising the interests of user States and other stakeholders and the role
they could play in respect of the Straits, and that such co-operation should be on a
voluntary basis.199

The safety of navigation and environmental protection in the straits are the
main focus of the cooperative mechanism. This focus is implemented by conducting
co-operation forums, establishing a project co-ordination committee to implement
numerous projects particularly with sponsoring users and to receive financial
contribution for maintenance of aids to navigation.200
The cooperation forum serves as a platform of dialogue which would involve
stakeholders such as user States, the shipping industry and the coastal States.201 The
project co-ordination committee is established for implementing Article 43 of the
LOSC by promoting safety of navigation and environmental protection through the
implementation of projects.202 These projects will be conducted and funded by
stakeholders including littoral States (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) and user
States, and the shipping industry. Other than significant contribution by the coastal
States for the maintenance of navigation, Japan as a user State continues to provide
financial aid on a voluntary basis.203
Knowing that a number of platforms are present around the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, the presence of the cooperative mechanism could be beneficial in
addressing issues related to marine pollution as well as safety of navigation. The cooperation mechanism, as a platform for dialogue, thus offers options to cooperate and
199
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contribute on voluntary basis to protect the environment and ensure the safety of
navigation of the straits.204
7.5.2

CSCAP Memorandum on Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas
Installations205

The CSCAP Memorandum revealed several safety and security issues as a result of
offshore oil and gas activities in the Asia-Pacific. It is one of the few regional
attempts at a recommendatory framework to address the safety and security of
offshore oil and gas installations. The memorandum recommended that risk
mitigation and treatment options to the platforms need to be developed. Furthermore,
cooperative measures to ensure the safety and security of offshore oil and gas
installations is needed, involving stakeholders including regional governments and
relevant industries. In addition, it urges that close attention should be directed to
regional disaster and emergency prevention, response and recovery measures.206
In order to address the offshore oil and gas safety and security issues in the
Asia-Pacific region the memorandum identified and recommended several risk
mitigation and treatment options. The memorandum stated that comprehensive
assessment of the issue in the region should be in place.207 Stakeholders need to
adopt a common risk management approach that would enable a common risk
treatment, prevention, response and recovery arrangements and capabilities if an
incident occurs. One guide used by industries is the ISO 31000:2009 Risk
Management - Principles and Guidelines. Point 2 of the memorandum states that
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regional States and consultative entities are urged to cooperate in numerous fields
including:
a. Maritime safety and security cooperative activities, including dialogue and
consultation; b. Disaster response and emergency management; c. Regional search
and rescue, including training and exercises; d. Establish regional standards on
marine pollution including dumping and environment/seabed management (this
could take the form of a treaty as is already the practice in many other maritime
regions); e. Establish a regional approach to decommissioned platforms; f. Regional
environmental disaster response measures; and g. Reference global best practices to
improve regional arrangements.208

Furthermore, the memorandum encouraged States to ratify and implement
international conventions and regional instruments including the LOSC, SUA
Convention and Protocol, London Convention, OPRC Convention, IMO Resolution
A.672 (16) Guidelines for the removal of offshore installations, and 2002 ASEANChina Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.209
The memorandum also encouraged stakeholders to address offshore oil and
gas safety and security issues by sharing responsibilities for prevention, response and
recovery.210 This could be done by considering that responsibilities of the
stakeholders are clearly divided and, thus, regional States and industries are aware of
their respective obligations. Furthermore, treatment of the decommissioned platforms
should be effectively addressed by stakeholders. In addition, it argues that there
should be a common arrangement in disaster and emergency response.211
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7.5.3

The Decommissioning Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities by the
ASEAN Council on Petroleum

A legally binding instrument on the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas
facilities is yet to be agreed upon in Southeast Asia.212 However, in 2013, a nonlegally binding document was produced by the ASEAN Council on Petroleum
(ASCOPE) 213, titled ‘ASCOPE Decommissioning Guidelines for Offshore Oil and
Gas Facilities’. Although the guidelines cannot be enforced, it is hoped that they will
be used as a common platform for addressing the issue in Southeast Asia and, in the
future, lead to a binding framework on the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas
facilities.
ASCOPE was established on 15 October 1975 in Jakarta, Indonesia, with the
ASEAN member countries represented by their respective national oil companies.
The main aim of the association is to support member States with various aspects of
the petroleum industry, including mutual assistance. Furthermore, the council serves
as a platform for regional cooperation, particularly on petroleum and energy matters.
The ASCOPE Declaration states that petroleum has a strategic importance to
member States, and should therefore be protected to enhance economic development
in Southeast Asia.
The guidelines agreed upon by ASCOPE member countries consist of
regional decommissioning provisions which accord with both international law and
the domestic legislation of member states. The goal of these guidelines is to “provide
a common technical reference for ASEAN countries for decommissioning”.214 In
addition, the guidelines aim to enhance environmental protection and the safety of
212
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navigation. However, as the guidelines do not cover natural disasters or the collapse
of platforms, they only apply in the context of the normal operations of oil and gas
facilities.215
However, in the absence of international instruments and established industry
practices regulating decommissioning in the region, the domestic law of individual
States must be relied upon as the prevailing legal norm.216 Also, while it is true that
the full removal of oil and gas installations is to be preferred over their disposal at
sea, the notion of reusing disused platforms for legitimate purposes presents a
feasible solution that accommodates the interests of various stakeholders. As the
development of offshore oil and gas facilities in the region continues to intensify,
regional organisations such as ASCOPE (as well as other forums), are needed to
address the gaps in the current framework and to create a common platform for
understanding the complex interplay of issues related to offshore oil and gas
activities.217
7.5.4

The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and
Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China
Sea

The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) was
initiated to obtain peaceful and durable solution to the dispute between China and
ASEAN – one which accords with international law principles.218 Furthermore, the
declaration provides that the parties will take measures for the planning and
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realisation of cooperative initiatives. Nonetheless, the declaration does not initiate
intensive cooperation between States, and it has been alleged that both China and
some ASEAN States have violated the declaration. The efforts of ASEAN member
States to implement the DoC by establishing a Regional Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea (CoC) in 2012 have not been successful this far.219 China is yet to
agree on the draft CoC and has indicated that it may take time for States to comply
with the agreement, as the terms of the document evince what is essentially the longterm goal for the South China Sea issue, rather than the means by which the goal can
be achieved.220
The main objective of the DoC is to mitigate the South China Sea dispute
through a regional framework – that is, the ASEAN regime and prevailing principles
of international law. As the principle of non-intervention is still well respected
among ASEAN nations, and China prefers to have bilateral rather than multilateral
talks, it is unlikely that the issue will be resolved through independent international
mediation.
Setting aside maritime delimitation issues, cooperative oil and gas
exploration activities are not regarded as a positive step forward by States in the
region.221 However, in 2005, an agreement was reached among the national oil
companies of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines for a Joint Marine Seismic
Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea. Although the agreement
was considered an important step in the resolution of the dispute, it did not achieve
the desired cooperative outcomes. Indeed, it was reported that only a few of the
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cooperative measures contemplated by the agreement were actually carried out.222
The existing territorial disputes thus remain, and serve as the main barrier to the
development of an agreed framework on oil and gas safety and security in the region.
7.5.5

Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia

The goal of the establishment of Partnerships in Environmental Management for the
Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) was ‘to foster and sustain healthy and resilient coasts
and oceans, communities and economies across the Seas of East Asia through
integrated management solutions and partnerships’.223 In order to conduct effective
management of coasts and oceans in maritime areas around East Asia, PEMSEA has
provided several suggestions as well as solutions. PEMSEA also serves as the
regional coordinating mechanism for the Sustainable Development Strategy for the
Seas of East Asia (SDS-SEA). Furthermore, the organisation also works with
national and local governments, companies, research and science institutions,
communities, international agencies, regional programs, investors and donors
towards implementation of the SDS-SEA.
PEMSEA plays a vital role as the pioneer of integrated coastal management
(ICM), ecosystem

rehabilitation

and

protection and adaptive

and

resilient

communities in East Asia. 224 Also, ICM creates positive impacts on communities
through food

security

and

livelihood

opportunities, pollution

and

waste

management, water use and supply management as well as civil society
empowerment youth. In 2003, participating countries in PEMSEA adopted the SDS222
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SEA as a management framework for integrated implementation of various IMO
marine pollution conventions and other multilateral instruments addressing the
coastal and marine environments. SDS-SEA has more than 50 action programs,
many of which focus on prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution.225

7.5.6

Regional Cooperative Approach

Pollution produced from the activities of offshore installations is best dealt with
under regional arrangements.226 Indeed, according to the UN Charter, regional
organisations play an important role in addressing such issues among states in a
given region.227 There are several reasons why regional organisations are significant
in addressing pollution from offshore installations: (i) international efforts may not
be able to take into account the specific and unique geographic conditions of a
particular region, which may be relevant in addressing the prevailing problems in the
area;228 (ii) regional efforts represent a solid platform for complying with larger,
global agreements, as a smaller group of states with mutual interests can work
together potentially, making it easier to achieve consensus on pertinent issues;229 and
(iii) compared to large organisations such as the UN, regional organisations are
perceived to be directly accountable by the international legal and political order.230
Thus, for the protection of the marine environment, there are several regional
responses in place covering a variety of issues including environmental control,
225
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arrangements on regional development, as well as scientific research.231 As for
pollution from offshore platform activities, the UNEP Oceans and Coastal Areas
Programme is one initiative that supports regionalism. The program has noted that
there are ten regional seas which are governed by twenty five international
frameworks.232
International anti-pollution measures would be effective if States were
prepared to implement such measures through regional mechanisms.233 That said,
Southeast Asian States have made an effort to address marine environmental
problems through their relevant domestic agencies. However, what is lacking is
coordination between these agencies, and thus, at present, the individual efforts of
States are not producing the desired results. In what is considered a positive step,
institutions at both the international and regional levels are conducting capacitybuilding measures to address the issue of marine pollution. These institutions include
the IMO, UNEP, the Global Environment Facility, the South East Asian Programme
on Ocean Law Policy and Management (SEAPOL), Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC),234 as well as ASEAN.
Despite the beneficial work of these institutions, the measures and activities
undertaken are usually repetitive and overlapping.235 Furthermore, the relevant
officers in charge of attending and participating in the numerous capacity building
and training programmes hosted by these institutions are often confused as to which
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of the (often competing) measures need to be implemented. Therefore, to effect
meaningful change, these institutions must communicate with each other and
formulate a coordinated response to capacity building activities. One of the ways to
achieve this goal is through the creation of a regional mechanism which would act as
a platform for mapping and prioritising regional activities, thereby achieving
mutually beneficial outcomes for the States involved.
Indeed, there are numerous instances where institutions have acted
unilaterally to address the same problem. These same institutions are conducting
capacity building activities in Southeast Asia to implement marine pollution
provisions. Joint training programs have been conducted by the IMO and several
regional States in order to implement the IMO Convention on Marine Pollution.
Likewise, ASEAN countries have agreed on the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on
Transboundary Pollution, which aims to enhance enforcement activities and
implement capacity building activities among relevant officers, thereby preventing
and responding to marine pollution. Similar efforts have been made by UNEP,
SEAPOL and APEC.
Undeniably, these capacity building efforts are positive and will benefit
States in implementing pertinent provisions on marine pollution. However, there
should be a focus on coordinating these efforts so that activities do not overlap and
confusion does not ensue. Indeed, such coordination could be realised by means of a
regional mechanism which would provide a forum for discussion and act as a
platform for deciding which activities should be undertaken by States in the
region.236
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7.5.7

Recommendations to Enhance Regional Collaboration

The implementation of prevailing minimum standards and frameworks of offshore
oil and gas activities at the regional level remains a significant concern for States in
the region237 Moreover, the absence of a common platform for implementing risk
management measures during security incidents has been highlighted as an issue
worthy of detailed consideration. It is submitted that regional organisations and
consultative groups such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional forum (ARF)238 and
APEC should intervene in order to devise and implement cooperative arrangements
concerning the issue.
Several key areas that could be considered in furtherance of the cooperative
arrangements have been suggested by Cordner, and include:
a.

a unified risk management approach to offshore oil and gas safety and
security. This would ensure that states respond to security incidents
involving offshore platforms with a degree of consistency and
coherency;

b.

cooperative activities as well dialogue on issues such as environmental
protection and maritime safety and security;

c.

cooperative arrangements on regional maritime search and rescue
operations;

d.

a marine pollution arrangement to tackle dumping at the regional level;

e.

a unified standard for regional environmental disaster response,
including procedures, equipment reserves and training; and

237
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f.

the adoption of international best practices on offshore oil and gas
safety and security in order to improve and develop the current regional
arrangements. 239

7.6

Analysis of the Current Framework

There are numerous globally-applicable international provisions that seek to regulate
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. LOSC is still the main
reference point for the development of other relevant international frameworks.
However, the main problem is the lack of regional frameworks regulating such
issues.
Oil spill incidents cause marine pollution which, in turn, has the potential to
damage the marine environment. There have been several offshore oil and gas
incidents in the Southeast Asia region. The consequences of such incidents can be
serious, with significant harm to human life in addition to devastating environmental
damage. Furthermore, if such an incident were to occur in an important area, such as
the Malacca or Singapore Strait, it would cause serious disruption to international
trade. As the previous section has demonstrated, there are limitations to the existing
international framework governing marine pollution from offshore activities. These
limitations are mainly due to a lack of quantitative standards, the general nature of
the duties imposed on States, the dependency of States on the prevailing international
framework for the adoption and/or development of regional regulations, as well as
the unwillingness of States (especially in Southeast Asia) to ratify and implement the
relevant international instruments.
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The dumping of disused offshore oil and gas platforms is a major cause of
marine pollution. The responsibility of States to remove disused offshore platforms is
governed by the LOSC.240 Indeed, LOSC is the primary international instrument
regulating the further treatment of offshore oil platforms, and in particular whether
they should be removed or left in situ. Even so, there are differing interpretations of
the prevailing LOSC provisions, while those in other international instruments (such
as the London Convention and Protocol, as well as 1989 IMO Guidelines and
Standards) have not been universally adopted. This uncertainty creates difficulties
for States when it comes to implementing the relevant provisions into their domestic
legal regime. In Southeast Asia for instance, both regional and domestic provisions
are lacking, particularly with regard to the adoption of the London Convention and
Protocol, as well as the IMO Guidelines and Standards.
The disposal of offshore platforms is permitted by both Article 210241 of
LOSC as well as the London Convention and Protocol. However, such action can
only be taken if States adopt the ‘permit system’ for dumping at sea. States which are
active in oil and gas production are reluctant to adopt the London Protocol, despite
the instrument being useful in instances where States have abandoned their disused
offshore platforms.
Neither the London Convention nor the IMO Guidelines oppose the reuse of
disused offshore installations.242 Indeed, such action is not considered dumping
under either instrument. Furthermore, the IMO Guidelines cannot be implemented on
their own. LOSC provisions on dumping are also necessary in order to decide the
proper treatment of disused offshore installations. In removing or disposing of
240
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offshore platforms, LOSC requires States to consider the protection of the marine
environment as well as the safety of navigation of vessels.
In order to effectively apply the provisions on the removal of offshore
installations, and to avoid the legal uncertainties previously mentioned, regional
provisions on the treatment of disused installations should be adopted. In Southeast
Asia, these regional provisions would help in filling the legal gaps which currently
exist with regard to the decommissioning regime. If these rules were in place, the
marine environment would be better managed and protected, and the safety of
navigation would be assured. It is important to note, however, that such provisions
need to be applied on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, some platforms may pose less of
a risk if left in their current position, as removal may endanger the safety of
personnel.243
Given the vast number of disused platforms in the region, the lack of
regulations governing their partial or full removal has the capacity to cause problems
for the protection of the marine environment. Conversely, if these regulations were
put in place, a case-by-case evaluation of the platforms would occur, and ultimately a
decision would be made regarding their full or partial removal. Alternatively, a new
use for the installation may be ordered, such as the creation of an artificial reef.
Moreover, LOSC expressly provides in Article 210 that States are obliged to
implement globally accepted rules and standards which regulate offshore oil and gas
activities.244
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In light of the sheer number of ageing platforms in the region, it is imperative
that States in Southeast Asia develop regional agreements to address the situation.245
These agreements would be useful as they establish a common platform for offshore
oil and gas activities in the area. In this regard, it is important to note that ASCOPE
has conducted a substantial number of meetings on the decommissioning of oil and
gas facilities in the region. It is now incumbent upon Southeast Asian States to
support these meetings and work towards the establishment of a comprehensive
framework which takes into account the protection of the marine environment, the
safety of navigation, as well as the commercial and security interests of States.
7.7

Conclusion

Marine pollution caused by an oil spill from offshore platforms, as well as the
dumping of such platforms following their operational phase, has the capacity to
pollute the marine environment. At the international level, offshore oil and gas safety
and security has been addressed by international conventions such as LOSC,
MARPOL, the OPRC Convention, the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards, the
London Convention and Protocol. Despite the absence of a comprehensive regional
framework, there are several instruments which seek to address the safety and
security of offshore oil and gas activities in the Southeast Asia region, such as the
ASEAN Decommissioning Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities. However,
as discussed in this chapter, the current framework - at both the international and
regional levels - is inadequate to address the problem of marine pollution resulting
from oil and gas operations. Although some aspects of the problem may arise within
a single State, others are transnational in nature, such that they cannot be solved
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through unilateral State action. For this reason, regional cooperation among all States
in Southeast Asia represents the only practicable for ensuring offshore oil and gas
safety and security, and thus reducing or preventing damage to the marine
environment from oil pollution.
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CHAPTER VIII
8 Prospects for Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: A Proposal for Change

8.1

Introduction
It is no easy task for defence and law enforcement officers to maintain

security and safety in their maritime areas.1 Such officers have been authorised by
States to ensure that maritime zones falling under national jurisdiction are safe from
criminal acts. These maritime areas range from the territorial sea and archipelagic
waters to the exclusive economic zone. The major concern for States lies not only
with the security of living and non-living resources above the subsoil, but also
natural resources which are found on the continental shelves. The presence of
international straits in some Southeast Asian states poses a different set of
challenges. As many ships transit through these straits, it is vital that relevant
security measures are taken by authorities to ensure that no unlawful activities take
place. Moreover, because some of these straits are located between two or more
countries, the need for international cooperation is paramount.
To address maritime security issues, cooperation through bilateral and
multilateral frameworks is needed.2 These arrangements constitute the goal of
Maritime Security Partnerships, and are also encouraged by international law and
various conventions. In implementing such agreements, contracting States may use
their respective statutory authorities and military capabilities, provided their actions
do not contradict generally accepted principles of international law.

1
2

Naval Studies Board, Maritime Security Partnerships (National Academies Press, 2008) 18.
Ibid, 19.
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The purpose of this chapter is to identify common themes related to the five
maritime security threats in Southeast Asia which are covered in this thesis: piracy,
maritime terrorism, people smuggling, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing, and marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. This chapter
concludes that the existing international and regional frameworks are inadequate to
address the entire maritime security threats in Southeast Asia and therefore States in
the region could consider implementing regional measures as proposed in this
chapter. All five maritime security threats discussed in this thesis are transnational in
nature and thus unilateral action by a single State will not be adequate to address the
problem comprehensively. Regional cooperation is required in combating maritime
security threats in Southeast Asia.
The chapter will propose Maritime Security Partnership as a solution to deal
with the existing maritime security threats. Furthermore, it also proposes other
solutions at the regional level to address the maritime security problems. A way
forward in maintaining the safety of the region and to prevent the occurrence of
maritime security threats will also form a part of the discussion.
8.2
8.2.1

Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia: Common Themes
Piracy

As a maritime security threat, the problem of piracy in Southeast Asia has received
worldwide attention. As discussed in Chapter Three, the act of piracy affects human
safety as well as international commerce. Piracy is governed by both international
and regional legal frameworks. The prominent legal frameworks at the international
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level are the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)3 and the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA Convention).4 However, these instruments are inadequate as the
LOSC definition of piracy does not encompass most of the piratical acts occurring in
the region. The SUA Convention, on the other hand, is essentially inapplicable
because several States, including Indonesia and Malaysia, are not party to the
convention and its protocol. One of the reasons for not ratifying the Convention is
sovereignty concerns: they argue that it would undermine their sovereignty.
At the regional level, there are frameworks which address piracy such as the
Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
in Asia (ReCAAP)5 and the Malacca Straits Patrols.6 The handicap with the
effectiveness of ReCAAP is that neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are parties to the
agreement. The Malacca Straits Patrols are the one of the measures that seem to be
effective in monitoring and mitigating risks of piratical attacks in the Straits of
Malacca. There are other forums which are relevant to piracy eradication such as the
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional
Meeting (ARF-ISM) on Maritime Security, and the Maritime Security Expert
Working Group (MSEWG).7 Nonetheless, these forums are regarded as mere ‘talk
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shops’ which are largely perceived as not producing legally binding frameworks but
only viewed as platform for dialogues.
In conclusion, international and regional legal frameworks are in place in
order to combat piracy in Southeast Asia. However, existing frameworks still need
further development in order to be effective and therefore in its current state they are
inadequate to address the problem of piracy in the region.
8.2.2

Maritime Terrorism

Maritime terrorism is regarded as a maritime security threat by the international
community and Southeast Asian States. Numerous developments and the adoption of
several international legal frameworks regulating transnational organised crime
including terrorism, have taken place.8 The SUA 2005 Convention Protocol and the
ISPS Code are amongst the international instruments which address the issue of
maritime terrorism. Nonetheless, these instruments still have their limitations and
shortcomings, and therefore the further development of these frameworks is required.
For example, the SUA Convention fails to address all aspects of maritime terrorism .
In the Southeast Asia region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has initiated numerous efforts in combating maritime terrorism. However,
ASEAN States seem to be proceeding with caution in developing their response.9 As
a result of this tentative approach, operational measures to combat terrorism are
totally lacking in ASEAN. Instead of adopting and implementing operational and
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practical measures in counter terrorism, ASEAN initiatives are more geared towards
the declaration of common principles.10
In conclusion, there are several international legal frameworks which address
the issue of maritime terrorism. However, these legally binding frameworks still need
to be developed in order to be effective. In the Southeast Asian region there are
numerous non-binding frameworks in the form of declarations initiated within the
framework of ASEAN. Nonetheless, non-binding frameworks are not enough in
eradicate the complex issue of maritime terrorism in the region. It could be
concluded that the current measures both at international and regional level are
inadequate to address the threat of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia.
8.2.3

People Smuggling

People smuggling is regarded as another maritime security threat in Southeast Asia.
It causes human loss as well as breaches to immigration policies of several States. At
the international level, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air11 (Smuggling Protocol) which is attached to the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime (CATOC)12 serves as the prominent legal
framework in addressing the matter. Even though the protocol has been ratified by
most States, its implementation still leaves much to be desired. The lack of
implementing legislation, inadequate policies and planning, as well as limited
international cooperation, account for the ineffectiveness of the Protocol. It is
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difficult to establish interagency cooperation to respond to the problem of people
smuggling activities as there are only a few States that have a specific policy
addressing the matter.
At the regional level, the Bali Process13 has been the prominent platform in
addressing the issue. The Bali process aims to raised regional awareness of the
consequences of people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational
crime. It has produced several outcomes which are not legally binding and thus not
widely regarded as successful in combating people smuggling activities in Southeast
Asia. Moreover, the Bali Process is a forum, not an organisation and therefore its
outcomes are mostly intangible. In ASEAN, people smuggling has received the
attention of the member states since 1997, however the organisation is not able to
produce a legally binding framework as member States have different approaches
and perspectives towards people smuggling activities depending upon their
involvement as States of origin, transit or destination.
In conclusion, whilst an international legal framework is in place to address
people smuggling, at the regional level there are only non-binding frameworks
produced by the Bali Process and within ASEAN. Since the implementation of the
international binding framework is insufficient and in the absence of a legally
binding framework at the regional level, it could be concluded that the current
measures at the international as well as the regional levels in addressing people
smuggling in Southeast Asia are inadequate.

13

The Bali Process see http://www.baliprocess.net/ at the 4th of May 2015.
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8.2.4

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

IUU fishing poses a threat to maritime security in Southeast Asia. As fish are
considered a main source of protein for all States and also a source of national
income, therefore, IUU fishing is considered a threat to the sustainable management
of fisheries resources and food security. Similar to piracy, the problem of IUU
fishing is addressed by legally binding frameworks both at international and regional
levels. However, the implementation of such frameworks is still insufficient. One of
the challenges in combating IUU fishing in the region is the enforcement of fisheries
regulations. In several circumstances, governments are not able to conduct effective
fisheries management measures due to the lack of capacity as well as fiscal
resources.
At the international level, IUU fishing is addressed in the LOSC, International
the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU),14 the FAO Code of Conduct15 as well as the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement.16 At the regional level, measures in place include the are
Regional Plan of Action (RPOA), the ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership17
(ASSP) and the Coral Triangle Initiative.18 Positive impacts in eradicating IUU
fishing in Southeast Asia have been made by these frameworks. The presence of
these frameworks particularly at the regional level has pushed the Southeast Asian
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States to work together through several coordinated schemes. Nonetheless, with a
large maritime area, the Southeast Asia region is prone to maritime security problems
including IUU fishing. Regional fisheries management organisations need time in
order to be able to comprehensively address the issue. Furthermore, unresolved
maritime boundary disputes and complex fisheries problems also constitute barriers
to address IUU fishing. Also, some Southeast Asian States fishers are perpetrators of
illegal fishing in the region.
In conclusion, even though IUU fishing is governed by international and
regional frameworks, the problem still prevails and thus the legally binding
frameworks are inadequate to address it. There are numerous non-binding regional
instruments in place to address the issue of IUU fishing. These instruments, however,
are not obligatory; they are voluntary in nature, thus only applicable to those States
that are willing to apply them. The inability and unwillingness of States to implement
such frameworks and to exert control over their fisheries resources serve as the main
reasons why existing frameworks remain inadequate.
8.2.5

Marine Pollution caused by Offshore Oil and Gas Activities

Offshore oil and gas activities also pose potential maritime security threats to
Southeast Asian States. These activities potentially cause pollution to the marine
environment in Southeast Asian waters. Two specific marine pollution problems
generated by offshore oil and gas activities in the region are oil pollution and the
dumping of offshore installations at sea. Similar to people smuggling, this problem
is only addressed by a legally binding framework at the international level. There is
no legally binding instrument at the regional level which addresses the issues.
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The global instruments governing marine pollution caused by offshore oil and
gas activities include the LOSC, the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards19, and the
International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention).20 However, these legal frameworks
are not popular in the region and therefore not many of the Southeast Asian States
have ratified them.
At the regional level, several non-legally binding frameworks are found in the
context of addressing marine pollution caused offshore oil and gas activities, such as
the Decommissioning Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities produced by
ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE).21 This guideline is projected to form a
common platform for Southeast Asian States to address decommissioning of offshore
oil and gas facilities. Furthermore, member States of ASCOPE also hope that the
guidelines could lead to the establishment of a binding framework in addressing the
matter.
In conclusion, a legally binding framework at the regional level governing
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities is yet to be produced.
However, there are several binding frameworks which prevail at the international
level. Nonetheless, these frameworks are yet to be ratified by most of the Southeast
Asian States. Therefore, as a result the current regional frameworks alone governing
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities are inadequate in
addressing the problem in Southeast Asia.
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8.2.6

Overall conclusion

Southeast Asia is considered as an area which is prone to maritime security threats.
The maritime area in this region is particularly vast and the number of vessels
traverse within the region is high. Therefore, the five maritime security threats
examined in this thesis exist in this area. From the discussions above and in the
previous chapters, it can be concluded that the international and regional frameworks
are inadequate in addressing the problems. The five maritime security problems still
prevail in Southeast Asia.
Maritime security threats such as piracy and IUU fishing are addressed at both
international and regional level with binding legal frameworks. Nonetheless, the
implementation of such frameworks is insufficient.

Maritime terrorism, people

smuggling and marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities face a
different challenge where legally binding frameworks are only found at the
international level whilst at the regional level, only non-binding frameworks are in
place.
Piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing, and marine
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities are transnational in nature.
Therefore these problems cannot be addressed by a single State. Better multilateral
and regional cooperation is needed in order to comprehensively address these
problems.
From the above-mentioned maritime security threats in Southeast Asia there
are two common themes that can be identified in every threat: ratification of legal
instruments, both international and regional; and implementation of the legal
frameworks at the domestic level. In addition, a complex geopolitical situation in
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Southeast Asia, and constraints on maritime security information sharing, also create
barriers to addressing the five threats.
8.2.6.1 Ratification of Legal Instruments
The ratification level of international legal instruments regulating maritime security
is considered lacking in the region. As shown in Tables 34 and 35, not a single
international instrument has been ratified by all States in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless
the SUA Convention 1988 and its Protocol, SOLAS Convention 1974 and MARPOL
73/78 (Annex I/II), have been ratified by most of the States in Southeast Asia.

SUA
Convention
1988
ü

SUA
Protocol
1988
ü

SUA
Convention
2005
x
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Protocol
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SOLAS
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ü

ü

ü
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ü

Indonesia
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x
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ü
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ü
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x
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Malaysia

x

x

x

x

ü

Myanmar

ü

ü
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x

ü

Philippines

ü

ü
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x

ü

Singapore

ü

x

x

x

ü

Thailand

x

x

x

x

ü

Vietnam

ü

ü

x

x

ü

Timor Leste

x

x

x

x

x

Brunei
Darussalam
Cambodia

Legend: ü = Contracting States, x = Non- Contracting States.

Table 34: Status of International Legal Instruments in Southeast Asia22
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UN Fish
Stocks
Agreement
X

MARPOL 73/78
(Annex I/II)

OPRC 1990

London
Convention 1972

London
Protocol 1996

ü

x

x

x

X

ü

x

x

x

Indonesia

ü

ü

ü

x

x

Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar

X
X
X

x
x

x
ü

ü

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
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√
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ü

ü

ü
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X

ü

ü

x

x

Thailand

X

ü

ü

x

x

Vietnam

X

ü

x

x

x
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X

x

x

x

x

Brunei
Darussalam
Cambodia

Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded
Table 35: Accession Status of International Legal Instruments in Southeast Asia23

On the other hand, regional legal or policy frameworks regulating maritime
security threats are limited. However, two regional frameworks, namely ReCAAP
and APEC’s Counter Terrorism Action Plans, have been adopted by the majority of
the States in the region (Table 36). The low level of ratification of the international
legal frameworks and the presence of only minimal regional instruments creates
issues in resolving common problems. One of the benefits of ratifying existing
frameworks is that it creates common understanding as well as mechanisms to
mitigate threats, and control and punish perpetrators.

23
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Southeast Asian States

ReCAPP

Brunei Darussalam

ü

APEC's Counter
Terrorism Action Plans
ü

Cambodia

ü

x

Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar

x
ü
x
ü

ü
x
ü
x

Philippines

ü

ü

Singapore

ü

ü

Thailand

ü

ü

Vietnam

ü

ü

Timor Leste

x

x

Legend: ü = Contracting States and x = Non-Contracting States

Table 36: Status of Regional Instruments in Southeast Asia 24

8.2.6.2 Implementation and Criminalisation
While not ratifying the existing maritime security legal frameworks could be
problematic, not implementing those frameworks that have been ratified is another
problem. For some States, implementation of international and domestic instruments
at the domestic level is required to make the application of the international or
regional framework effective. It would be insufficient to only ratify an international
instrument without having national legislation that could implement it. As maritime
security threats continue to occur in Southeast Asia and necessary actions under
international law are required to be taken in order to eradicate the problems, States
are urged to establish implementing regulations at the domestic level. This requires

24
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Counter Terrorism Action Plans in Southeast Asia, see http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-SteeringCommittee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-Terrorism/CounterTerrorism-Action-Plans.aspx 22 October 2015.
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criminalization of certain offences such as piracy, consistent with the LOSC, in
domestic law.
8.2.6.3 Geopolitics
The geopolitical situation also forms a barrier to combating maritime security threats
in Southeast Asia. The complexity of the Southeast Asian regional maritime
geography creates a challenge in addressing reginal maritime security problems.
Several States in the region still have maritime disputes in regard to territory,
jurisdiction or maritime boundary delimitation. This problem creates mistrust among
States and can be an obstacle in conducting bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
Furthermore, perpetrators of several maritime security threats such as IUU fishing
and maritime terrorism originate within the region itself. Moreover, sub-regions in
Southeast Asia are not equally balanced in terms of maritime security partnerships.
The Malacca Strait Patrol for instance only operates in the Straits of Malacca and is
conducted by the littoral States, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand. Other sub-regions which are equally important, such as the Sulu-Sulawesi
Seas tri-border area also require similar measures to mitigate threats and exert good
order at sea. Thus, in certain sub-regions, States need to step up, create and push
forward sub-regional partnerships in order to maintain safety and security of the subregion.
8.2.6.4 Information Sharing
The last common theme of the maritime security threats in Southeast Asia is the
reluctance of some States in the region to provide and share information about their
maritime security status, threats and perception. One of the reasons behind this
argument is that sharing of information may undermine the sovereignty of certain
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States. The non-intervention principle, which has been greatly respected in Southeast
Asia, makes it clear that States do not have the rights to interfere in other States’
affairs. This, however, is difficult in shared maritime geography lacking the clarity of
well delimited boundaries. Nonetheless, meetings such as the Maritime Security
Desktop Exercises (MSDE), which have been hosted by both Australia and
Indonesia, and used as a guide for the framework of this thesis, have become an
important platform for discussing prevailing maritime security threats in the region.
Furthermore, the exercises addressed several maritime security scenarios, with
participating States agreeing that cooperation is vital in addressing maritime security
threats, especially those which are transnational in nature. A particular outcome
common to all MSDEs has been agreement on the singular importance of maritime
security information gathering and sharing, both nationally and regionally between
partner States in the inherently transnational maritime environment. MSDE aims at
strengthening coordination among the participating countries in combating crimes at
sea at the region. As stated in Chapter I the Southeast Asian States which participated
in the Maritime Security Desktop Exercise (MSDE) 2, 3 and 4 held in 2011, 2012
and 2013, revealed that piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing
were the primary maritime security threats in Southeast Asia.
8.3

Maritime Security Partnerships as a Proposed Solution to address
Maritime Security Threats

This section will discuss the proposed solution for Southeast Asian states to address
the maritime security threats by conducting maritime security partnerships. The
discussion will include modes and models of Maritime Security Partnerships,
international legal frameworks, Maritime Security Partnerships (MSP) models,
requirements for MSP establishment, levels of MSP, and schemes for the
349

implementation of MSP. This concept was produced by the US Navy, which aimed
to bring all nations together in order to build a global maritime network.
Furthermore, another goal of establishing such a network is to create the basis for
regional or sub-regional cooperation (such as ReCAAP). The first and most
important step of the initiative is to encourage construction of local networks of
cooperation and information sharing in a maritime region or sub-region.25 MSP
could be used as a model to eradicate maritime security problems in Southeast Asia.
As noted in previous chapters, many of the frameworks governing maritime security
in Southeast Asia are inadequate. Therefore, in the absence of comprehensive and
effective legal frameworks, MSP offers potential operational-level cooperative
solutions to some of the problems.
In regards to the Southeast Asia region, the obstacles in the application of
MSP include sovereignty sensitivities and acceptance of involvement of extraregional powers. Furthermore, the effective application of MSP in the region also
depends upon the willingness of States to share relevant maritime security
information to support the establishment of maritime security networks. Nonetheless,
if Southeast Asian states could put aside these barriers in order to achieve a bigger
goal, that is, to comprehensively address and possibly eliminate maritime security
threats in the region, MSP might have a better chance of being accepted.
8.3.1

Modes and Models of Maritime Security Partnership
The aim of creating maritime security partnerships is to encourage

cooperation among States (particularly with regard to sharing information), so that
each party has a clear picture of the security situation in their respective maritime
25

For more information see Chris Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications
for the Royal Australian Navy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008) 1.

350

areas.26 The next step is to analyse the data and identify security trends in the region,
thereby enabling effective solutions to be formulated. Indeed, as a result of MSP,
states obtain a greater awareness of the prevailing security situations in their
respective maritime areas, and are therefore able take steps to improve security
protection measures. Moreover, to enhance regional security, States are obliged to
share relevant data with other countries, thus enabling them to implement broader
security measures at the regional level.
Different models of security partnerships have been adopted by States.
During the Cold War era, security cooperation was conducted under the umbrella of
an international institution, and with a legal treaty forming the foundation for the
partnerships. Such security cooperation still occurs today, and can be found in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).27 This organisation has its own laws
which bind member States. However, in practice, NATO members are willing to
cooperate more than what the treaty requires them to. Indeed, States are willing to
share information and work together to successfully carry out the mission of the
organisation. The long history of the organisation means that member States are
bound by mutual trust, and therefore NATO negotiations tend to be open and
engaging. Even though there have been disagreements among members in the past,
NATO maritime forces have remained steadfast in their commitment and continued
to train with one another in order to successfully complete maritime missions in the
Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, as well as along the East African coast. Therefore, the

26
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sharing of intelligence is not a problem among NATO member States, and this
practice continues today.28
Bilateral security partnerships also exist between States. One such partnership
is between the United States and Russia. Under this partnership, the two States have
agreed to share and develop certain strategic information, although the areas of
cooperation are limited and narrowly defined. Such cooperation includes protocols
and mechanisms for risk avoidance, as well as common signals (formal and
informal), which have been produced and implemented between the two nations’
navies.29
8.3.2

International Legal Framework

The existence of maritime governance gaps has allowed illegal activities to flourish
at sea. Indeed, if this problem is not comprehensively addressed, maritime security
threats such as piracy, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing, people smuggling, and
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities will continue to occur.
Moreover, as these crimes or impacts are transboundary in nature, they have the
capacity to impact more than one country. For this reason, international cooperation
represents the best way to address the problem.
It is proposed that information sharing serves as a principal platform for
achieving this cooperation. By conducting this activity, States would have better
surveillance over their maritime areas, and thus be more likely to apprehend
perpetrators of criminal activities in the region. Once a perpetrator is apprehended,
the relevant State could prosecute the crime according to prevailing international law
and the domestic law of the country concerned. Furthermore, surveillance activities
28
29
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would enable States to take preventive measures to ensure the safety of their
maritime areas. These measures include boarding vessels suspected of being
involved in criminal activities and checking their registration. Such measures not
only avoid the negative effects of criminal acts on the State immediately concerned,
but also reduce the harm that may be occasioned to neighbouring states.30
One of the strategies behind MSP is to first receive international recognition
and support, thus demonstrating that such partnerships are worthy of implementation.
However, this strategy is only feasible if: (i) the unifying concepts behind MSP are
being shared internationally; and (ii) those States initiating the MSP in their region
are lobbying or otherwise engaged in discussions with other states to achieve a
common understanding on the subject. The greater the willingness of States to get
involved, the easier it will be for groups of States to conduct such activities.
Conversely, if the idea of MSP does not receive a positive response from States, then
it will be more difficult for such partnerships to operate in practice. A global
maritime security network is the ultimate goal of MSP. If such an objective is not
welcomed by a majority of States, then the prospect of MSP being implemented is
slight.
In order to gain popularity and acceptance from States, MSPs must be able to
demonstrate their significance and prove that they are compatible with prevailing
international frameworks. Furthermore, such partnerships have the capacity to serve
as a set of guidelines for the implementation of new international frameworks. If the
objectives, regulations and responsibilities of MSP could later be embodied in a more
formal document, this would broaden the applicability of such initiatives,

30
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encouraging States to adopt them one as one of the necessary sets of instruments for
maintaining maritime security. However, MSP can only be effective if States are
willing to implement the agreed strategies and share relevant information so that a
global maritime security network can be established.31
8.3.3

Requirements for MSP Establishment

The establishment of MSP require several elements to ensure that the cooperation
has the desired effect of maintaining security in the region. These elements include:
(i) personnel who have the requisite linguistic and cultural competencies. These staff
members should ideally be drawn from both civilian and military backgrounds and
have a sound understanding of the region; (ii) adequate funding to ensure that the
forged partnerships can endure well into the future; and (iii) the involvement of high
level officials. This is significant from a policy-making perspective, as well as for
coordination between authorities and agencies at the State level.32
The establishment and strength of MSP can be influenced by several
factors,33 including:
a. the level of the organisation that is representing the state that would act
as the focal point of the partnership;
b. the commitment of the parties to exchange information and consult with
one another;
c. the agreement period;
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d. the type of agreement or partnership – i.e., is it bilateral, regional or
multilateral? Indeed, the type of partnership has the potential to influence
the strength of the MSP;
e. the officials involved. In this regard, an important question to consider is
whether the state’s representatives are from a military or civilian
background (or both)? A combination of the two is always preferable,
and would make a significant contribution to the partnership; and
f. the scope of the agreement – i.e., whether it will be limited to
information sharing, or will it also encompass other activities such as
military and law enforcement operations.
8.3.4

Levels of MSP

MSP can be conducted in different forms at both the bilateral and multilateral level.
The basis for the cooperation is the sharing of information between contracting
parties. The cooperation can also extend to the signing of an agreement whereby
States engage in a more sophisticated relationship, such as a military operation or
joint law enforcement measures.
8.3.4.1 Bilateral Cooperation
In terms of bilateral relations, States can offer different kinds of cooperation, ranging
from basic information sharing to more intense cooperation, such as joint tactical
operations. Furthermore, such cooperation can be undertaken in a number of
different areas, such as surveillance and reconnaissance.34
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8.3.4.2 Multilateral Cooperation
Another way of establishing MSP is through multilateral relationships. This form of
cooperation is marked by the signing of an agreement by more than two States. The
agreement typically contains different forms of commitments and partnership
arrangements, as agreed by the contracting States. Like bilateral relationships,
multilateral agreements may range from basic information sharing to a specific joint
operation. Therefore, in certain circumstances, MSP may contain more ambitious
agendas.35
Many of these agreements have been produced by international organisations,
and therefore the stated obligations apply to all members of the organisation. The
agreement may take the form of a protocol, treaty or convention, with the provisions
generally being in accordance with prevailing international law. Various multilateral
frameworks have been produced by Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Interpol
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). States have also agreed to
multilateral arrangements which, in principle, focus on issues related to maritime
safety and security. One such agreement is the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).36 This arrangement provides standards for the
identification of ships with 300 GT or more as stipulated in the Automatic
Identification System (AIS) and Long-range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)
regulations.37 On the other hand, multilateral organisations may create non-binding
or informal agreements. Although these types of arrangements are not prescriptive,
35
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they are usually welcomed by states because they contain norms which are widely
accepted.38
Compared to bilateral agreements, multilateral agreements are far more
challenging to set up, requiring the acceptance of all parties in order to be effective.39
However, once established, they tend to attract greater legitimacy, as they are more
inclusive. This accords with the main aim of MSP – to foster cooperation and trust
between States. From a broad perspective, States which are linked to one another
through MSP benefit the global security network. This is because the network
enables States to share their information in accordance with agreed multilateral
agreements. In addition, the network encourages States to engage closely with one
another and to form comprehensive partnerships, thus benefitting all contracting
parties.
8.3.5

Maritime Security Partnership in Practice

MSP could be implemented at different levels, such as through local, regional or
global schemes, depending upon the issues involved and the depth of the agreement.
Local agreements usually involve two to three States which are
geographically close to each other. An example of one such arrangement is an illegal
fishing agreement. These agreements typically consist of provisions regarding
mutual rights to arrest citizens of other contracting States, as well as rights relating to
the prosecution of offenders. Importantly, contracting States are able to determine the
applicability of the agreement in light of their own unique circumstances. Regional
agreements represent a wider arrangement, with states in a specific area seeking to
address common dilemmas. This mutual concern for matters affecting their security
38
39
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serves as the basis for the cooperative strategy, and is usually harnessed to prevent
and solve security issues in the region. The best time to implement these types of
schemes is when all relevant parties have a high degree of interest in addressing the
prevailing issues. Indeed, at this point there would likely be overwhelming support to
implement the provisions of the contemplated agreement. This type of arrangement
is popular in Southeast Asia, with ASEAN playing a pivotal role in addressing the
common concerns of its ten member States.
Global agreements are the most expansive cooperative schemes, bringing
together not only groups of States but also third party actors, such as nongovernmental organisations and commercial stakeholders, to address a variety of
security issues.40
There are several different approaches towards regional maritime
cooperation. They include the top-down approach (which has been suggested by
stakeholders outside the region), and the bottom-up approach (which has been
proposed by States within the region and has become the preferred model among
members).41 Both these approaches seek to shape the regional maritime security
landscape based on their respective agendas, as well as create a regional maritime
security regime which prioritises the interests of States.
Although a variety of definitions have been proffered for the term
“international regimes”, the author has selected one which focuses on “regulated
patterns of practice on which expectations converge [to] govern State behaviour in
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specific areas of international relations”.42 Currently, there are several maritime
regimes regulating fishing, the protection of marine resources, as well as shipping.
However, the most comprehensive and globally accepted maritime regime is the
LOSC. In Southeast Asia, this convention is highly significant as it forms the basis of
cooperation for a range of maritime activities. Not only does the convention govern
the rights of States, it also sets out the obligations of foreign States conducting
activities in other States’ jurisdictions.
As maritime security is a common concern in the region, the prospect of
maritime regime suites the needs of most Southeast Asian States.43 However, despite
a plethora of meetings and conferences designed to build trust and foster
understanding of the importance of regime building, regional states have remained
silent on the issue, preferring to maintain the status quo.44 However, the idea of
regime building will remain significant, especially to extra-regional players such as
the United States and Japan.
8.3.5.1.1 The Top-Down Approach
The political situation in Southeast Asia is not only influenced by regional players,
but also extra-regional actors who have an interest in the region and therefore
contribute to the Southeast Asian political landscape.45 While some regional States
welcome input from extra-regional actors, other States remain critical of such
‘external’ involvement, openly rejecting any proposals put forward by these
42
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stakeholders.46 One prominent example of this scenario is Japan’s Ocean
Peacekeeping Force.47 This government supported initiative sought to increase
cooperation between Japan and littoral States in Southeast Asia. The idea was
proposed in 1999 during the ASEAN Plus Three Summit and involved Japan, South
Korea and China. The main aim of the initiative was to form a regional coast guard
with a view to eradicating piratical attacks in the region. However, China did not
agree with a key aspect of the proposal – namely, multilateral patrols composed of
forces from Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and China. Indeed, the proposal
was viewed by the Chinese government as a way for Japan to expand its security
influence in the East Asia region.
Acknowledging the sensitivity of some States to joint patrols, but not wanting
to cease their engagement in the region, Japan proposed a more flexible initiative that
would garner the support of all relevant States - ReCAAP.48 Under ReCAAP, as
noted by Rahman members are encouraged to voluntarily share information with
contracting parties.49 Furthermore, the funding of the institution is conducted on a
voluntary basis. However, what the above discussion makes clear is that when extraregional players attempt to lead cooperative strategies, they inevitably face
challenges from the other extra-regional players who are seeking to exert their own
leadership prowess in the area.
Sovereignty issues pose another barrier to the involvement of extra-regional
players. A prime example of this is the 2004 Regional Maritime Security Initiative
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(RMSI) which was proposed by the US. The aim of this initiative was to serve as a
platform for information sharing between regional States, as well as to give early
warnings of transitional threats.50 Importantly, the initiative was designed to be
neutral and function as a platform for multilateral maritime security cooperation.
However, despite its grand agenda, the RMSI was rejected by a majority of regional
States due to a series of misunderstandings and mixed messages as to its aims.
Indeed, there were conflicting media reports over the suggestion of the US Pacific
Command (USPACOM), under the leadership of Admiral Thomas Fargo, that US
forces conduct patrols in the Malacca Strait.51 Furthermore, testimony presented to
the US Congress indicated that such patrols would be conducted by American
Special Forces and Marines using high speed vessels. Although the US did not
confirm the media reports, Indonesia and Malaysia perceived the contemplated
patrols as a breach of their sovereignty and immediately rejected the idea.52 As a
result, the RMSI was not able to be implemented in the region and the US had to
withdraw the proposed initiative.
It is unlikely that a different result would have been achieved had the
misunderstanding not occurred.53 This is because the implementation of the RMSI
would have undoubtedly given the US a leadership position in the region – one
which it could easily have used to develop even greater cooperative strategies. In
light of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the prospect of giving the US an integral
role in guiding and developing local plans and strategies was difficult for regional
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States to accept. Furthermore, other extra-regional players such as China were
opposed to the US taking the lead in one of the most important regions in the world.
However, China remained silent on this particular issue, realising that regional States
would reject the US-led initiative on the basis that it would breach their
sovereignty.54
Its goal is to build regional capacity to address a range of maritime challenges
– including China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea – through various
means such as improving regional maritime domain awareness, expanding exercises,
and leveraging senior-level engagements.
More recently the United States has introduced the Southeast Asia Maritime
Security Initiative (MSI)55, which actually appears as the “South China Sea
Initiative” in U.S. legislation. It authorizes funds for assistance and training for the
purpose of increasing maritime security and maritime domain awareness of the South
China Sea littoral States – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and
Vietnam. Specifically authorized elements of assistance for these countries include
equipment, supplies, training and small-scale military construction. The authorization
also includes additional “covered countries” – Brunei, Taiwan and Singapore –
which may participate in training and other activities.
Another US-based proposal which has not been very popular in the region is
the Proliferation Security Initiative. This initiative seeks to prevent the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- an issue of concern for the US in the wake
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of the September 11 terrorist attacks. In order to implement the PSI statement of the
Interdiction Principle as discussed in Chapter 4, the initiative requires partnership by
as many States as possible in the region, as only flag States have the right to stop and
inspect vessels on the high seas, or coastal or port states in their territory under
limited circumstances.56 The PSI remains open to any State willing to join, and
therefore the PSI has participants rather than members. The PSI is not considered an
organisation per se, but rather an activity which seeks to engage as many States as
possible to enter into non-binding arrangements. Furthermore, States are not required
to conduct activities which conflict with their national interests. The activities of the
PSI may include inspecting vessels which are suspected of carrying WMD, as well as
providing consent for suspect vessels that are registered with a participating State to
be searched and inspected. Furthermore, the PSI is in keeping with the 2004 UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 154057 which, in principle, urges States to
take measures to oppose and prevent proliferation of WMD.58
In order to develop and update the initiative, PSI partners have made several
efforts to strengthen the initiative, including to review progress made since the 2013
High-Level Political Meeting (HLPM) and future measure that need to be taken
before the 15th anniversary of the PSI in 2018; conduct workshops and exercises in
order to promote PSI activities; highlight the growing importance of preventing
proliferation financing; and conduct capacity building activities. 59.
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Despite the impressive goals of the PSI, the initiative was not well received in
Southeast Asia. Indeed, only Singapore and Malaysia responded favourably to the
idea. Within Asian generally, Japan was the only country to show support for the
initiative. With regard to Malaysia, it is important to note that although the State’s
commitment to non-proliferation was expressed before the UN General Assembly,
Malaysia also stressed the need for multilateral arrangements which are universal,
comprehensive and non-discriminatory.60 The Malaysian perspective suggests a
desire to avoid American hegemony in the region,61 as well as a need to prevent the
rise of unilateralism instead of negotiation and multilateral consultations.62
Concerns have also been raised over the legal ramifications of
implementing the PSI. Several States have expressed concern that the PSI would
enable the US to implement its security strategy abroad – a strategy that allow preemptive action to be taken against WMD threats in certain circumstances. Indeed,
such action could be viewed as a breach of international law. China clearly stated
in 2005 that it would not join the PSI due to legal concerns. A similar stance was
taken by the Indonesian government when it received a request from the US
Secretary of State to join the initiative. One of the reasons the Indonesian
government declined the proposal was that the implementation of the PSI might
violate the LOSC.63
From the various regimes discussed above (ReCAAP, RMSI and PSI),
there are several conclusions that can be drawn. First, extra-regional powers that
attempt to exert their leadership prowess in Southeast Asia are unlikely to gain a
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foothold, if only because other, extra-regional powers will likely prevent them
from doing so. Indeed, China’s reaction towards the posturing of the US and Japan
clearly demonstrates that some States will not tolerate external interference in the
region. Furthermore, the strong economic relations which China has with several
Southeast Asian countries mean that the leadership aspirations of other third-party
States are unlikely to be realised. Thus, this situation favours several States in the
region which do not wish to be aligned with a particular extra-regional actor.
Evidently, the notion of regime building by extra-regional States is viewed
as a breach of national sovereignty by regional States. Similarly, alleged plans by
some external actors to conduct maritime operations within Southeast Asian
territorial waters have caused sovereignty concerns in the area. Indeed, this
explains why several States have been reluctant to join patrol operations at the
behest of extra-regional powers. States in the region remain confident that
controlling their own maritime areas is the best way to avoid interference with
their sovereignty. Furthermore, Indonesia, by virtue of being the largest
archipelagic State in the world and the fourth most populous country, is the
leading ASEAN power. Therefore, its influence in keeping the area free from
external leadership has been well acknowledged by external powers.
Another factor militating against ‘regime building’ by external powers is
that regional States are quite content to maintain the status quo based on prevailing
international law principles. Indeed, these States would probably only consider
changing from their current regime if there were substantial changes to
international law. One of the consequences for States engaging in maritime
security cooperation with extra-regional players is the concomitant sacrifice of
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their political freedom. Regional States might be prepared to shoulder this burden
if the upshot of such cooperation was the maintenance of State security or the
provision of an enhanced sense of security. However, it could be argued that the
prevailing security issues in the region are not compelling enough for a majority of
Southeast Asian States to cooperate with external powers at the risk of
relinquishing their autonomy and political freedom.64
8.3.5.1.2 The Bottom-Up Approach
Considering that ‘regime building’ by extra-regional powers is unlikely to occur,
another option is for the necessary cooperation to be forged through a range of
mechanisms which are formulated by regional States themselves.
Indeed, cooperative strategies such as information sharing and coordinated
patrols have existed in the region for some time, with States assisting each other to
maintain maritime security without any third-party intervention. Therefore, there
are both multilateral and bilateral ties among regional States with regard to various
operations, including coordinated antipiracy patrols and personnel exchanges.
These ties derive from the region itself, and unlike initiatives proposed by external
actors, represent the preferred means of maintaining maritime security in
Southeast Asia. However, there are initiatives in place which have been introduced
by extra-regional powers, such as the Japan initiated ReCAAP agreement. Even
so, Indonesia and Malaysia have declined to join.
Multilateral cooperation in the region was first implemented by means of
the Malacca Strait Patrols. This initiative involved Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore, and was initially established to conduct coordinated patrols around the
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Malacca Strait. However, the scope of the Malacca Strait Patrols was later
restricted, with the patrols being implemented by only three littoral States. These
restrictions were imposed to avoid any sovereignty issues that might arise. The
Coordinated Patrols were established in mid-2004.65 What makes these patrols
unique is that each participating State is only allowed to conduct patrols within
their own territorial sea. Also, the scheme does not allow the littoral States from
engaging in hot pursuit in other States’ territorial waters, and therefore
coordination between States is necessary into order to make this initiative
effective.
The following year, contracting States initiated an aerial patrol operation
named Eyes in the Sky (EiS).66 This adjunct to the Malacca Strait Patrol allows
member States to conduct air patrols over each other’s territorial sea. This is
permitted due to the fact that the strait is quite narrow and can only be effectively
controlled if enhanced surveillance is carried out. However, to ensure that the
operation does not infringe on the sovereignty of States, officers are prevented
from carrying weapons on board, and a foreign liaison is also present to ensure
that the operation is undertaken in the due and proper way.67
Fortunately, neither the Malacca Strait Patrols nor the EiS initiative has
created tension among contracting parties, with both programs being generally
well received. Moreover, the programs do not violate international law, as member
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states voluntarily agree to conduct such operations. Importantly, the restrictions
which have been placed upon the maritime patrols and aerial surveillance
operations ensure that the sovereignty concerns of states are assuaged.68
Under ReCAAP, several forms of cooperation are conducted among
member States, such as information sharing, extradition, legal assistance and
capacity building. ReCAAP also has an Information Sharing Centre69 (ISC) which
is located in Singapore. ReCAAP is considered a breakthrough in multilateral
arrangements in Southeast Asia.70 As mentioned earlier, ReCAAP is able to
strategically engage extra-regional powers to conduct multilateral exercises.
However, the main reason for the program’s success has been its emphasis on
neutrality and sense of inclusiveness, particularly among Asian States. However,
Malaysia and Indonesia are yet to ratify the initiative. Malaysia objected the
location of ReCAAP ISC in Singapore,71 while Indonesia has sovereignty
concerns regarding the presence of ReCAAP.72
8.4

Proposed Solutions to Address Maritime Security Threats in Southeast
Asia

This section will discuss proposed solutions for the Southeast Asian States to address
maritime security threats at the regional level. The discussion will include regional
cooperation enhancement, maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia, maximising
maritime security cooperation, equitable maritime security partnership, regime
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formation in Southeast Asia’s maritime sphere, and securing Southeast Asia’s
maritime environment.
8.4.1

Regional Cooperation Enhancement

Maritime security cooperation is influenced by structural, normative and economic
changes to the regional system in Southeast Asia.73 There are a variety of factors that
could lead to a greater cooperative engagement in the region. According to Bradford,
these factors can include reduction of sovereignty sensitivities, potential involvement
of extra-regional players; cooperation norms enhancement, development of necessary
state resources, recognition of the importance of maritime security, and protecting
Southeast Asia’s maritime area.74
8.4.1.1 Reduction of Sovereignty Sensitivities
Sovereignty has been a sensitive issue among many Southeast Asian countries – one
which continues to prevail even today. Indeed, as most States in the region were once
colonised, and fear a return to their colonial past, they are eager to safeguard against
threats to their sovereignty. To this end, States in the region abide by the nonintervention principle – that is, States respect the domestic affairs of their neighbours
and eschew any interference.75 Therefore, maritime security cooperation is unlikely
to be successful if States perceive any interference with their domestic affairs.76
Even though this sensitivity is still prevalent in contemporary society, there
are several areas where States tend to be more relaxed in their cooperative
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exchanges, with one of these areas being maritime issues. A prominent example of
maritime cooperation amidst sovereignty incursions can be seen in Singapore and
Malaysia’s compliance with post 9/11 IMO and US security standards. Both States
allowed the stationing of US authorities in their respective ports, even though
according to Bradford such action would have been viewed as highly suspicious in
different circumstances.77
8.4.1.2 Potential Involvement of Extra-Regional Players
Historically, certain Southeast Asian States have been reluctant to cooperate with
extra-regional powers. However, States including Japan, the US, Australia, India and
China have repeatedly approached Southeast Asian nations with a view to
developing mutually beneficial security agendas. As previously mentioned, several
proposals from extra-regional States have proved unpopular in the region, and
therefore could not be effectively implemented. These programs include the RMSI,
as well as Japan’s joint patrol initiative. However, despite these programs failing to
launch, extra-regional powers are still keen to cooperate with Southeast Asian States
to achieve greater security in what is undoubtedly a strategically important region of
the world.78
8.4.1.3 Cooperation Norms Enhancement
Cooperation between Southeast Asian States began to grow after the Cold War
period. Before this time, States were very reluctant to engage in cooperative
arrangements due to nationalistic tendencies and earlier conflicts that had occurred.
Fortunately, Southeast Asian States now acknowledge that cooperative strategies
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(and particularly maritime security partnerships), are vitally important to keep their
respective maritime areas (and the region as a whole) safe and secure. There are
various maritime dialogues which have been established and are still operating today,
including the ARF Maritime Focus Group, the South China Sea Workshop, Maritime
Cooperation Working Group (CSCAP-MCWG), ReCAAP and the APEC Working
Group on Maritime Security.
Although the non-intervention principle is still regarded as important among
ASEAN States, the above-mentioned maritime dialogues and negotiations elicit one
clear response: in certain areas States are willing to communicate and share
information to achieve a greater sense of security and safety in the region.79
Furthermore, these dialogues are important in fostering trust and confidence among
regional States - qualities which are essential for a firm and robust cooperative
platform. If this engagement is maintained, Southeast Asia may well be on its way to
establishing the same type of maritime security cooperation enjoyed by other
developed nations around the world.
8.4.1.4 Development in Fulfilling Necessary State Resources
Limited resources are another factor that forms a barrier to maritime security
cooperation in Southeast Asia. Indeed, several States in the region are still facing
economic challenges, and thus their main focus is on stimulating economic growth.
Also significant is the disproportionate number of sea patrols compared to land
patrols. Most States prefer to safeguard their land territory, with their maritime areas
being a secondary consideration. At the same time, they are unlikely to engage in
international cooperation for fear that other States may exert undue influence over
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them.80 However, it is important to note that States such as Singapore and Brunei are
economically equipped to unilaterally implement maritime patrols.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis prompted States to prioritise economic
growth rather than develop their maritime capabilities.81 However, as economic
conditions in the region improved, States were able to enhance and extend their
maritime capabilities. In particular, new maritime opportunities arose for States
including Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, such as the purchase of
state-of-the-art naval ships and, in the case of Malaysia, the establishment of a coast
guard force. If this trend continues, Southeast Asia States may be able to keep their
territories safe and cooperate with extra-regional maritime powers (such as the US
and China), to create an enhanced maritime security platform. However, these
positive developments do not obviate the economic challenges facing the region.
Indeed, States with large maritime areas (such as Indonesia), must have sufficient
resources to compensate for smaller nations which have less expansive sea territories
and limited economic capabilities. Nonetheless, States in the region are showing
increased optimism - something which will hopefully result in improved maritime
security cooperation in the near future.82
8.4.1.5 Recognition of the Importance of Maritime Security
Historically, traditional military threats have been prioritised over and above the
types of maritime security threats analysed in this thesis. This view has been
acknowledged by Southeast Asian States with large maritime areas such as Indonesia
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and the Philippines whose primary security concern for most of their post-colonial
existence has been domestic stability. However, after the Cold War period, regional
States became cognisant of the growing importance of maritime security, making it a
State priority. One of the reasons for this shift has undoubtedly been the increased
frequency of maritime crime - both on a regional scale and a global scale. Most
Southeast Asia States thus have paid closer attention to maritime security threats than
in times gone by.
8.4.1.6 Protecting Southeast Asia’s Maritime Area
As criminal syndicates operate in more than one country, multilateral cooperation is
needed to eradicate transnational crimes such as piracy, maritime terrorism, people
smuggling, IUU fishing and marine pollution.83
During the Cold War period, cooperation was lacking between States in
Southeast Asia due to the separation between pro-communist and non-communist
States. However, after the Cold War ended, talks began between pro-communist
States such as Laos and Vietnam, and other states in the region, and eventually new
possibilities for security cooperation opened up. In 1992, maritime security
arrangements at both the bilateral and multilateral level were formally discussed.
Perhaps the most important regional organisation insofar as maritime security
cooperation is concerned is ASEAN. Indeed, in 2003, ASEAN played a significant
role in bringing together like-minded states to create a security community which,
through open dialogue and cooperative action, would later give attention to
combating transnational crimes such as piracy and maritime terrorism.84
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Despite its visionary security goals, ASEAN’s policies are limited by the
principle of non-intervention, whereby States eschew interference with other States
domestic affairs.
8.4.2

Maximising Maritime Security Cooperation

Maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia began to develop in the post-Cold
War era.85 However, since this time different threats to maritime security have arisen
– threats which have capacity to severely impact the lives of people, many of whom
are already vulnerable due to their socio-economic conditions and geographic
location. States in the region are also facing economic, legal and structural
challenges which are proving advantageous in fostering maritime security
cooperation in Southeast Asia. Regardless of these developments, there are barriers
to enhancing maritime security cooperation. Distrust between some States is still
high, and concerns over sovereignty and territoriality still abound.
Even so, greater maritime security cooperation in the region is seen as a
priority, and could serve to diffuse some of the intense distrust between States.
Indeed, Southeast Asian States have made maritime security cooperation one of their
goals to ensure the safety of their territory and the region as a whole. Even though
bilateral ties represent a more feasible way of achieving this cooperation as opposed
to forming new multilateral frameworks, existing regional organisations could be
used as a platform to foster regional maritime security cooperation.86
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8.4.3

Equitable Maritime Security Partnership

It is a misconception that extra-regional States are not welcome to join maritime
security cooperative strategies in Southeast Asia. ReCAAP is clear evidence that
proposals from non-Southeast Asian States are accepted by most States in the
region. However, when compared to other multilateral arrangements devised and
implemented by regional States, third party initiatives are bound by certain
restrictions that have the capacity to affect their chances of success.87
Despite the open-mindedness of Southeast Asian States to maritime
security initiatives proposed by extra-regional powers, the sovereign concerns of
regional States must be taken into consideration. For this reason, the most
successful initiatives tend to be those which are not politicised or narrowly framed.
The ‘bottom-up’ approach is certainly preferred to the ‘top-down’ approach, as it
allows operational cooperation to build incrementally and does not breach the
sovereignty of States.
ReCAAP has been successful because it is viewed as a neutral initiative
which welcomes other extra-regional powers. Also, due to its limited scope, it
serves mainly as an information sharing platform, with provision having been
made for non-military assistance where required. Therefore, in order to strengthen
the regional maritime security regime, extra-regional States could take several
measures, including:
1. Brainstorming ideas related to regime-building through international
multilateral forums. Viable forums which could be used to develop these ideas
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include the Shangri-La Dialogue88 (which is held annually in Singapore and is
attended by defence ministers).89
2. Offering support to prevailing initiatives such as ReCAAP. Other States which
are interested in becoming involved in regime-building could seek inclusion in
existing maritime security initiatives. After becoming a member, these States
could suggest ideas to strengthen regional security measures.
3. Engaging regional States by proposing capacity building activities. This would
promote confidence and increase understanding between States. Extra-regional
powers could send their experts to regional States to offer training programs
and lead various security initiatives. Indeed, technical assistance is required by
several States in the region, as often budgetary constraints do not allow these
states to promote maritime security arrangements. A measure fitting this
description was implemented by Japan in 2006, when it donated a training ship
to Malaysia through the Nippon Foundation.90
Another way of building trust is through the provision of humanitarian
assistance. An example of this occurred in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami which decimated several coastal areas, including the city of Aceh in
Indonesia. Both the US and Japan (among other countries) provided significant
financial and non-financial aid to Indonesia, resulting in tremendous goodwill
being established between the countries concerned.91
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4. Extra-regional States could also assist with regional capacity building by
contributing ideas to international organisations. Indeed, both the UN and the
IMO could produce legal instruments, the provisions of which could be
effectively implemented not only by regional States in Southeast Asia, but by
contracting parties all around the world. Therefore, if a State would like to
propose an ambitious agenda to be implemented in the region, creating new
frameworks through highly-regarded international organisations might be a
supportive suggestion.92
5. Several sub-regions are in particular need of maritime security partnerships,
such as the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas tri-border area, Gulf of Thailand, Andaman Sea
and Bay of Bengal. These areas are prone to maritime security threats
discussed in this thesis and thus require coordinated measures among the subregional States in order to mitigate threats and exert good order at sea. The
Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal, however, need the involvement of extraregional States such as India and Bangladesh because of their location.
Regional and sub-regional measures such as ReCAAP and Malacca Strait
Patrols, respectively, are prominent examples of the types of maritime security
partnerships that could be adopted by the States where such measures are
currently absent.
8.5

Challenges Ahead

Cooperation among Southeast Asian states has shown signs of positive progress.
With various regional initiatives in place, it would appear that the stage is set for
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even more regional agreements to be struck in the future.93 Moreover cooperative
efforts combined with capacity building support have also been the main reasons for
the improved maritime security situation in Southeast Asia.94 Nonetheless, more
work is needed to ensure the development is progressing and that cooperation is
increasing. As maritime security incidents continue to occur with increasing
frequency in the region, States are encouraged to maintain existing ties and develop
more robust and comprehensive cooperative platforms.
Both international as well as regional frameworks are in place to address the
maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. However, these frameworks are
inadequate to eradicate the problem comprehensively. Maritime security incidents
still prevail and thus regional States are encouraged to maintain prevailing
frameworks and explore prospects for new initiatives that enable greater security in
the region, especially in the maritime space.95
It is clear that in order to adequately address and eliminate maritime security
threats in the region both regional and international cooperation is required. Maritime
security threats in Southeast Asia are transnational in nature and therefore it is almost
impossible for States to unilaterally address such threats. Thus, cooperation among
regional States is essential. However, it should be noted that sovereignty concerns
are still prevalent in the region, and therefore extra-regional powers should approach
the needs and preferences of littoral States with a degree of understanding and
sensitivity. Only by acknowledging this will regional and extra-regional States be
able to work together to strengthen the maritime security regime in the region.
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8.6

Conclusion

There are different ways of combating maritime security threats in Southeast Asia.
This thesis proposes Maritime Security Partnership as one of the solutions to address
the problem. MSP encourages States to cooperate in order to be informed about
each-others’ security situations. It focuses on information sharing and capacity
building. Improved acquisition, sharing and analysis of information are thus
necessary in formulating an effective solution in addressing the maritime security
problems. As stated earlier, in order to gain popularity and acceptance by regional
States, MSP must be able to demonstrate benefits and s operational level cooperative
solutions, particularly in those circumstances where legal instruments are not in place
or poorly endorsed. Furthermore, in order MSP to be accepted in Southeast Asia,
States could seal their commitments in a binding document which portrays the intent
of States to resolve problems using MSP.
This thesis also proposes a solution which could be taken at the regional level
that would enable greater cooperative engagement among the Southeast Asian States.
The factors that enable greater cooperation, as extensively discussed in this chapter,
include the reduction of sovereignty sensitivities, the potential involvement of extraregional players, enhancement of cooperation norms, the development in fulfilling
necessary State resources, the recognition of the importance of maritime security,
and protecting Southeast Asia’s maritime area. Improved maritime security
cooperation may potentially reduce sovereignty sensitivities, because the issues of
maritime security cannot be addressed by the solo attempts of a single State.
Therefore, establishing multilateral treaties, determined cross-border cooperation,
and less formal forms of cooperation can be pursued by Southeast Asian countries as
ways to reduce sovereignty issues.
379

Southeast Asian States can accept involvement of extra-regional players by
establishing a neutral multinational framework with them. Sharing ideas and building
understanding through multilateral forums can also create an acceptance of
involvement of extra-regional powers,. If states in the region take into account these
factors, then differences between States would not be a barrier to establish
meaningful cooperative arrangements and partnership would be enhanced. As a
result, the potential for new or enhanced regional initiatives to address prevailing
maritime security threats will become more likely, making a tangible improvement in
Southeast Asia’s regional security.
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